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Abstract  
This thesis discusses the emergence of ethnic, or indigenous, parties in Bolivia and Peru. More 
specifically, it seeks to explain why Bolivia has seen the emergence of indigenous-based political 
parties at the national level, while similar parties have so far only been successful at the local and 
regional levels in neighbouring Peru. The two cases share a number of attributes – most notably, both 
countries are Andean and they have large indigenous populations – but, significantly, differ on the 
dependent variable, emergence of indigenous parties. 
Using social movement theory and theory linking parties and social movements, this thesis tries to 
unite three differing focuses, or approaches, to explain the variation on the dependent variable. First, 
the “framing processes” approach focuses on the symbolic aspects of collective action, and 
development of indigenous-based discourses and their relations with other discourses, most relevantly 
here, the anti-neoliberal discourse. Second, the “mobilising structures” approach focuses more 
specifically on the organisational infrastructure of indigenous movements, while third, the “political 
opportunity” approach focuses on how political and institutional factors external to the social 
movements may encourage, or hinder, the development of indigenous parties. 
With this theoretical starting point, the thesis develops a model adapted to the Latin American context 
to explain the emergence of indigenous parties. The main variables that best explain the different 
development in the two cases are the following: First, in Bolivia, the ethnic discourse has prevailed 
within the indigenous movement, while, in Peru, the class-based discourse has been dominant. Second, 
the connection between indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourse has been highly successful in Bolivia 
implying the broadening of affiliates of the indigenous organisations as well as the broadening of the 
electorate for indigenous parties. Third, the higher territorial concentration of indigenous peoples in 
Bolivia, the fostering of a strong indigenous identity, and the ability of Bolivian indigenous 
movements to create alliances both with other indigenous organisations as well as with urban 
movements meant that it was easier for indigenous-based parties to succeed in Bolivia. In Peru, the 
large distances, the weakening of indigenous identities due to migration and assimilation, and the 
Peruvian movements’ failure to create lasting alliances, meant that it was less likely to see the 
development of indigenous parties. Fourth, organising and mobilising was made much more difficult 
in the Peruvian case due to the combined pressures of the Shining Path guerrilla movement and 
subsequent repression from the state’s military apparatus. Additionally, the softer party registration 
requirements in Bolivia as well as a successful and a significant decentralisation reform were 
important for the possibilities of new parties to emerge, making the formation and success of 
indigenous parties more likely. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
In December 2005, Evo Morales Ayma was elected the first indigenous president in Bolivia 
backed by the indigenous-mobilising party Movement toward Socialism (MAS) with an 
overwhelming 54 percent of the vote. On the day of his inauguration at the end of January 
2006, the Plaza Murillo in La Paz was covered with wiphalas1 and people celebrating the 
indigenous peoples’ long-awaited political victory. Six months later, in July 2006, the 
Peruvian indigenous Congress- women Maria Sumire and Hilaria Supe, who were elected 
from non-indigenous parties2, were denied to speak in their mother tongue Quechua at the 
Congress’ inauguration ceremony. These examples serve as illustrations of the different 
developments of indigenous political participation and representation in Bolivia and Peru 
since the transitions to democracy in 1982 and 19783
The principal question asked in this thesis is thus: Why has Bolivia experienced significant 
indigenous parties at the national level, whereas Peru to this date has no parallel experience?  
, respectively. The emergence of 
successful indigenous parties in Bolivia since the mid- 1990s, and the lack of the same in 
Peru, is curious given the fact the large indigenous populations in neither country were 
properly represented by existing political parties nor had launched their own parties at the 
times of the transitions to democracy around three decades ago.  
1.1 Why study indigenous parties in Latin America? 
One of the most enduring questions in political science is how social cleavages and collective 
interests are translated into party systems (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).  However, in most Latin 
American countries, the quality of representation secured through parties is poor. Many 
parties lack linkages to society, and many social cleavages are under-represented or poorly 
represented by parties (Roberts 2001:17). The assumption in the literature on social cleavages 
and political parties4
                                                 
1 The wiphala is the flag representing the indigenous peoples in the Central Andes.   
 which states that ethnic cleavages are among those that most likely will 
2 Supe and Sumire were both elected from the highland region of Cusco on the Partido Nacionalista 
Peruno/Unión por Perú-list. 
3 In the case of Peru, one speaks of two transitions. The first was in 1978, whereas the second transition took 
place in 2000, when authoritarian president Alberto Fujimori lost power.  
4 The definition of a party in this thesis is equivalent to the minimalist definition of Giovanni Sartori (1976:63): 
“Any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through 
elections (free or non-free), candidates for public office".  
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generate political parties in multi-ethnic societies (Harmel and Robertson 1985; Horowitz 
1985), has not been a valid one for the Latin American multi-ethnic societies. In Latin 
America, the indigenous population constitutes approximately forty million people, and in 
countries like Guatemala, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru they form majorities or large minorities 
(Brysk 2000). Yet, until the 1990s5, there were very few examples of Latin American political 
parties organised on the basis of an indigenous identity (Van Cott 2005), in spite of the 
politicisation of ethnicity in the region since the 1970s (Yashar 2005). During the most part of 
the 20th century, it was rather class, party, religious or revolutionary identities that served as 
the basis for political mobilisation of the region’s  indigenous peoples (Yashar 1998:23). The 
prolonged lack of ethnic parties in Latin America is peculiar given the large indigenous 
population, and because ethnic movements have a long tradition of mobilising and creating 
parties in Africa, Asia, and parts of Europe (Yashar 2005:3). This deviation has led to Latin 
America being neglected in the literature on ethnic politics and political parties (Rice and Van 
Cott 2006:711). Rather, political comparativists working on Latin America have to a large 
degree focused on the weak representativity of the existent political parties, and the weak 
institutionalisation of the region’s party systems6
A peculiar characteristic of the new indigenous parties in Latin America is that they all have 
originated in indigenous social movement organisations (SMOs) (Van Cott 2005). The 
decision of indigenous SMOs to form parties is an innovation in Latin America, where 
historically it has been more common to see political parties forming SMOs. Traditionally, 
political parties and leftist movements formed dependent peasant organisations in order to co-
opt and control indigenous voters and rural workers. The nature and scope of these 
organisations, changed in the 1960s and 1970s, however (Yashar 2005). Many organisations 
that had been subordinated to political parties, labour unions, and the Church asserted their 
autonomy, and independent indigenous organisations were formed. They were defending 
cultural and ethnic rights in opposition to the limited set of socioeconomic claims that the left 
promoted (Van Cott 2005). A large body of empirical work has analysed the emergence of 
.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
5 Prior to the 1990s, smaller parties organised around ethnic identity existed, but they did not achieve enduring 
electoral success and had little impact on the party system (Stavenhagen 1992:434). 
6 See for example: (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Coppedge 1999; Mainwaring, Bejano et al. 2006) 
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indigenous movements in the region which occurred particularly in the 1980s and 1990s7
1.1.1 Why focus on Bolivia and Peru? 
. 
However, the literature on ethnic politics in Latin America has not sufficiently explained why 
some of these movements have transformed themselves into parties or achieved electoral 
success (Madrid 2008:476). 
The interest in focusing on Bolivia and Peru stems from the very different trajectories of 
indigenous participation in the two countries. In terms of electoral participation, Bolivia is a 
highly successful case, whilst Peru is widely considered a deviant case (Van Cott 2005; Martí 
i Puig 2008). Moreover, in Peru, indigenous mobilisation in general has been characterised as 
“marginal” (Albó 1991), “largely non-existent” (Yashar 1998), and “a profound failure” 
(Mayer, cited in Yashar 1998). This thesis, however, does not subscribe to the established 
truth that Peruvian indigenous peoples do not mobilise on the basis of indigenous identities. 
Particularly since the turn of the millennium, a politicisation of indigenous identities has 
given rise to movements and a few parties that identify as indigenous and include ethnic 
demands on their political agendas (Pajuelo Teves 2005; Albó 2008a). However, there are still 
no indigenous parties at the national level in Peru, as compared to Bolivia and other countries 
in the region8
1.1.2 Theoretical starting point 
.  
To be able to understand why successful indigenous parties have emerged at a national level 
in Bolivia, whereas parties based on indigenous identities have only appeared at the local and 
regional levels in Peru, this thesis makes use of insights from social movement theory and 
theory linking social movements and political parties. The reason behind this theoretical 
starting point is precisely the fact that all of the new successful indigenous parties in Latin 
America have been created by indigenous movements (Van Cott 2005). There are three main 
approaches within the social movement paradigm: 1) Framing processes, which focus on 
cultural dimensions of mobilisations; 2) mobilising structures, which treat the organisational 
infrastructure of the organisations; and 3) political opportunities which refers to political 
factors that are external to groups that may attempt to mobilise.  
This thesis merges these three theoretical approaches in a manner that to the author’s 
knowledge has only been carried out by Martí i Puig (2008) in the Latin American context. 
                                                 
7 See for example Albó (1991; 2008a); Alvarez et al. (1998a); Lucero (2002); Jackson and Warren (2003; 2005); 
Van Cott (1994); Yashar (1998; 2005), and Postero and Zamosc (2004).  
8 Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela.  
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However, Martí y Puig makes use of a Boolean approach in the study of six Latin American 
countries, which does not allow for an in-depth analysis of each case. The political 
opportunity approach has to a large degree dominated the studies on Latin American social 
movements, whereas the resource mobilisation approach, also called mobilising structures, 
has been almost entirely ignored (Trejo 2000: 206).  
 1.1.3 Methodological considerations  
This thesis takes a qualitative approach to explain why Bolivia has experienced indigenous 
parties at the national level, whilst there is no parallel development in Peru. A main reason 
why a qualitative approach is considered to be the most appropriate to answer the research 
question, is because many of the concepts derived from social movement theory are difficult 
to apply within a quantitative study with a high degree of conceptual validity (Rice and Van 
Cott 2006). The applied methodological design is the Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD). 
MSSD is particularly suited for the comparison of cases that differ on the dependent variable, 
in this case the emergence of indigenous parties, but are similar regarding as many 
characteristics as possible, to be able to control for common characteristics. Even though the 
findings cannot be make generalised to broad populations, the aims of high internal validity 
and good historical explanations of particular cases” (George and Bennett 2005:22), have 
justified the methodological choice. Moreover, the approach is explorative and can be tested 
on other countries in the region with large indigenous populations.  
1.2 The dependent variable 
The dependent variable is emergence of indigenous parties. There are different 
understandings among scholars of how to define ethnicity and ethnic identification, a fact that 
accordingly has implications for the definition of ethnic mobilisation and ethnic parties, or in 
my case, the indigenous category. In order to define an ethnic party that is appropriate for and 
sensitive to the Latin American context, the following sections will present different 
theoretical approaches to ethnic identification, then turn to a brief discussion of how ethnicity 
in Latin America diverges from other parts of the world, before presenting the two cases’ 
value on the dependent variable.    
1.2.1 Different approaches to ethnic identification  
In ethnicity theory primordialism and instrumentalism are often treated as the two main 
opposing theoretical approaches, whereas the constructivist approach reconciles the 
contradictions between the first two. Primordialism refers to ethnic identities as “natural”, 
“ineffable” or primary (Tilley 1998:501). According to primordialists, individuals feel a 
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natural attachment to members of their own ethnic groups and these attachments are older 
than the nation-states (Calhoun 1997:31). The emergence of indigenous protest and 
organising is understood as a natural expression of integral ethnic identities  (Yashar 2005:9). 
According to Degregori (1993:116), a danger of this approach is the “exotification” of the 
ethnic “other” and a view of ethnicity as static. Furthermore, if one assumes that individuals 
have one single identity, one cannot explain why ethnic identities serve as a basis for political 
action  and mobilisation in some cases and not in others (Yashar 2005; Madrid 2008).  
On the other hand, instrumentalist approaches, also labelled rational choice analyses, argue 
that ethnic identity is the result of political mobilisation, and not a prerequisite or a motivation 
per se. Instead, instrumentalists stress the individual intentionality and its collective 
consequences. In other words, individuals are assumed to have fixed preferences, clear goals 
and act in a utility-maximising way (Yashar 2005:9-11). It is suggested that ethnic identity is 
not primary, as it may be changed according to particular interests (Lindblom 1993:9). In this 
perspective, the main question deals with how to maximise a particular goal rather than to 
discuss why ethnicity becomes politicised. 
However, work in ethnic politics over the past thirty years is leaning on the reconciling 
constructivist approach to ethnicity (see for example: Barth 1969/1998; Fearon and Laitin 
1996; Banton 1997). This approach recognises that ethnic mobilisation involves the 
construction of identities under changing circumstances. Constructivists do not take ethnic 
groups as given, natural entities, nor as the arrangement of political elites, as do the 
primordialist and instrumentalist approaches (Yashar 1998:29). Rather, it is assumed that 
individuals can construct or reconstitute their identities. Ethnic boundaries may shift, groups 
may combine or divide, and the same individuals may identify or be identified by others in 
multiple ways depending on the context of their interactions, their intellectual ethnic 
discourse, lived social experience, and individual choice (Gisselquist 2005; Yashar 2005). To 
make the point even clearer, a constructivist approach is most appropriate because “ethnic 
identities can best be understood as social constructs with deep cultural and psychological 
roots based on national, cultural-linguistic, racial, or religious backgrounds (Norris 2004:209). 
The constructivist approach presented this far can be considered part of the postmodernist 
paradigm (Yashar 1998; Trejo 2000). A second approach within the constructivist 
approximation to ethnicity is the analysis of game theory (Hardin 1995). This theory 
considers the formation of collective identities a coordination game in which a group of 
individuals with multiple identities decides to act collectively and frequently encounters an 
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identity dilemma (Trejo 2000:213). The next section will show why the constructivist 
approach is the best suited to the Latin America context.  
1.2.2 Ethnicity in Latin America 
Ethnic identification in Latin America is characterised by a lower level of polarisation 
compared to other regions of the world. In fact, Latin America is not even included9 in 
Donald L. Horowitz’ significant book “Ethnic Groups in Conflict” (1985) because class 
conflict is considered to be more prominent than ethnic cleavages. Also, levels of ethnic 
violence are comparatively very low in Latin America (Trejo 2000:230).  According to Raúl 
L. Madrid (2008:477) the class cleavage’s preponderance may be accounted for by the 
fluidity of ethnic identification in Latin America whereby people often identify with multiple, 
intersecting groups. Some of this fluidity may be connected to the process of assimilation with 
the goal of mestizaje10
A certain degree of conceptual confusion is present in the discussion of ethnic identities in 
Latin America, as numerous scholars juxtapose the concepts of “indigenous” and “ethnic”. 
The definition of “indigenous” applied in this thesis is broadly used by indigenous movements 
and international agreements: Indigenous peoples are the “descendants of the original 
inhabitants of a geographical region prior to colonization who have maintained some or all of 
 which has blurred the lines between different ethnic or racial groups. 
Also, corporatist regimes in the Andean countries imposed a peasant identification on the 
indigenous communities which prevailed for decades and blurred indigenous identities (Albó 
2008a). Another important explanatory factor for the less salient ethnic identification in Latin 
America is prejudice and discrimination. Those factors have led many individuals to identify 
with ethnic groups that are accorded higher social status (Madrid 2008:480). Moreover, ethnic 
conflicts in Latin America are not principally between groups, as in many Asian and African 
countries. Indigenous peoples have mobilised against the state rather than against mestizos 
(Trejo 2000:226). Another difference from African countries is that the indigenous 
populations in Latin America tend to be more dispersed and not concentrated to one 
administrative unit (Fearon and Laitin 1997). According to Trejo (2000:208), the culminations 
and declines of the waves of indigenous mobilisations throughout history clearly illustrates 
that the constructivist approach is the best suited to the Latin American context as identities 
appear and reappear in concordance with changing circumstances and interests.  
                                                 
9 With the exception of Guyana. 
10 Mestizaje is the process of national homegenisation, essentially the notion of racial and cultural mixture (Wade 
2005).  
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their linguistic, cultural and organizational characteristics. In addition, self-identification is a 
fundamental criterion to determine who is considered indigenous” (Deruyttere 1997:2). 
However, Rachel M. Gisselquist (2005) warns that such a juxtaposition of the concepts could 
be a dangerous manoeuvre in that it excludes other salient ethnic identities than the 
indigenous/ non-indigenous. One problem is that many theories about indigenous populations 
assume them to be small minorities, which is not the case in Bolivia, for example. Moreover, 
there are many ethnic cleavages that go beyond the indigenous/non-indigenous divide. For 
instance, the Afro-Latin communities that exist in a number of Latin American countries do 
not fit this categorisation. Moreover, Jackson and Warren (2005:557) argue that recent 
scholarship demonstrates why certain dichotomies and concepts that were conveniently 
employed in earlier analyses now hinder more than help. An example of such a dichotomy is 
precisely the hegemonic indigenous/non-indigenous division. “Indigenous” is a historical 
product of European colonialism that masks enormous variations in history, culture, 
community, and relations with those who are considered non- indigenous (Jackson and 
Warren 2003).  
Also, the concept of “Indian”, similarly to “indigenous”, is a concept that does not take into 
account the historical diversity of ethnic populations before the Spanish colonisation 
(Gisselquist 2005).  However, Jackson and Warren (2005:557) do not dismiss this dichotomy, 
but rather recommend a cautious approach that recognises that such dichotomies are complex, 
nuanced and inhibit dynamic meaning structures. Other overly simple dichotomies that have 
been applied to the Latin American context have been “authentic” vs. “inauthentic” and 
“modern” vs. “traditional”. These polarities play on a Western concept, “authentic” as 
opposed to fake, invented, new, modern, Western, etc. Both indigenous groups and their 
opponents use the “authenticity” card in their external and internal politics through which they 
claim that some groups are “no longer indigenous” because of their “untraditional behaviour” 
(Turner 2002) (Turner 2002). A last point to be made is that the indigenous organisations and 
parties have different preferences as to which term they use to define themselves. While 
“indigenous” seems to be the preferred term when referring to the original inhabitants of Latin 
America, some indigenous movements also refer to themselves as “Indian” or “native” 
movements (Albó 1991:301).  
The definition of ethnic identity and ethnic parties in the remainder of this thesis is equivalent 
to “indigenous” identity and “indigenous” parties, unless interviewees or names of 
organisations or parties use “Indian”. Both Van Cott (2005) and Birnir (2004) use the broader 
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term “ethnic party” in order to relate their research to the literature on ethnic parties, but their 
understanding of ethnic identity is equivalent to “indigenous” identity. This choice implies 
that I do not look into the mobilisation based on other salient ethnic identities, for example the 
Afro-Latin. However, well aware of the nuances and dangers that are inherited in such 
juxtapositions, the different indigenous groups will be referred to throughout the analytical 
chapters. Moreover, even though Gisselquist (2005) argues that the theories on indigenous 
populations assume that they are minorities and this is not the case in Bolivia, the indigenous 
groups could still be regarded as politically non-dominant by the time of transition to 
democracy (Van Cott 2005). Finally, the indigenous identity will be considered a fluid, 
dynamic and always relational process consistent with the constructivist understanding of 
ethnicity.  
1.2.3 Specification of the dependent variable 
A classic understanding of ethnic parties is that the party must serve the interests of one single 
ethnic group that supports the party overwhelmingly (Horowitz 1985:291-292). However,  the 
static view that individuals have one single identity and that the boundaries dividing ethnic 
groups are clear and relatively stable is not appropriate for the analysis of the emergence of 
ethnic parties in Latin America (Madrid 2008:479). Latin American ethnic parties are distinct 
from similar parties in other parts of the world, as they usually represent more than one ethnic 
group (Van Cott 2005; Madrid 2008). Furthermore, the indigenous peoples often constitute a 
minority of the registered voters, and a large share of the votes may come from non- 
indigenous voters that consider the candidates from indigenous parties a better alternative 
than the traditional politicians that are often considered to be corrupt (Van Cott 2005:17).   
I will rely on Donna Lee Van Cott’s broadly recognised definition of ethnic parties:  
“[an] organization authorized to compete in elections, the majority of whose leaders and 
members identify themselves as belonging to a nondominant ethnic group, and whose 
electoral platform includes among its central demands programs of an ethnic or cultural 
nature” (Van Cott 2005:3)11
This definition also includes parties that incorporate non-indigenous candidates and form 
electoral alliances with non-indigenous parties and movements, provided that ethnic rights 
.  
                                                 
11 This definition also includes entities that call themselves “political movements” in order to distance 
themselves from the negative connotations associated with political parties.  
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and recognition are central to the party’s platform (Van Cott 2005:3). Moreover, in this thesis 
this definition covers both exclusionary and inclusive or ethnopopulist parties. Leaders of 
exclusionary ethnic parties mobilise members of their own group by exaggerating the threat 
posed by members of other ethnic groups and adopting exclusionary rhetoric and platforms, 
and are thus more in the line of Horowitz’ definition of an ethnic party (Madrid 2008:479). 
On the other hand, an inclusive or ethnopopulist party is ethnically based and adopts classical 
populist electoral strategies and is defined as “[a party which] recruits members of various 
ethnic groups for the top leadership positions of the party, forms alliances with organization 
that represent a diversity of ethnic groups, eschews exclusionary rhetoric, and emphasizes that 
it seeks to represent all members of the nation” (Madrid 2008:475). This thesis follows Van 
Cott’ (2005:18) definition of a formally established party, in that the party must have 
participated in at least two successive elections at the municipal, regional or national level to 
be considered formally established. An overview of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru is 
provided in Table 1. 
Table 1: Indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru, 1980-2009 
Country Party First 
election 
Level of 
represen-
tation 
Highest electoral 
achievement 
Ethnic 
composition 
Bolivia Movimiento Indio 
Tupak Katari 
(MITKA) 
1980 National 1980: Two deputies 
in the lower chamber 
Indigenous 
only 
 Movimiento 
Revolucionario 
Tupaj Katari de 
Liberación Nacional 
(MRTKL) 
1985 National 1985: Two deputies 
in the lower chamber 
Indigenous 
only 
 Asamblea de la 
Soberanía del 
Pueblo (ASP) 
1995 National 1997: 4 uninominal 
seats in the lower 
chamber 
Indigenous 
only 
 Instrumento Político 
para la Soberanía de 
los Pueblos (IPSP)/ 
Movimiento al 
Socialismo (MAS) 
1999 National 2005/2010: Evo 
Morales elected 
president 
Indigenous-
based 
 Movimiento 
Indígena Pachakuti 
(MIP) 
2002 National 2002: 6 deputies in 
the lower chamber 
Mono-ethnic 
Peru Movimiento 
Indígena de la 
Amazonía Peruana 
(MIAP) 
1998 Municipal 2000: 12 mayoralties Indigenous 
only 
 Frente Popular 
Llapanchik 
2002 Regional 2002: Regional 
president 
Indigenous-
based 
Source: (Van Cott 2003a; Van Cott 2005; Pajuelo Teves 2006) 
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1.3 Structure of thesis 
The remainder of this thesis will consist of the following chapters: Chapter 2 presents social 
movement theories that may shed light on the empirical explanations of differences in the 
dependent variable, and concludes with the presentation of an analytical framework. Chapter 
3 is concerned with the methodological considerations, such as the choice of methodological 
design and the countries under study, the sources, and the question of reliability. The three 
main currents within social movement theory, framing processes, mobilising structures and 
political opportunity structures, serve as headings of the analysis chapters 4, 5 and 6. Finally, 
chapter 7 will discuss the main findings of each analysis chapter in order to make concluding 
remarks. The analysis of the emergence of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru is limited to 
the period after the transitions to democracy in 1982 and 1978, respectively. However, the 
first analytical chapter, which analyses the discourses that have served to mobilise indigenous 
organisations and parties, necessarily needs to take into account earlier developments of 
indigenous discourses (Maíz 2004). 
2.0 Theories that can explain variation in the emergence of indigenous 
parties in Bolivia and Peru 
2.1 Linkages between social movement organisations and political parties 
Social movement organisations (SMOs) and political parties are usually analysed in separate 
literatures, and there are few analyses of why social movement organisations decide to form 
electoral vehicles or political parties. According to Charles Tilly (2003:255), this is a research 
programme that merits further attention. One reason for the lack of literature connecting 
social movement organisations and parties, is that movement politics for a long time were 
considered extra-institutional, as social movement theorists associated institutionalisation with 
demobilisation (Katzenstein 1998:195). The argument was that as social movement actors 
gained institutionalised access to the political system, the protest action would fade away.  
Goldstone (2003b:2), however, argues that “state institutions and parties are interpenetrated 
by social movements, often developing out of movements, in response to movements, or in 
close association with movements”. The repertoire of contentious action has not shifted from 
protest to politics, but rather includes both. According to Tarrow (1998:2),  
“Collective action (...) becomes contentious when it is used by people who lack 
regular access to institutions, act in the name of new or unaccepted claims and behave 
in ways that fundamentally challenge others”.  
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Social movements are thus part of “normal politics”, and not only in the Western world, as 
found by Meyer and Tarrow (1998), but also in emerging democracies in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, Africa, and South-East Asia (Cadena-Roa 2003; Glenn 2003; Goldstone 
2003b). In all these regions, citizenship rights and political party systems are developing out 
of social movements. Currently, then, leading social movement scholars have recognised that 
the split between institutionalised and non-institutionalised politics must be challenged 
(McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001). The comprehension of how social movements give rise to 
parties has become essential to comprehend political dynamics (Goldstone 2003b:12).  
Goldstone delineates various ways in which states may respond to social movements12 and 
stresses the fact that the relationship between parties and movements are not “reducible 
simply to action and response, opportunity and repression” (2003b:24). Even though 
repression and open protest are most visible and have been the focus of most social movement 
literature, movements shape and sometimes produce spin-off parties that may remain allied 
with the movement or become independent (Garner and Zald 1987; Goldstone 2003b). 
Examples of such spin-off parties are the Labour and Socialist parties that grew out of the 
labour movement in Europe, and more recently, the Green parties that developed from 
ecology movements (Inglehart 1977; Kitschelt 1989). Even though social movements and 
interest groups are different, Clive S. Thomas (2001b)  has provided a typology of various 
relationships between interest groups13 and political parties in traditional post-World War II 
and transitional democracies that is useful for the purpose of this thesis. Thomas’ “integration 
model” illustrates a relationship in which a political party and the interest group are 
practically identical or at a minimum very close organisationally, since one usually creates the 
other. These entities approximate what Maguire (1995:201-5) calls “parties of movement”, 
and such parties are more likely to be formed by strong organisational, cultural, and policy 
resources in electoral systems with low barriers to entry. Herbert Kitschelt’s work on the 
emergence of ecology parties and left-libertarian parties in Western Europe is also relevant for 
this thesis. He applies a combination of theories of structural changes14
                                                 
12 Repression with institutional change; repression with no institutional change; toleration or encouragement; 
influence with no institutional change; influence with institutional change; influence through ongoing alliances; 
and influence through movement spin-off of political parties (Goldstone 2003:20-24).  
, and resource 
13 Zeigler (1992) defines an interest group as: “a formal organization seeking to influence public policy in 
democratic polities”.  
14 The structural changes were: Economic growth; transformation in a society’s occupational profile; and 
changes in values and lifestyles. 
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mobilisation and political opportunity structure approaches to explain the emergence of these 
parties (1989:14-15). Kitschelt explains various social movements’ decisions to form political 
parties by the unresponsiveness of existing political institutions or the failure of the existing 
parties to respond to the claims of new groups, as well as propitious political opportunities to 
displace existing parties (Kitschelt 1989:19). These insights prove useful for this thesis, 
because established social movement organisations created all of the new successful 
indigenous parties in Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, ethnic elites lacking 
the support of a well-rooted and institutionalised organisation failed in their attempts to form 
indigenous parties (Van Cott 2005:9).  
2.2 Defining an indigenous social movement organisation 
Social movement theorists have identified a set of variables that create conditions for social 
movement formation and mobilisation. Following the logic of Kitschelt (1989) as well as Van 
Cott (2005), these conditions can also explain the strategic decisions of social movements to 
form political parties. There is still no integrated theory of social movements, but social 
movement theorists generally agree on three different approaches, or groups of factors, that 
influence social movement emergence and persistence: Political opportunity structures, 
mobilising structures, and framing processes (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996). However, 
before turning to these approaches and the presentation of the independent variables, it is 
necessary to define a social movement organisation (SMO), explain how it differs from the 
analytically distinct concept of social movement, and define an indigenous organisation in the 
Latin American context. 
Many collective action scholars do not distinguish between social movements and SMOs. 
Della Porta and Diani (2006:20-21) define social movements as a distinct social process 
consisting of the following mechanisms through which actors engage in collective action: 
Involvement in conflictive relations with clearly identified opponents in order to promote or 
oppose social change; linkages by dense informal networks, which distinguish social 
movements from other innumerable instances of collective action; and sharing and 
development of a distinct collective identity. Social movements are not organisations, not 
even of a peculiar kind. Rather, they are networks that may include formal organisations or 
not, and as a consequence, a single organisation can never constitute a social movement for 
itself  (Tilly 1988; Della Porta and Diani 2006). However, organisations often play a very 
important role within the social movements. The indigenous movements in Latin America that 
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have created political parties are better defined as SMOs. An SMO is “a complex, or formal, 
organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or 
countermovement and attempts to implement these goals” (McCarthy and Zald 1987:20). 
However, the SMOs vary considerably with regard to formal structure and rules. Some are 
very hierarchical, while others are highly decentralised or egalitarian (Goodwin and Jasper 
2003:165-66). Another difference from social movements is that the latter have adherents, 
while the SMOs have constituents who provide the organisation with resources. Each SMO 
has a set of target goals which link them with particular social movements (McCarthy and 
Zald 2003:174). The indigenous SMOs in Latin America have participated collectively in 
various demonstrations, uprisings and marches based on wider informal networks constituting 
part of a broader global indigenous rights movement (Brysk 2000). Moreover, as will be seen 
shortly, in Bolivia, since 2000, various indigenous movements and popular fronts have 
participated collectively in what could be called a national social movement, or even a 
“society movement” (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). The definition of an 
indigenous movement in this thesis is equivalent to that of Albó (2008a:13, my translation): 
“[they are] social movements [organisations] whose actors are and consider themselves to be 
indigenous or, as a minimum, have sufficient historical and cultural elements to be able to 
consider themselves as such”. This definition is thus able to grasp the changing salience of 
identities, and avoid the clear demarcation between indigenous, peasant, and other popular 
movements that are commonly distinguished between.  
2.3 Applicability to Latin America 
It is challenging to analyse the emergence of indigenous parties in Latin America, because 
both the social movement literature and the literature linking social movement organisations 
to political parties are primarily developed in Western Europe and the United States 
(Foweraker 1995; Gunther and Montero 2002; Goldstone 2003a). It is paradoxical that 
theories are generated where social movements are in decline, whereas social movement 
activity has increased in Latin America and in other parts of the world. Foweraker (1995) 
questions whether social movement theory can grasp the characteristics of social mobilisation 
in very different political and cultural contexts. In a similar vein, Jackson and Warren (2003) 
stress that the Latin American indigenous movements rarely emerge in the singular, but most 
often come in the highly contested plural, and the indigenous movements rarely have 
standardised visions or are as organisationally coherent as their supporters suggest. Thus, the 
Latin America indigenous movements challenge political scientists’ attempts to categorise 
 
 
14 
 
them into neat typologies, such as “resource focused” or “culturally focused” (McAdam 
1996), because they clearly do both (Warren 1998; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 1998b). The 
political opportunity approach and the new social movement perspective have to a large 
degree dominated the studies of social movements in Latin America. The new social 
movements approach was developed to account for the structural changes in society that gave 
rise to movements with new constituencies, values and forms of action in advanced industrial 
societies since the 1960s (Inglehart 1977; Foweraker 1995:15). Social movement activity was 
described as the mobilisation of identity rather than objective material position (Melucci 
1989; Escobar and Alvarez 1992). On the other hand, the resource mobilisation perspective 
which focuses on organisational infrastructure, and the theory of framing processes, with its 
focus on construction of identities, have been almost entirely ignored (Foweraker 1995; 
Revilla Blanco 2005). In fact, Van Cott, in her book on the emergence of ethnic parties in 
South America, leaves it to the anthropologists and historians to deal with the question of 
identity (2005:47-48). According to Escobar and Alvarez (1992), a “cross-pollination” of 
research between identity-centred and resource mobilisation approaches is needed to 
understand social movements dynamics in Latin America. Tilly and Tarrow (2006) opt for a 
dual analysis of the construction of political identities and political structures and processes, 
because they are inseparable. On the one hand, political processes and institutions constrain 
and empower the construction of political identities and the culture of the movements. On the 
other hand, the way in which political identity is activated influences how actors face political 
processes both in terms of opportunities and constraints.  According to Foweraker (1995:3), 
the different approaches might best be applied to the Latin American context in a pragmatic 
and selective fashion, and this is what the remainder of this chapter is concerned with.  
2.4 Analytical framework- presentation of independent variables 
Combining the recommendations of Escobar and Alvarez (1992), as well as Tilly and Tarrow 
(2006), the analytical framework which is delineated in the next sections will draw on insights 
from the three main approaches within social movement theory - framing processes, 
mobilising structures, and political opportunity structure - in order to present a comprehensive 
understanding of the formation of indigenous parties in Bolivia and Peru. The presented 
variables are based on the work of Van Cott (2005), Yashar (2005), and Martí i Puig (2008), 
who have all tried to explain the emergence of indigenous organisations and/or political 
parties in Latin America.  
 
 
15 
 
2.4.1 Framing processes 
The proponents of the theory of framing processes argue that cognitive, cultural and 
ideational dimensions of collective action were missing in the work on social movements: 
”Mediating between opportunity, organization, and action, are the shared meanings and 
definitions that people bring to their situation” (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996:5). Snow et 
al. (1986, cited in McAdam et al. 1996: 5) define framing processes as “conscious strategic 
efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves 
that legitimate and motivate collective action”. For people to mobilise when they have an 
opportunity to do so, people must feel part of a larger group and consider their own 
contribution valuable. However, the creation of framing processes does not start from scratch, 
but is the aggregated result of personal experience, collective memory, and the objective 
practices that are associated with culture (Martí i Puig 2008:705). This leads us to the concept 
of collective identity (Melucci 1996), which has been crucial in the reconstruction of 
indigenous identities in Latin America. Frames, such as discourses, symbols, slogans, or 
attributions of blame for social problems, can contribute to the creation of a collective identity 
(Zald 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 2003:52). All social movements need a political 
consciousness or an explicit identity to translate individual to collective action, and to create 
and mobilise a constituency (Bernstein 2003:237). The framing processes approach yields one 
main variable - mobilising discourses, which is operationalised into the following three 
indicators: (1) Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse; (2) Inclusive indigenous 
discourse; and (3) Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse.  
1. Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse 
Various scholars speak of an astonishing process of re-indianisation in Latin America that has 
given rise to indigenous movements all over the continent in the 1990s (Albó 1991; de la 
Cadena 2000; Plant 2002). The concepts of de-indianisation and re-indianisation are examples 
of what Jackson and Warren (2005) refer to as a problematic approach to identity processes 
that are flexible and fluid. Still, the concepts do grasp the increasing salience of indigenous 
identities that have been a result of discourse changes that have taken place at the local, 
national, and transnational levels, and that have served to back indigenous mobilising in the 
past two decades (Jackson and Warren 2005). The national and transnational levels will only 
be mentioned briefly here, both due to the scope of this thesis and the larger body of work that 
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already exists covering these levels15
The elaboration of a complex identity discourse over time has contributed to an ethnification 
of political claims and the construction of a collective indigenous identity on the basis of 
heterogeneous peasant and communitarian identities, and in some cases a national generic 
indigenous identity has appeared (Maíz 2004). According to Taylor (1994), the indigenous 
peoples have turned indigenous identity into a strategy or a political opportunity structure. 
The creation of an indigenous discourse and collective identity can be seen as a coordination 
game, because individuals within a SMO frequently have to decide on which identity to 
adopt. An example of such a dilemma is whether an organisation should principally promote 
an indigenous or a peasant discourse. There are two solutions to this dilemma: A powerful 
political leader may suggest a focal point that can work as an equilibrium, or, alternatively, 
elite conflicts lead to some consentient equilibrium (Trejo 2000). However, one should be 
aware that it often is impossible to forge one single voice of a movement:  
. The focus is rather on the indigenous peoples own 
change of discourses that have served to create collective identities.  
“The degree to which there are unified and consensual frames within a movement is 
variable, and it is comparatively rare that we can speak sensibly of the movement 
framing. It is more useful to think of framing as an internal process of contention 
within movements with different actors taking different positions” (Gamson and Meyer 
1996:283, emphasis in original).  
The variable is operationalised as salience of ethnic identity. The assumption is that 
dominance of ethnic discourses increases the probability of indigenous party emergence.  
2. Inclusive indigenous discourse  
According to Martí y Puig (2008:705-8), for an identity to be a successful framing for 
indigenous movements and parties, an inclusive “indigeneity” must be created. A discourse 
which can serve as an integrating tool for the diverse people in a territory must be developed. 
In a similar vein, Madrid (2008:475-9) discusses the differences between exclusionary and 
inclusive indigenous parties in the region. He argues that leaders of exclusionary ethnic 
parties mobilise members of their own group by exaggerating the threat posed by members of 
other ethnic groups and adopting exclusionary rhetoric and platforms, and is thus in line with 
                                                 
15 See, for example  Brysk  (2000), and Keck and Sikkink (1998).  
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Horowitz’ definition of an ethnic party. The more successful inclusive or ethno-populist 
parties, on the other hand, have adopted classical populist electoral strategies, and recruit 
leaders from various ethnic groups, form alliances with organisations that represent a diversity 
of ethnic groups, and stress the wish to represent all members of a nation. The 
operationalisation of this variable is the presence of an inclusive indigenous discourse. The 
assumption is that a more inclusive discourse reaches out to a broader segment of the 
electorate and yields a higher probability of party emergence and success.  
3. Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse 
Another way to evaluate the success of discourses of indigenous organisations is whether their 
discourses are connected to the fight against neoliberal reforms that were imposed by the 
majority of Latin American governments in the 1980s and 1990s (Martí i Puig 2008:705-708). 
Similarly, Brysk and Wise (1995) and Yashar (2005) stress the importance of the fight against 
neo-liberalism16
Even though neo-liberalism is largely uncontested in current development practice and 
discourse, the governments have been less successful in convincing their citizens of the 
benefits of neo-liberalism (Arce 2008). Gill (2003) argues that because neo-liberalism lacks 
the support from civil society for creating a hegemonic system, governments are vulnerable to 
attacks from counter-movements that may be organised on combinations of class, gender, 
ethnicity, or religious, territorial, or identity interests. There are two main currents that deal 
with how economic liberalisation affects collective political activity. The first and dominant 
perspective is the atomisation approach (Kurtz 2004; Wolff 2005) which suggests that 
economic liberalisation is the cause and consequence of widespread de-politicisation and 
demobilisation of civil society, and does not predict that political liberalisation will renew 
collective political action. Neo-liberalism’s economic consequences are considered to be 
detrimental to the collective capacity of civil society and thus weaken societal organisation. 
The other current, the re-politicisation approach, predict that mobilisation reappears as a 
 in the construction of an ethnic discourse where large indigenous 
mobilisations have taken place. Moreover, the opposition to neoliberal reforms has attracted 
many non-indigenous supporters to the indigenous organisations (Van Cott 2005:10), as well 
as broadened the electorate for indigenous parties, particularly from the middle classes 
(Madrid 2008).  
                                                 
16 The combination of neoliberal reforms and liberal democracy is known as “market democracy”, and implies 
policies such as the reduction of government deficits, the privatization of state-owned companies, and the 
opening of countries to international capital (Kohl 2006).  
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consequence of economic liberalisation, especially in the context of political liberalisation, 
and is the approach adopted in this thesis. Indeed, protests against neoliberal reforms have 
been seen all over the world, not least in Latin America where unemployed, rural workers and 
indigenous peoples have been important actors in the protests (Arce 2008:38).  
One reason why indigenous peoples protest is that a free market harms indigenous ways of 
life, and thus politicised indigenous communities take action (Yashar 2005:16). The 
consequences of the neoliberal reforms for indigenous peasants have been dramatic: Cuts in 
the budget for the ministries of agriculture and social services; as well as cuts in economic 
programmes, such as agricultural subsidies, access to credit, and protection of peasant land 
(Yashar 2005:67). Particularly reforms that have threatened the inalienability of communally 
held land have challenged the indigenous concept of territoriality17
2.4.2 Mobilising structures 
 and given impetus to the 
fight against neo-liberalism (Yashar 2005:68). However, increasing poverty rates among 
many sectors of the population, including indigenous peoples, have also sparked mobilisations 
that have been more material-oriented. This variable is operationalised as presence of a 
discourse that is opposing neoliberal reforms. The assumption is that connection with 
opposition to neoliberal reforms contributes to the reaching out to a broader constituency 
than the indigenous population, which will create a higher probability of party formation and 
success. 
The resource mobilisation approach, also labelled mobilising structures, broke with the 
grievance-based conceptions of social movements as expressed by the relative deprivation 
theory that predicted collective mobilisation by people who feel deprived of some goods or 
resources (Gurr 1970). Subordination and marginalisation of ethnic groups cannot solely 
predict social or political mobilisation (Yashar 2005; Martí i Puig 2008). Instead, the 
mobilising structures approach focuses on mobilisation processes and the formal 
organisational manifestations of these processes (Zald and McCarthy 1979). McAdam et al. 
(1996:3) define mobilising structures as “those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action”. This approach assumes that 
successful movements are dependent on financial, organisational, cultural and human 
resources to form, endure, and achieve political effectiveness (Foweraker 1995:15-16). Three 
                                                 
17 Territoriality is a concept that includes more than land, as it also covers the indigenous ways of life and 
political organising (Yashar 2005: 68). 
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main variables from the mobilising structures approach will be applied: (1) Territorial 
concentration of affiliates; (2) Maturity of the SMO, and; (3) Brokerage mechanism.  
1. Territorial concentration of affiliates 
The territorial concentration of indigenous peoples is an important mobilising factor, because 
in particular areas where indigenous peoples are concentrated, it will be easier for them to 
promote their demands and be heard through organisations or the launching of political parties  
(Wessendorf 2001:16). In fact, most of the successful indigenous parties in South America 
have emerged in an electoral district where the indigenous proportion of the population was 
high (Van Cott 2005:46). Furthermore, the indigenous parties that have succeeded at the 
national electoral level tend to attain more votes from certain regions, whereas they have 
remained relatively weak in others (Rice and Van Cott 2006:713). Where indigenous peoples 
are concentrated, interaction may increase, and networks are more easily constructed18
Due to migration and urbanisation processes, the territorial concentration of indigenous 
peoples has changed in many countries since the mid-1950s. The cohesion of a group, 
indigenous or any other identity, requires high levels of interaction among the group 
members. Sharing a home ground promote interaction (Gurr 2000), and migration of 
indigenous people is thus likely to weaken group identities. The variable will be 
operationalised into the following two indicators: (1) Territorial concentration of indigenous 
people; and (2) migration and urbanisation of indigenous people. The assumptions are that 
territorial concentration of indigenous groups is positively related to the formation of 
indigenous parties, and that processes of migration and urbanisation will lead to a weaker 
indigenous identity and is thus negatively related to the creation of indigenous parties.  
.  
2. Maturity of the SMO 
The maturity of indigenous organisations is an important factor for the launching of parties. 
One evident method of measuring the maturity of an organisation is to look at the years in 
existence of the highest level of an organisation: “The longer a social movement organisation 
has been in existence and the more political experience its leaders and members have, the 
more its members will feel a sense of loyalty to and collective identification with the 
organization” (Van Cott 2005:43). Levels of prior social organising can have an impact on the 
                                                 
18 The concentration of indigenous peoples is also important in relation to the institutional surroundings. 
Electoral rules, such as spatial registration requirements, may hinder groups from launching a political party 
(Birnir 2004). The latter factor will be dealt with in section 2.4.3.  
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degree and type of social mobilisation, as a history of former activism make people more 
likely to be recruited to a SMO (McAdam 1988; Foweraker 1995:16). Another way to 
measure organisational maturity is through the unity of organisations (Van Cott 2005:46). 
Many indigenous organisations are characterised by regional and interethnic differences and 
rivalries, ideological differences particularly stemming from disagreements regarding the 
focus of class versus ethnicity, as well as conflicts originating from access to resources and 
leadership positions. With regard to the latter factor, many of the leaders of indigenous social 
movements and federations have been highly vulnerable, as the entrance into the political 
arena put a strong pressure on them to solve the problems of the members of the organisations 
(Ruíz Hernández 2001). Because of the interethnic composition of many indigenous 
organisations, the task of designing leaders is complicated as leaders have to be both 
representative of the group’s values and effective in the political arena. This will frequently 
lead to splits within the organisations and to the development of parallel organisations19
3. Brokerage mechanism 
. The 
higher the degree of maturity, unity, and organisation of indigenous movements in particular 
districts, the more likely it is that a movement will “(a) seek to participate in elections, (b) will 
have the organizational resources to surmount registration barriers; and (c) will be able to 
convert its social movement ties into votes on election day” (Rice and Van Cott 2006:723). 
The maturity of indigenous organisations will be operationalised as follows: (1) Years in 
existence of the SMO: and (2) unity of the SMO. The assumptions are, firstly, that the older 
the organisation, the more experience is acquired, which leads to a higher probability of the 
launching of indigenous parties. Secondly, indigenous organisations that remain united are 
more likely to launch political parties.  
The configuration of social movement networks or webs is considered crucial within the 
mobilising structures approach (Melucci 1988; Foweraker 1995; Alvarez, Dagnino et al. 
1998a), as dense networks of affiliates make mobilisation more likely (Foweraker 1995:16). 
The brokerage mechanism (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001) refers to the capacity of the core 
activists of the movement to make connections between two or more groups that have 
previously been disconnected. Yashar (2005:71) refers to such networks as transcommunity 
networks, and argues that organisational capacity must be demonstrated, not just assumed, by 
                                                 
19 The question of the dominance of “ethnicity” vs. “class” as mobilising factors within the movements will be 
treated in chapter 4.  
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indigenous communities that are often separated by great distances, and cultural and linguistic 
differences, as well as for indigenous identities that have historically been embedded in local 
communities. Networks provide spaces where indigenous leaders can build ties, develop trust, 
gain leadership experience, as well as forge new and common ideas. Without such networks 
between and among communities it is an extremely difficult task to organise successfully and 
build significant indigenous movements Yashar (2005). This thesis takes this argument one 
step further, and argues that the presence of the brokerage mechanism through cooperation 
between different indigenous groups and organisations both inter- and intra regions (highlands 
and the Amazonian area) are necessary for the creation and success of indigenous political 
parties. This variable is operationalised as: Intra- and inter-regional cooperation between 
indigenous SMOs. The assumption is that inter- and intra- region cooperation among 
indigenous organisations increases the probability of the emergence of indigenous parties.  
2.4.3 Political opportunities 
The political opportunity structure approach refers to political factors that are external to 
groups that may attempt to mobilise, factors that will influence the form, content and 
possibility of mobilisation (McAdam 1996:3). The political structure can both imply 
opportunities and constraints, and  the challenge for SMOs is to identify and seize the possible 
opportunities for action (Canel 2005). Political opportunities is currently the hegemonic 
paradigm among social movement scholars and is criticised for labelling a political 
opportunity “virtually anything that, in retrospect, can be seen as having helped a movement 
mobilise or attain its goals” (Goodwin and Jasper 2004:11). However, in spite of a myriad of 
variables being added to the concept of political opportunity, scholars have agreed to a large 
degree on four dimensions of a political system that  impacts the structuring of collective 
action (McAdam, McCarthy et al. 1996:10): The relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalised political system; the presence of elite allies; splits within and fragmentation 
of the ruling elite and the stability of its internal alignments; and the state’s capacity and 
propensity for repression. However, as elite alignments and the access to elite allies do not 
uniformly contribute to movement formation in Latin American (Yashar 2005:75, footnote 
34),  this thesis will employ the following variables: (1) State’s capacity and propensity to use 
repression”, adapted as “political associational space (Yashar 2005)”, as well as (2) the 
relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system.  
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1. Political associational space 
Yashar (2005:76) defines political associational space as “the de facto existence of freedom of 
association and expression”. It cannot be reduced to a question of regime type or democracy 
vs. dictatorship. Furthermore, it is not equivalent to networks, as political associational space 
refers to a political opportunity to organise, whereas networks refer to the existing capacity to 
mobilise (Yashar 2005). However, the factors mutually influence each other, as associational 
space can lead to the creation of networks. Political associational space can exist in varying 
degrees. It can  be present due to state absence, like in the Bolivian and Peruvian Amazon 
until the second half of the 20th century, or in the context of political liberalisation regimes in 
transition (Yashar 1998:32; Yashar 2005). On the other hand, it can be absent due to military 
regimes and the state’s penetration into certain areas. The presence of political associational 
space has varied considerably in the Bolivian and Peruvian highlands. However, as both 
Bolivia and Peru experienced military regimes until the transitions to democracy, the analysis 
is limited to the democratic period, from 1982 and 1978, respectively. The variable is 
operationalised as the existence of freedom of association and expression. The assumption is 
that an open political associational space increases the opportunities for indigenous 
mobilisation and creation of networks, which ultimately leads to a greater probability of the 
formation of indigenous parties.  
 
2. The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system 
Many scholars support a determined “crisis of representation” in Latin America generally, and 
in the Andes particularly (Hagopian 1993; Di Tella 1998; Mainwaring, Bejano et al. 2006; 
Luna 2007). This crisis encapsulates a severe erosion of linkages between voters and parties 
because of socio-economic, political, and technological changes (Roberts 2001). When 
linkages between parties and voters are eroded, space may be opened to political challengers 
(Mainwaring and Scully 1995:18). Tanaka (interview 2007) argues that the demise of leftist 
parties throughout Latin America opened a political opportunity space that was favourable to 
the emergence of indigenous parties, as leftist parties traditionally have attracted indigenous 
voters. In a similar vein, Rice and Van Cott (2006:721) claim that “the disarticulation of 
traditional class-based collective action and the crisis of the political (...) parties have created 
a void in popular sector interest representation”.  
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Another way to assess the openness or closure of the institutionalised political system is 
through the analysis of electoral institutions, which create an underlying structure that can 
both support and impede the development of party systems (Taagepera and Shugart 1989). 
With regard to the political participation of ethnic groups, there is a large body of work on 
how institutional changes create new electoral incentives and/or facilitate the participation of 
such groups20
1)  Weakening of leftist parties 
. An open institutional environment as well as laws and rules that structure the 
electoral competition shape the incentives that face political actors and may facilitate the 
emergence of ethnic parties (Norris 2004; Van Cott 2005). There is, however, much debate 
surrounding the work on electoral systems in plural societies within established democracies 
and its transferability to contexts of ethnic tensions in new democracies (Norris 2004:212). As 
mentioned earlier, Latin America has been neglected in the literature on ethnicity and ethnic 
tensions as well as in studies on how institutions may contribute to stable governments in 
spite of ethnic plurality. Thus, this thesis borrows from the work of scholars that have 
identified electoral rules and institutions that tend to permit the emergence of new political 
parties representing under-represented groups in the Latin American context (Van Cott 2003a; 
Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2005; Martí i Puig 2008). “The relative openness or closure of the 
institutionalised political system” is thus operationalised into the following indicators: (1) 
Weakening of leftist parties; (2) Softer party registration requirements; (3) Shift to 
proportional representation electoral system and low threshold of representation; (4) Electoral 
arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities; and (5) decentralisation.  
Because the majority of indigenous people are poor and belong to the lower social strata 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 1994), minor leftist parties and populist parties have 
traditionally attracted indigenous voters. The leftist parties in Latin America were of a 
different nature than in Western Europe. The latter saw the emergence of class-mass parties, 
whereas in Latin America, a version of the catch-all party emerged21
                                                 
20 See for example: (Lijphart 1977; Horowitz 1985; Horowitz 1991; Laydeyret 1993; Cox 1997) 
. These types of parties 
have dominated the party systems in the region ever since. The catch-all parties blurred 
dogmatic ideology in the interests of pragmatism, and the aim was to reach the electorate 
21 Some of them were mainly instruments of caudillos, some were based on the middle class, and a latter version 
was more structured and enduring and had pragmatic programs to attract broad multiclass support (Dix 1989). 
Examples of this latter version of the catch-all party are APRA in Peru, PRI in Mexico, AD in Venezuela, and 
the Bolivian MNR. It is important to stress that in the Latin American context, it was the catch-all parties, rather 
than the European class-mass parties, that were the successors to the traditional elite-centred parties.  
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beyond social class or religious denomination (Dix 1989:27). On the other hand, the leftist 
parties that emerged have leant on a Marxist ideology that demanded that indigenous  
identities be subordinated to class identity for socialism to succeed (Mainwaring and Scully 
1995). Ethnic demands were rejected as counter-revolutionary, and as a result of the 
underlying racism which dominated the leftist parties, indigenous and peasant movements 
never became equal partners (Van Cott 2005:27). However, leftist parties in Latin America 
weakened in the 1960s and 1970s following the repression during the dictatorship, and 
furthermore in the 1980s and 1990s in the wake of economic austerity measures and 
neoliberal reforms that eroded the linkages between many of the unions and the leftist parties. 
This impairment implied that the groups that had voiced greater political participation and 
social equality disappeared. Ever since the neoliberal reforms were implemented, indigenous 
movements have been at the forefront demanding greater social redistribution (Van Cott 
2005; Kohl 2006). According to Tanaka (interview 2007) and Van Cott (2005), the weakening 
of leftist parties is crucial to understand the emergence of indigenous parties in Latin 
America. The assumption is this that the electoral weakening of leftist parties is favourable to 
the emergence of indigenous parties.  
2) Softer party registration requirements 
The costs of party registration are decisive in the context of new democracies, as they can 
potentially change representation even before allocation rules come into play (Birnir 2004). 
Both pre-election and post-election requirements may hinder the emergence of new parties. 
The pre-election requirements may include popular support, in the form of signatures or the 
attainment of a specified number of votes in a lower-level election; spatially distributed 
popular support; and financial viability, whereas the post-election rules may cover both 
popular support and financial viability (Birnir 2004). Formation rules interact with 
demographic and social conditions, and can thus have a different effect than other electoral 
institutions. Rigid spatial rules may be negative to the launching of indigenous parties, as the 
indigenous peoples are generally geographically concentrated (Van Cott 2005:27). Financial 
requirements may also imply difficulties for the launching of parties in constituencies where 
indigenous groups are economically disadvantaged. It is probable that a financial requirement 
is a heavier burden for indigenous parties than for small parties in general in Latin America 
(Birnir 2004; Van Cott 2005). Post-election requirements are theoretically different from pre-
election barriers in that they do not bar parties from legislative representation in the first 
place, but they can deprive a party of its registration for the subsequent elections. Post-
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election rules requirements that are higher than a possible election threshold or more stringent 
than the district magnitude, may force a party that has achieved legislative representation to 
concentrate on re-registering or gather funds to pay the fine. Particularly, this can constitute a 
problem for smaller parties with few financial resources and a limited organisational staff 
(Birnir 2004:7). The assumption is that the withdrawal of rigid or the implementation of 
‘softer’ registration rules pre-election and post-election increases the probability of the 
emergence of indigenous parties.  
3)  Shift to PR-system or a mixed PR-SMD system, and a low threshold of 
representation 
The literature on parties agrees upon the view that proportional representation (PR) electoral 
systems are more likely to encourage the formation and endurance of new parties than are 
majoritarian systems. The basic principle of PR systems is that parliamentary seats are 
allocated according to the proportion of votes cast for each party, and thus lowering barriers 
to party system entry (Sartori 1986:58; Norris 2004:50). Majoritarian systems, in contrast, 
tend to produce a two-party system and make it more difficult for new parties to enter the 
political system. Proportionality is of particular importance to minorities because other types 
of electoral systems tend to under-represent or exclude them (Lijphart 1986:113). However, 
the literature on newer democracies consider PR systems’ effectiveness in including 
minorities in parliament as contingent upon different factors, such as the stage of 
democratisation, the possible application of affirmative action strategies, and the 
concentration of ethnic groups (Sisk and Reynolds 1998). Van Cott stresses precisely the 
distribution of ethnic groups in the Latin American context, and argues that where groups are 
geographically concentrated, a mixed single-member district (SMD) system and PR-system 
may be more favourable to than a pure PR system (2005:29). Moreover, the election through 
single member districts tend to facilitate a stronger link between representatives and voters 
(Payne, Zovatto G. et al. 2002). For a threshold of representation to be categorised as low, the 
electoral formula must be proportional22
                                                 
22 The more proportional the electoral formula, the more likely it is that new parties gaining few votes will gain 
representation (Taagepera 1989:133).        
, the electoral district magnitude must be relatively 
large, and a low threshold for gaining seats must exist (Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Cox 
1997). However, former work (Van Cott 2005) has shown no significant effect of the electoral 
formula on party emergence the two cases under study, and the factor is thus excluded from 
the analysis. The election threshold refers to the minimum share of vote that leads to winning 
at least one seat, and can have an important impact on the proportionality and the chances for 
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smaller parties (Norris 2004:51-55). Both Bolivia and Peru have applied formal thresholds23
4) Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities  
, 
and thresholds will consequently be dealt with in the analysis. The district magnitude (DM) 
mediates the impact of seat allocation formulas and thresholds, and may be especially 
important in explaining the formation of indigenous parties. However, where larger ethnic 
groups are concentrated geographically, neither thresholds nor district magnitude may exclude 
them from political representation. Nonetheless, it is a difficult task to observe the full impact 
of DM in my cases as the DM may vary in different districts throughout the countries. 
Therefore, the focus is on the district magnitude in national elections. The assumptions are 
that a shift to a PR system or a mixed SMD/PR system may be propitious to the formation of 
indigenous parties, and that a shift to an increased district magnitude under a proportional 
representation electoral system as well as a non-existent or low election threshold increase 
the probability of emergence of indigenous parties.  
Lijphart (1986) argues that the easiest way to guarantee ethnic representation is through the 
creation of electoral districts along ethnic rather than geographic criteria. Arrangements that 
can secure greater political participation of ethnic minorities, or in this case, indigenous 
groups, are the establishment of reserved seats for ethnic minorities, special circumscriptions 
for indigenous candidates, or requiring that political parties include them on their lists (Van 
Cott 2005:27). As previously mentioned, even though the Bolivian indigenous population 
constitute a majority of the population, they could still be regarded as non-dominant at the 
start of the analysis period. The assumption is that the presence of electoral arrangements that 
strengthen the participation of ethnic minorities increases the probability of the emergence of 
indigenous parties.  
5) Decentralisation  
Federal political systems that have local and/or regional elections are more conducive to the 
appearance of new parties than are centralised or unitary systems. When a political movement 
wins elections at a lower level, it may then step on to the regional or national level (Dalton, 
Flanaghan et al. 1984:467). However, until the 1990s, the federal status only existed in the 
larger countries of the region, namely Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela and Brazil (O'Neill 
                                                 
23 In Latin America only a few countries have applied formal thresholds. However, countries may have practical 
thresholds as a consequence of the combined effect of the district magnitude, the number of parties competing, 
and the seat allocation formula (Payne, Zovatto G. et al. 2002:93). 
 .                   
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2006; Gómez-Reino 2007:13). Both unitary and federal forms of the state were established as 
forms of territorial organisation unrelated to the presence or absence of specific indigenous 
communities (Gibson 2004). Moreover, Latin America was characterised by centralised party 
systems dominated by urban elites and a general populace that was not included in political 
decisions (Grindle 2000:4-7). Changes in the territorial organisation of the unitary systems of 
countries in the region were carried out in the 1980s and primarily in the 1990s. According to 
O’Neill, this decentralisation trend has reshaped the political landscape dramatically in Latin 
America (2005:3).  
In terms of democratic practice, Diamond and Tsalik argue that decentralisation “provides 
additional channels of access to power for historically marginalised groups and thus improves 
the representativeness of democracy” (1999:121-122). However, the focus here is on the 
possibilities for smaller parties to build a party organisation at the lower levels before 
competing in national elections. At the lower levels, the logistical and economic costs are 
lower and a smaller organisation is sufficient to carry out an electoral campaign (Van Cott 
2005:25). Local and regional elections are thus particularly favourable to ethnic minorities, as 
these groups are often concentrated demographically and because they generally count on less 
financial resources (Van Cott 2005:8). The decentralising reforms that swept Latin American 
countries provided a double opportunity for indigenous party emergence. First, because in the 
process of redefinition of the territorial design, specific claims of indigenous rights surged, 
and second, the possibility to elect representatives in the local institutional spaces could imply 
the appearance for the first time of elected posts in the indigenous communities (Martí i Puig 
2008:689-90). The assumption is that decentralisation at the municipal and regional levels 
are conducive to the emergence of indigenous parties.  
2.4.4 Model of analytical framework 
A model of the analytical framework is presented below. The theoretical approaches, 
variables, indicators and assumptions are summarised in this model. All the indicators, except 
“Migration and urbanisation of indigenous people” are expected to have a positive effect on 
the dependent variable - “indigenous party formation”. The fundamental argument is that 
mobilising structures and framing processes determine the scale and duration of collective 
action (Tarrow 1998:6). Thereafter, changes in factors related to the political opportunity 
structure create incentives for the formation of political parties.    
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Independent 
variables 
Model 1: Analytical framework 
Indicators 
1. Framing 
processes 
 
a) Mobilising 
discourses 
 
Prevailing ethnic discourse over class 
discourse 
 Inclusive indigenous discourse 
 
Connection with anti-neoliberal 
discourse 
 
2. Mobilising 
structures 
 
a)Territorial 
concentration of 
affiliates 
 
b) Maturity of the 
SMO 
 
Territorial concentration of indigenous 
people 
 
Migration and urbanisation of 
indigenous people 
 Years in existence of the SMO 
 Unity of the SMO 
 Intra- and interregional cooperation 
between indigenous SMOs 
 
c) Brokerage 
mechanism 
 
3. Political 
opportunities 
 
Freedom of association and expression 
 
a) Political 
associational 
 
 b) The relative 
openness or 
closure of the 
institutionalised 
political system 
 
Weakening of leftist parties 
 
Softer party  registration requirements 
 
Shift to PR- system or a mixed PR-
SMD system, and low threshold of  
representation 
 Electoral arrangements to enhance 
participation of ethnic minorities 
 
Decentralisation 
 
Dependent 
variable 
Formation of 
indigenous 
party 
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3.0 Methodological considerations 
This thesis uses a qualitative approach to explain why Bolivia has experienced indigenous 
parties at the national level, whilst there is no parallel experience in Peru. The main reason 
why a qualitative approach is considered to be the best suited is because the point of departure 
is an interest in “specific historical processes and structures”, a characteristic of the case-
oriented approach (Ragin and Zaret 1983:741). Thus, this thesis trades making generalisations 
that apply to broad populations for the aim of “high internal validity and good historical 
explanations of particular cases” (George and Bennett 2005:22), in this case the detailed 
expression of indigenous mobilisation and, specifically, the launching of indigenous parties. 
This chapter will first proceed to present the advantages of using a qualitative comparative 
approach to explain the research question. Then, the benefits and disadvantages of applying a 
Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) as a research design is discussed, the case selection is 
justified, and the similarities between the two cases are presented. Finally, the collection of 
data will be presented and assessed on the basis of its reliability.  
3.1 The advantages of a case-oriented approach  
This thesis follows George and Bennett (2005:18) in their definition of case study methods. 
This definition includes both case studies, which are limited to the examination of single 
cases, and the comparative method, which compares among a small number of cases. 
According to Lijphart (1971:683), the comparative (case-oriented), experimental, and 
statistical methods all establish “general empirical relationships among two or more variables, 
while all other variables are controlled”. However, Lijphart argues that the comparative 
method has major weaknesses compared to statistical methods particularly with regard to 
problems connected with “small-N”24
Firstly, researchers who use case study methods achieve higher levels of conceptual validity 
than do researchers of statistical methods (George and Bennett 2005:19). A recurrent 
difficulty within the statistical methods is that of “conceptual stretching”, which leaves 
concepts too vague or amorphous (Sartori 1970:1036), and ultimately lumps together 
 and a large number of variables. Thus, one should 
generally resort to the statistical method rather than the “weaker comparative method” 
(Lijphart 1971:685). However, the limitations referred to may be mitigated, and are better 
considered as trade-offs than problems. The case study methods have several advantages 
compared to statistical methods (George and Bennett 2005:19-22). 
                                                 
24 It is more difficult to draw strong inferences from a “small-N” analysis because of the problem of selection 
bias (Landman 2003).  
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“dissimilar cases to get a larger sample” (George and Bennett 2005:19). Case studies, by 
contrast, allow for detail-attentive analysis and conceptual refinements that may identify and 
measure indicators that more accurately measure the theoretical concepts (Ragin 1987; 
George and Bennett 2005:18-9). In the same vein, Mahoney (2007:128) argues that 
qualitative researchers who engage in detail-focused analyses, “tend to avoid simple coding 
errors that may be common in some large-N, statistical databases.” One reason why a 
statistical approach was ruled out in the analysis of ethnic party emergence in Latin America, 
was precisely that a number of important concepts and independent variables are difficult to 
measure adequately. Particularly, strength and cohesion of indigenous identities and the 
subgroups within the indigenous category, the maturity of and the cooperation between 
indigenous organisations, as well as the complex and fluctuant electoral alliances that 
indigenous-movement-based parties are forming with leftist and populist parties, are variables 
that are hard to measure with a high level of conceptual validity within a statistical approach 
(Rice and Van Cott 2006:728). Furthermore, as stated in the theory chapter, this thesis follows 
the middle position of Foweraker (1995) in the specification of concepts and indicators from 
social movement theory that are adapted to the Latin American context, yet without 
abandoning all the concepts that have been developed in the European and North American 
contexts. Thus, the conceptual validity is higher than when a universalist position, which 
holds that concepts must be able to “travel to all parts of the globe” to have explanatory 
power, had been followed (Landman 2003:44).  
Secondly, in-depth case studies are able to study how causal mechanisms in individual cases 
operate in detail (George and Bennett 2005:18-9). Thus, the case-oriented comparative 
method stands out from the statistical method as cases are considered as configurations or 
combinations of characteristics, rather than based on the analysis of separate variables (Ragin 
1987:3,32). Within the field of social movement research, few studies compare many 
countries (large-N). This is because “controlled comparison of few countries yields important 
insights into the origins, shape, and impact of social movements” (Landman 2003:130). 
Controlled comparison allows the researcher to have a more detailed look at the dynamics of 
mobilisation and the political context in which a SMO emerges and protests (Landman 
2003:130). Such an analysis of the combinations of characteristics is a difficult task to carry 
out within a statistical approach, due to the large number of cases (Ragin 1987).  
According to Lijphart (1971:684), the crucial difference between the comparative or case-
oriented method and the statistical method is that the number of cases that the case-oriented 
 
 
31 
 
approach deals with “is too small to permit systematic control by means of partial 
correlations”. Yet, when applied in such a way that the method minimises the limitations and 
takes advantage of its strengths, “they can be highly useful instruments in scientific political 
inquiry” (Lijphart 1971:693). Possible solutions to the short-comings of the comparative 
method will be presented in the following section, concluding in the choice of the Most 
Similar Systems Design (MSSD) as a research design, and the case selection.  
3.2 Methodological design- Comparing similar countries 
One way to limit the weaknesses connected with “small- N” is to focus on cases that are 
comparable. When such comparable cases are found, they constitute a good starting-point for 
the application of the comparative method “because they allow the establishment of 
relationships among a few variables while many other variables are controlled” (Lijphart 
1971:687). Bolivia and Peru are undoubtedly comparable cases, and these similarities will be 
dealt with shortly. Furthermore, the problem of “many variables” may be mitigated through 
the use of comparable cases where one “can reduce considerably the number of operative 
variables and study their relationships under controlled conditions without the problem of 
running out of cases” (Lijphart 1971:687). John Stuart Mill developed the “method of 
difference” to approach this problem. This method consists of comparing cases where a 
phenomenon occurs with cases which are similar in other respects, but where the same 
phenomenon does not occur (J.S. Mill, cited in Lijphart 1971:687).  
MSSD precisely compares cases or systems that differ on the dependent variable, in this case 
the emergence of indigenous parties, but are similar regarding as many characteristics as 
possible to be able to control for common characteristics and thus allowing a large number of 
variables to be ignored (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Sartori 1994). Thus, MSSD limits the 
problem of “small-N” as many variables may be held as constants. According to Martz 
(1966), MSSD is especially suited for area studies, including Latin America, as the countries 
share a common background. Similarly, Landman (2003:30) argues that “there is something 
inherently similar about countries that make up a particular geographical region of the world 
(…) whether it is common history, language, religion, politics or culture”. Even though 
comparability is not necessarily inherent in a given area, it is more likely achieved within an 
area, than in set of countries selected randomly (Lijphart 1971:681). The problem of “many 
variables” is dealt with as the similar features of Bolivia and Peru, which are presented 
shortly, reduce the number of operative variables.  
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MSSD assumes that preferably one key explanatory variable (x) should be able to predict the 
different outcome on the dependent variable (y) (Landman 2003:29). Yet, as we have seen, a 
feature of the comparative method is that it analyses cases as configurations of characteristics 
(Ragin 1987:3), precluding the possibility of examining the explanatory effect of each 
independent variable. Thus, it is impossible to rule out that the dependent variable is not 
“over-determined”, which means that two independent variables contribute to the same 
explanation of the variation of the dependent variable. Nor is it possible to treat the 
explanatory variables as “isolated”, meaning that “the explanatory pattern does not change 
when new variables are added” (Przeworski and Teune 1970:23). Moreover, the MSSD risks 
attaching too much significance to negative findings (Lijphart 1971:686), as a study may 
neglect the importance of explanatory variables as they deviate from a predicted pattern of 
necessary and sufficient causation (Landman 2003; Mahoney 2007:134). 
However, in spite of the shortcomings of the MSSD approach, they should be considered as 
trade-offs in the choice between parsimony and richness, as well as detailed-attentive analysis 
and high internal validity, versus making broader generalisations (George and Bennett 
2005:22). The focus is on similarities and differences between Bolivia and Peru, rather than 
the analytical relationship between the independent variables in the two cases (Landman 
2003:29).  
3.2.1 Case selection 
This thesis started off with an aim of comparing the five Latin American countries with the 
largest indigenous populations - Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru (Brysk 
2000). However, during the process of a systematic dialogue of ideas and evidence (Ragin 
2004:127), as well as time delimitations on the master thesis and fieldwork (Landman 
2003:24), the cases were limited to two. Another reason for this decision, is that the fewer 
cases studied, the more intensive the study may be (Eckstein 1975:83). Furthermore, the 
decision to study two cases rather than one was made because until recently most of the 
studies on ethnic mobilisation in Latin America were limited to the study of specific 
communities or countries (Martí i Puig 2008). However, there have been increasing attempts 
at developing general explications of the resurgence of indigenous identities in Latin 
America25
                                                 
25 See for example: Yashar 1998; 2006; Jackson and Warren 2003; 2005; Albó 2008a. 
. Yet, the relatively recent phenomenon of indigenous identities’ translation into 
political parties, has to the author’s knowledge only been treated comparatively by Van Cott 
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(2003a), Van Cott (2005), Rice and Van Cott (2006), and Martí y Puig (2008). However, Van 
Cott (2003a) limits her analysis to institutional variables, Van Cott (2005) leaves out the 
question of ethnicity, Rice and Van Cott (2006) take a quantitative approach to the emergence 
of indigenous parties and admit the shortcomings of quantitative analysis particularly in terms 
of conceptual validity, whilst Martí y Puig (2008) resorts to a Boolean analysis of six Latin 
American countries26
Bolivia and Peru were selected because the value of the dependent variable varies 
substantially between the two cases (Ragin 2004:128), in spite of the cultural, political, and 
social proximity of the countries. Clearly, Ecuador could have been analysed in comparison 
with Peru, as Ecuador and Bolivia are the most successful cases in the region
 which does not include in-depth analyses of each country.  
27
3.2.2 Common characteristics of Bolivia and Peru 
 in terms of 
indigenous’ electoral participation (Rice and Van Cott 2006:715). However, existent work 
compares indigenous mobilisation in Peru and Ecuador (Sánchez 1994; Sánchez 1996; 
Kilander 2001). Mexico and Guatemala were ruled out because of their negative value on the 
dependent variable (Martí i Puig 2008:711), as well as the geographical distance to Peru 
which would have complicated the task of neutralising differences and highlighting others 
(Landman 2003:29).  
Bolivia and Peru share a number of common characteristics that may hold all other than the 
independent variables constant, as far as this is possible (Landman 2003:29). Firstly, both 
Bolivia and Peru have a diverse indigenous population which is spread into two ecological 
and geographical zones, the Andean highlands, which are elevated, cold, and dry, and an 
Amazonian region (Montoya 1998). Furthermore, the indigenous populations have been 
systematically excluded due to a history of prolonged colonial rule, and the maintenance of 
the exclusionary character of the state after the independence from Spain in 1821 (Peru) and 
1825 (Bolivia) (Pajuelo Teves 2005:111). Both states have since independence continuously 
struggled with the incorporation of the indigenous masses into the nation-state, the so-called 
“Indian Question”. At the turn of the 20th century, the indigenous populations were neither 
totally assimilated nor autonomous (Yashar 2005:239).  
                                                 
26 Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru.  
27 On comparisons of Bolivia and Ecuador, see for example Andolina (1999) and Lucero (2002). 
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Poverty rates are higher among the indigenous population than the rest of the populace. Peru 
is a country characterised by enormous social inequality (Defensoría del Pueblo 2007). The 
percentage of the indigenous population living in poverty is 63.8 percent compared to 46.8 
percent in the total population. Moreover, the extreme poverty ratio among indigenous people 
is 26.2 compared to 20.1 percent among the total population (Sánchez-Páramo 2006:550)28
With regard to economic structures, both Peru and Bolivia suffered from acute economic 
crises in the 1980s, a decade often referred to as Latin America’s “lost decade”. In both 
countries, the crisis led to the implementation of neoliberal reforms (Mainwaring and Scully 
1995; Kohl 2006).  
. In 
Bolivia, 65 percent of the indigenous population is poor, whereas the poverty-rate among non-
indigenous is 48 percent (Sánchez-García 2007:2).  
In terms of regime type, both Bolivia and Peru experienced almost continuous military 
regimes until the transitions in 1982 and 1978, respectively (Cotler 1995; Gamarra and 
Malloy 1995). In Peru, the period from independence in 1821 until the transition to 
democracy in 1978 was characterised by oligarchic and military rule and political instability  
(Cotler 1995). The new Constitution, which was approved in 1979, established the right to 
vote for all Peruvians through the removal of the literacy requirement. Thus, the indigenous 
people could participate in the elections in 1980 for the first time (Cotler 1995). In Bolivia, on 
the other hand, universal suffrage was instituted after the revolution led by the the 
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) in 1952. However, the MNR regime was 
inherently undemocratic and a de facto single-party system which channelled and supported 
the peasant-indigenous vote through the development of partisan structures outside the urban 
centres, as well as through corporatist structures29 and clientelism30
With regard to party systems, both the Bolivian and the Peruvian party systems have been 
categorised as “inchoate” as opposed to “institutionalised” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). 
. MNR was overthrown in 
1964, and from that year until the transition to democracy in 1982, Bolivia was led by a series 
of military governments which consequently hindered free elections (Gamarra and Malloy 
1995:403-04).  
                                                 
28 The numbers are based on the data from ENAHO (2001).  
29 The most important corporatist organisations were the Bolivian Workers’ Central (COB) and the National 
Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers (CNTCB), through which the MNR leadership tried to co-opt 
popular sectors (Gamarra and Malloy 1995).  
30 Clientelism can be defined as “a two-way relation between unequal actors in which the trade occurring 
between the two benefits both but does not alter the power differential between them” (Stokes 1995: 55).  
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The bonding between voters and parties is weak, and the party systems have traditionally not 
reflected the social cleavages in the countries (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). One way to 
measure the degree of institutionalisation of party systems is through electoral volatility, 
which reflects changes in voters’ electoral preferences and elite-driven changes such as party 
mergers and party-switching by individual politicians (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Both 
Peru and Bolivia score high on volatility throughout the period of analysis31. In Peru, the 
party system even “collapsed” in the wake of a dramatic decline of the four dominant parties32 
from 1987 to 2000 (Tanaka and Trivelli 2002; Kenney 2003). Another way to evaluate the 
institutionalisation of a party system is through fragmentation, which is measured by the 
effective number of parties. Party system fragmentation is related to weakened governability, 
populism, executive-legislative deadlock, and democratic breakdown (Mainwaring and Scully 
1995). Both countries experienced a marked increase of political parties since the mid- 
1990s33
3.4 Data collection 
, and Peru now experiences the highest effective number of parties ever (Mainwaring 
and Torcal 2006:318-9).  
This thesis is based on a large amount of secondary sources, such as books, articles, statistical 
databases, as well as primary data from interviews conducted in Bolivia and Peru  in 2007. A 
primary aim of the fieldwork was to gather secondary sources published in Latin American 
institutions by Latin American researchers. Many of these sources were inaccessible from 
Norway. Moreover, the literature in English which discusses ethnic politics and ethnic 
cleavages in Latin America generally is relatively scarce. Particularly information on Peru, 
considered a deviant case, was difficult to find in the English scholarly literature. However, 
this thesis also draws on relevant books published in English as well as articles from 
recognised journals, such as Comparative Political Studies, the Latin American Research 
Review, and the Journal of Latin American studies.  
A six weeks’ fieldwork was carried out in Bolivia and Peru in January and February 2007. In 
Peru, the interviews were geographically limited to Lima, while in Bolivia interviews were 
carried out in La Paz, Sucre, and Santa Cruz. The large distances and the limited time scope 
                                                 
31 The mean electoral volatility to lower chamber seats in Bolivia from 1980 to 1997 was 28.65. Peru, on the 
other hand, had the highest electoral volatility in Latin America from 1980 to 2000 with 49.58 (Payne, Zovatto 
G. et al. 2002).  
32 The American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Popular Action (AP), Christian People’s Party (PPC) 
and United Left (IU).  
33 See Table 3 in the appendix. 
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prevented the realisation of interviews in the Peruvian and Bolivian Amazon. The principal 
aim of the fieldwork was to carry out interviews with recognised academics working within 
the field of indigenous politics, as well as leaders and members of indigenous organisations. 
To be able to do so, the snowball sampling approach was utilised in both countries to get 
relevant interview objects. The interviews were unstructured and were used to discuss the 
research question and possible theoretical foundations, as well as to obtain in-depth 
knowledge of the cases. These insights subsequently contributed to the structure of the thesis. 
All the interviews34 were carried out in Spanish, a point which was important for the accuracy 
of the information gathered. Because three years have passed since the fieldwork35
3.4.1 Review of the data  
, e-mail 
communication with researchers in Peru and Bolivia, as well as an SMO activist in Bolivia, 
has supplied additional updated information on the research question. A list of the 
interviewees cited in this thesis, as well as those persons who have provided updated 
information, is presented in the preface to this thesis.  
The quality of the gathered data is crucial in order to present unbiased answers to the research 
question. With regard to secondary sources, the theoretical fundament of this thesis, social 
movement theory, has been developed in North America and in Europe. Yet, after having 
adapted the theoretical concepts to be more sensitive to the cultural specificities of Latin 
America (Landman 2003:44), a large selection of sources from recognised research 
institutions in Bolivia and Peru, as well as books and articles in English, when found relevant, 
have been utilised to collect appropriate data. In terms of the reliability of the interview 
objects, it is difficult to assess as one cannot be certain that different answers would not have 
been given to a different researcher at another point. However, most of the interviewees are 
recognised researchers who have published broadly in Latin America, which has made it 
possible to control their sources.  
Reliability refers to the accuracy of the data gathered, and the degree of consistency between 
the coding of units from one study to another at different points (Grønmo 2004:220) 
According to Molina and Albó (2006:36), “quantifying the indigenous [people] in all the 
continent [Latin America] is almost a gamble, and it is the motive of specific essays and work 
that show notable discrepancies” (my translation). In Bolivia and Peru, the quantification is 
                                                 
34 All the interviews were recorded, and transcriptions are available upon request.  
35 Due to a situation of prolonged illness. 
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carried out in different ways, thus complicating the task of comparing numbers between the 
two countries. The most common method to quantify the indigenous population in the region 
has been through the language criterion. However, the linguistic denominator has been 
removed from national censuses in Peru since 1993 (Pajuelo Teves 2006:37). Furthermore, a 
problem with the language criterion is that it in all likelihood yields a lower percentage of 
indigenous people of the total population, as many indigenous people, due to processes of 
migration or lack of bilingual education, have lost their language, but still identify as 
indigenous (Van Cott 2005:142). The Bolivian National Institute for Statistics (INE), on the 
other hand, has been a pioneer in the Latin American context in investigating both language36 
and self-identification in the 2001 national census (Molina and Albó 2006:29)37. The census 
introduced the possibility of marking more than one language as well as specifying any other 
language apart from Quechua, Aymara, Spanish, Guaraní, and a foreign language. Moreover, 
the citizens were asked whether they consider themselves as belonging to a native or 
indigenous group (Molina and Albó 2006:33)38. In the case of Peru, indigenous self-
identification has not been applied as a criterion in national censuses. If it had been, the 
numbers would possibly have been inaccurate because of the strong stigmatisation linked to 
the identification as indigenous in Peru, especially in the Andean region (Pajuelo Teves 
2006:28). Only a partial study39
Another concern has been the reliability of the coding of the dependent variable. Which 
parties can be considered an ethnic party or have an electoral platform with clear ethnic 
contents? Different scholars working on indigenous movements and emergence of parties in 
Latin America generally, and Bolivia and Peru specifically, do not agree on the 
, the National Survey for Homes (ENAHO) from 2001, has 
contemplated indigenous self-identification at the national level, albeit on the basis of homes 
(Trivelli 2005). Thus, to be able to better compare the numbers and geographical 
concentration of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Peru, both numbers from ENAHO and the 
1993 census have been included on Peru.  
                                                 
36 The 2001 census asked both about the spoken language and the language learnt in the childhood (Molina and 
Albó 2006). 
37 A limitation to the census is that only people over age 15 were asked.  
38 The possible answers were Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní, Chiquitano, Mojeño, other native, or none 
39 In 2007, a survey that considered the linguistic criterion to determine belonging to indigenous groups was 
carried out, but this survey was limited to the Amazon (INEI 2009). 
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categorisations40
4.0 Framing processes: The creation of mobilising discourses 
. Peru proved to be a particularly complicated case, as parties have only 
emerged at the local and regional levels, and often have names that reflect ethnic symbols or 
words (Van Cott 2005), which made the process of coding difficult. This thesis has had to rely 
on a large number of Peruvian secondary sources to determine which parties could be coded 
as indigenous or not, The definition of an ethnic party provided in chapter 2 proved crucial 
when deciding on which parties to be included or not. Thus, parties that are widely considered 
indigenous were included instantly, while other parties, particularly smaller Peruvian parties, 
have required the consideration of different scholars’ coding. A last point to be made, is that 
scholars and members of indigenous organisations and parties would probably in certain cases 
disagree on the coding due to questions of authenticity, such as which actors are representing 
the “real Indians” (Lucero 2006).  
The framing processes approach is preoccupied with the symbolic aspects of collective action, 
and the development of a collective identity that makes people mobilise when they have an 
opportunity to do so. All social movements need a political consciousness or an explicit 
identity to translate individual to collective action, and to create and mobilise a constituency 
(Bernstein 2003:237). According to Pajuelo (2007:25), the Latin American indigenous 
movements have reinvented the ideas of community, fatherland, and nation. In the Andean 
countries41
                                                 
40 For example, Madrid (2008) argues that only MIP and MAS can be characterised as indigenous parties in 
Bolivia, whereas Birnir (2004) characterises Condepa as an ethnic party, a categorisation which is rejected by 
Van Cott (2005) and Madrid (2008).  
, there is an intense process of redefinition of identities with a clear ethnic 
colouring underway. The capacity of indigenous movements to produce alternative 
representations of the nation is one of the most important factors of change. This strategic 
redefinition of identities have led to the emergence of indigenous movements that self-
identify in ethnic terms and that have distanced themselves from the old peasant movements 
that were imposed on them by leftist parties (Pajuelo Teves 2007:25). Thus, the indigenous 
movements that have been created in several Latin American countries since the mid-1980s, 
do not only defend identities, but they develop them (Brysk 1996:50). This chapter will look 
precisely into these mobilising discourses that have been constructed or “re-invented” and that 
have served as mobilising factors for indigenous organisations in Bolivia and Peru. The 
discussion of the framing processes approach in the theory chapter concluded in the 
formulation of one main variable, viz. mobilising discourses. This variable was further 
41 Understood by Pajuelo as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru.  
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operationalised into three indicators: (1) Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse; (2) 
inclusive indigenous discourse; and (3) connection with anti-neoliberal discourse. The 
assumptions are that these indicators are positively related to the emergence of indigenous 
parties.  
4.1. Prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse 
As previously mentioned, it is often difficult to forge one single voice of a movement 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996:238). Albó and Quispe clarify a point that is often not taken into 
account by researchers, and which is valid for both Bolivia and Peru:  
“The most common thing, particularly in the Andean region, is that the people are both 
indigenous and peasant. In terms of their historical and socioeconomic identity they are 
indigenous (...). But, in socioeconomic terms (...) they are peasants” (2004a:18, my 
translation).  
Thus, the indigenous and the peasant conditions cannot be seen as if they were degrees on one 
single dimension. Rather, they are two distinct dimensions that may, or may not, coincide 
(Albó and Quispe 2004a:18). Albó and Quispe’s point is thus in line with the constructivist 
approach to ethnic identity which was presented in the introduction to this thesis. One 
important dimension of this approach is that individuals may identify or be identified by 
others in multiple ways depending on the context. Moreover, leaders of indigenous 
organisations who strive to forge a collective identity and a dominant discourse in the 
organisations, may make strategic decisions to evaluate which identity and discourse is the 
most efficient to attract affiliates and supporters. However, less salient class cleavages are 
necessary for enhanced performance of indigenous parties (Van Cott and Rice 2006), and the 
following section will look into the dynamics of the salience of class versus ethnic identities 
within the Bolivian and Peruvian organisations created by people who are indigenous 
according to the definition presented in the introduction to this thesis.  
4.1.1 Process of re-indianisation in Bolivia 
Before the Bolivian revolution in 1952, there were strong rural indigenous movements in 
Bolivia that had gained strength in the decade prior to the revolution (García Linera, Chávez 
León et al. 2004:34-7). The  Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), that led the 
revolution, made the mestizo - the synthesis of racial and cultural mixing  of “Indians” and 
Spanish-descendants (Sanjínes C. 2004) - a fundamental ideological support of the new 
consciousness of being a nation-state. The “Indian” was officially renamed peasant, the 
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indigenous and traditional peasant cultures were considered one of the main reasons of the 
country’s backwardness, and the state initiated an assimilation strategy and a populist 
ideology of the mestizo in order to control the indigenous elements of resistance and to make 
them more Western (Ströbele-Gregor 1994). The MNR set out to organise the indigenous 
peasant communities in the Bolivian highlands into agrarian unions through corporatist 
peasant union structures which were imposed on any pre-existing form of rural organisation 
(Ticona 2003:6). The state-created National Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers 
(CNTCB) organised peasants at the provincial, departmental, and national level (Yashar 
2005:160). However, a new type of autonomy appeared in the countryside, as a land reform42
In the 1960s and 1970s in the highland department of La Paz, a new generation of Aymara 
indigenous peasant leaders and intellectuals who called themselves Indianistas and 
Kataristas
 
freed peasants from working for a landlord through granting them resources to work for 
themselves (Albó 1983:34). According to Yashar (2005:162), “indigenous authority structures 
persisted to varying degrees behind the institutional shell of the peasant union federations”. 
Thus, even though the term “indigenous” disappeared from official language in the aftermath 
of the revolution, the wide-held argument that the indigenous identity was traded for a peasant 
identity after the Revolution of 1952 is not valid (Albó and Quispe 2004a; Molina and Albó 
2006). There were always indigenous peoples, but there were times when the indigenous 
discourse was not a mobilising one. Rather, it was attached to stigmatisation (García Linera 
interview 2007).  
43
                                                 
42 Bolivia had the highest Gini Index for land concentration in Latin America prior to the revolution and the 
demands for a land reform had been strong (Eckstein 1983:108).  
 emerged from the traditional union sectors and bilingual schools which were 
both products of the MNR reforms (Rivera Cusicanqui 2003; García Linera, Chávez León et 
al. 2004:113). To be able to understand the rise of Indianismo and particularly Katarismo 
within the agrarian federations, one must remember that in spite of the 1952 revolution’s 
efforts to incorporate the indigenous masses into peasants in exchange for land and state 
subsidies, in reality they were starting to feel like “foreigners in their own homeland” and like 
objects of ethnic discrimination and political manipulation (Ticona Alejo 2003:7). The MNR 
had promised them that if they left their indigenous identity and converted themselves into 
peasants, they would become first class citizens. However, the indigenous people who came 
43 The Kataristas took their name from Tupac Katari, and indigenous leader in Bolivia in the 1780s.  He led an 
army of 40 000 men against the Spaniards  in the Bolivian department of La Paz, but he was killed in 1781. 
According to Garcia Linera (interview 2007), Katari is recognised as the first “Grand Indian leader”.  
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to the cities to study or find work were met with strong racism and discrimination (García 
Linera interview 2007).  
The Indianismo ideology stresses precisely the ethnic basis for the repression of the 
indigenous peoples, is explicitly anti-Western and anti-white, and identifies the source of their 
subordination in racism. The Katarismo ideology, on the other hand, takes a more pragmatic 
stance and merges class consciousness and ethnic claims, and maintains a mixture of 
traditional ethnic and Western systems of government (Van Cott 2005:53)44. The reason why 
this thesis stresses the contribution of the Indianista, and particularly the Katarista, 
ideologies45
In 1983, the Kataristas within the CSUTCB for the first time demanded the creation of a 
pluri-national state. According to García Linera (interview 2007), a pluri-national state is a 
“state which recognises various languages and various types of authority systems, including 
the traditional indigenous forms of direct communitarian participation, consensus democracy, 
and rotating representation”. A pluri-national state was thus a very different state from the 
continuous military regimes that dominated in Bolivia until 1982, and the eventually pacted 
and unrepresentative democracy where the dominant parties alternated in power until 2005 
(Gamarra and Malloy 1995). The demand for a fundamental restructuring of the state, which 
was to be prominent among the demands of the indigenous movements in the 1990s and 
2000s, was also articulated in this period (Ticona Alejo 2003:6). In Bolivia, an indigenous 
discourse was created with the help of Catholic clergy, who developed a theological discourse 
, is because even though they did not maintain political unity, their organisational 
force has had a lasting impact on unions as well as electoral politics in Bolivia, and their 
ethnic discourse started the “re-indianisation” of the Bolivian peasants (Yashar 1998:25). The 
Kataristas were among the first to focus explicitly on the problems connected with the 
recognition of the indigenous peoples in the country (Ticona Alejo 2003), and they worked to  
become leaders of the corporatist unions in the countryside to strengthen local autonomy from 
state structures (Albó 2008a). Eventually they managed to take control of the CNTCB and 
renamed it the Sole Union Confederation of Bolivian Peasant Workers CSUTCB in 1979 
(García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).  
                                                 
44 The Indian Tupak Katari Movement (MITKA) was the most successful Indianist party, whereas the 
Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL) was the most successful Katarista party. 
However, neither MITKA nor MRTKL managed to establish themselves in party politics (Van Cott 2005).  
45 Of the two currents, the Katarista ideology became the more influential of the two, as it built on the unity of 
the union networks of the countryside. The Indianistas mainly organised in the city, and this urban focus 
prevented them from taking advantage of pre-existing transcommunity networks (Albó 2008a).  
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that reappraised the indigenous cultures and languages, as well as promoted the social 
organisation of the indigenous population (Trejo 2000:219). The  Tiwanaku manifest, which 
was published by the Kataristas in 1973, asked the Catholic Church and other denominations 
to collaborate in the liberation of the Aymara and Quechua peoples (Montoya 1998). This first 
round of ethnic re-emergence was limited to the Bolivian highlands.  
The fact that there was an ethnic awakening within the indigenous peasant movement from 
the end of the 1960s does not mean that Bolivian indigenous movements did not apply a class 
discourse, or that leftist parties have not tried to mobilise them. The long dominant Katarismo 
ideology analyses precisely the society with “two eyes”- class and nation: “We have to see 
reality with two eyes: With those of class, like exploited peasants, together with all the others 
who are exploited; and with those of ethnicity, together with all the oppressed nations” (Albó 
2008a:242, my translation). However, leftist and Marxist parties never gained much strength 
in the Bolivian countryside, and did not manage to impose a class identity on the indigenous 
peasant as successfully as in Peru (Albó 2008a). The MNR government, in spite of its name 
which alludes to a revolutionary left, was nationalist (García Linera interview 2007). In spite 
of the influence and strength of indigenous discourses in the CSUTCB and in other incipient 
organisations, there was a type of state indigenismo46
                                                 
46 Indigenismo was a policy implemented by many Latin American countries from the beginning of the 20th 
century and until the mid-1950s. The states sought to solve the “Indian problem” through civilising and 
assimilation projects where the goal was to integrate the indigenous people into the various nations and into the 
markets. This state-led indigenismo was strongest in Mexico, but also in Peru it gained strength. The most 
important Peruvian indigenistas were Hildebrando Castro Pozo and Luis Valcárcel (Pajuelo 2005:112).   
 that neutralised the autonomy and the 
emancipating project of the Katarismo and Indianismo-influenced indigenous movements 
until 2000, when the recent period of large indigenous mobilisations started (García Linera, 
Chávez León et al. 2004:121). The implementation of neo-liberalism in Bolivia in 1985 
displaced the unions as political and social protagonists, and indigenous movements and their 
ethnic discourse were weakened. Moreover, the dominant political parties that had 
implemented the neoliberal reforms were successful in co-opting numerous leaders of the 
indigenous movements. One example is that the Katarista party, the Revolutionary Tupaj 
Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL) ran with the neoliberal party MNR in the 1993 
elections in what appeared to be a very unlikely alliance (Albó 1994). However, as will be 
analysed in section 4.3, an indigenous discourse that had been weakened during the 1980s and 
1990s regained strength from 2000, when a discourse that articulated opposition to the 
neoliberal policies intertwined with an indigenous discourse (Albó 2008a:242).  
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During this last round of indigenous mobilisations, several organisations have taken conscious 
decisions to assume a prominent indigenous identity as a mechanism of unity, differentiation, 
and mobilisation (García Linera interview 2007). According to Yashar (2005:187), the 
cocalero (coca-growers) movement, where current president Evo Morales received his 
political and organisational training, was initially defending the rights of the coca-farmers to 
cultivate their parcels of coca leaf47
Moreover, as we will see in chapter 5, branches of the CSUTCB have been continuously 
ridden by internal rivalries that have included the discussion of whether to predominantly 
promote a classist or an indigenous mobilising discourse
 and their discourse was classist. Eventually, they self-
consciously started to refer to ethnicity as a key component of their political struggle. 
According to Zuazo (interview 2007), the discourse of Movement toward Socialism (MAS), 
an indigenous party that originated in the cocalero movement in 1995, was one of rupture of 
the model of the dominant and, for them, unrepresentative state. The discourse was not ethnic, 
but rather articulated popular demands. Similarly, Goedeking (interview 2007) finds the fact 
that Evo Morales is portrayed internationally as Latin America’s first indigenous president 
curious. He argues that Morales is a unionist, first and foremost, and that the MAS did not 
publicly articulate an ethnic discourse before after they had won the presidential elections in 
2005. Albó (2008a), on the other hand, finds the MAS and the cocalero movement to be one 
of the best examples of the merging of class and ethnic discourses.  
48. The highland organisation 
National Council of Ayllus and Markas of the Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ), which was created in 
1997, is explicitly indigenous with claims of a cultural character. They work to reconstitute 
the ayllu,49
                                                 
47 The coca bush is a traditional plant that has been cultivated in the Andean region for more than 4,000 years. 
The coca leaf has been used for medical purposes, to alleviate altitude sickness, hunger and thirst. It is a strong 
symbol for indigenous identity in the Andean countries. In the Western world, the leaf is mostly known for its 
use in the production of the drug cocaine. However, only one per cent of the leaf contains the substance used to 
produce cocaine (Berge 2008). 
 the old communitarian organisational mode in the highlands. The CONAMAQ is 
very critical of the unionist structures and the class discourse which still influence many 
Bolivian organisations, and accuses particularly the CSUTSB of being unionists (García 
Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004; interview Williams Bascopé 2007). According to Lucero 
(2006:39), the efforts of the CSUTCB and the coca-growers to “indianise” their discourses 
have happened partly as  a consequence of the emergence of CONAMAQ, as well as a result 
48 The branches of La Paz, Oruro and Potosi tend to assume an ethnic discourse, whereas Santa Cruz, Beni and 
Cochabamba to a larger degree maintain a peasant discourse (García Linera interview 2007).   
49 An ayllu was the social core of the Andean culture that has survived colonisation and the republican time. Its 
organisation includes the family or the relatives (Montoya 1998).  
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of the explicit and successful indigenous discourse of the largest lowland organisation, the 
Confederation of Indigenous Peoples in Eastern Bolivia (CIDOB). Stefanoni calls this process 
a “wiphalisation” of Bolivian social movement organisations (2004). According to Albó 
(2008a:243), it is likely that this process of “indianisation” of discourses can be explained by 
the efforts of the organisations to gain a larger presence and support. Moreover, these efforts 
could be situated within the game theory-oriented constructivist approach to ethnicity in 
which a group of individuals with multiple identities decide to act collectively and frequently 
encounter an identity dilemma (Trejo 2000:213). 
In the Bolivian lowlands, which consist of the departments of Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Santa 
Cruz, an ethnic conscience and discourse emerged at a later stage than in the highlands. 
However, the subject of indigenous territoriality in general, and the rights of the indigenous 
peoples in the lowland, in particular, surfaced by the end of the 1970s, and particularly in the 
1980s and 1990s (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:275). The CIDOB and other 
affiliated organisations launched a series of marches to claim their right to their ancestral 
territories during the 1990s. Following the success of these marches, the lowland indigenous 
peoples achieved a greater level of acceptance in the urban society, the NGOs were more 
sympathetic to their cause, and, most importantly, the indigenous identity became one of the 
principal components through which the indigenous peoples present themselves publically 
before the rest of society. The marches contributed to the symbolic transformation of the 
significance of the indigenous category. Before the marches, there was still a collective 
resistance among the members of various indigenous groups to self-identify as indigenous  
(García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:230-43).  
4.1.2 Long-term prevailing class discourse in Peru 
A much-cited argument for the apparent lack of indigenous mobilisation in Peru is that the 
indigenous peoples have traded their indigenous identity for a class identity (Yashar 1998). 
This thesis argues that this line of argumentation is oversimplified. Firstly, it is only the 
indigenous population in the Peruvian highlands that has tended to identify as peasants rather 
than as indigenous. However, in line with the constructivist approach to identity which was 
exemplified by Albó and Quispe (2004a), their ethnic identity did not disappear. Rather, the 
peasant discourse overshadowed ethnic discourses for decades. The recuperation of an 
indigenous identity in the highlands has been slow and only partial, but an increasingly visible 
ethnic discourse has developed from the end of the 1990s (Pajuelo Teves 2006; Albó 2008a). 
Secondly, the Peruvian Amazonian population never suffered from the “peasant attack”, 
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which will be presented shortly, and the indigenous identification has been much stronger 
there (Albó 2008a:181).  
The currently largest Amazonian indigenous organisations, the Interethnic Association of the 
Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP) and the Confederation of Peruvian Amazonian Nationalities 
(CONAP), self-identify as indigenous, and more recently as native50
The question is then why a class discourse overshadowed an ethnic discourse for decades in 
the Peruvian highlands. According to the anthropologists Albó, Montoya, and Diez 
(interviews 2007), one explanation lies in the defeat and execution of “the first indigenous 
intellectual”, Túpac Amaru
. The case of the Peruvian 
Amazon is peculiar compared to the highlands, because as the central state was virtually 
absent, the control of the area was broadly transferred to churches until the last third of the 
20th century. For example, the Peruvian state signed a contract with the evangelical Summer 
Institute of Linguistics (SIL), which promoted assimilation through bible translations, 
bicultural education, and provided training of a new generation of indigenous professionals 
and intellectuals (Montoya 1998:160; Yashar 2005). Thus, future leaders were provided skills 
and networks that would later help them in the creation of indigenous movements from the 
end of the 1960s. Furthermore, native communities formed alliances with catholic and 
protestant churches to oppose the secular agendas of states, which ultimately led to their  
tribal or ethnic categories becoming frames to express their identities and demands without 
being assimilated into political parties, labour unions, or peasant organisations (Brown 
1993:314-322). According to Vega (2010:3), the Amazonian indigenous population has gone 
through an intense process of change during the last part of the 20th century, which has led to 
a search for new forms of expression of their identities, exercise of their citizenship, as well as 
the demand that the state offer them access to the benefits of modernity and construct a 
development which respects their cultural identity. However, the indigenous population in the 
Peruvian Amazon only constitutes 1.2 percent of the total population (INEI 2009).  
51
                                                 
50 “Originario” is the Spanish term for “native”. 
 II, in 1781 in Cusco, the heart of the Peruvian indigenous 
highlands. This defeat had repercussions for indigenous mobilising that still are valid- the 
indigenous elites were literally wiped out. In fact, Peru still lacks an indigenous elite or 
indigenous intellectuals who can lead large mobilisations (Montoya 1998). According to Luis 
Vittor (2010a), there are people who speak about the indigenous movement, but not people 
51 Tupak Amaru II was the leader of an indigenous rebellion against the Spanish colonisers in the highland 
region of Cusco.  
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who speak from within the indigenous organisations. Secondly, the process of mestizaje was 
much stronger in Peru than in Bolivia. The state opened institutions directed at attending the 
“Indian Problem”. In 1946, the Peruvian Indigenista Institute (IIP) was created with the goal 
of integrating the “Indian” into the nation52
A third explanation can be traced to the effects of the Revolutionary Government of the 
Armed Forces (RGAF), which lasted from 1968 until 1975. General Velasco Alvarado took 
power though a coup in 1968 in a context of extreme land inequalities and peasant 
mobilisations (Yashar 2005:230). The regime opted for the construction of a unitary and 
culturally homogenous nation through reforms which introduced bilingualism, a land 
reform
. These assimilation policies were promoted by the 
state over several decades (Pajuelo Teves 2005:112), and rejected the possibility of a 
complementary double identity - the Peruvian and the indigenous (Vittor 2010a). The 
Peruvian indigenistas often have a paternalist attitude to and a romantic vision of the 
indigenous movements,- a vision which is often mixed with racism (Vittor 2010a). Moreover, 
the assimilationist ideology can be summarised as “Incas yes, Indians no” (Méndez 1996), 
which precisely refers to this rhetorical romanticised view of the Incas, and the ignorance of 
today’s indigenous populations (Greene 2005:34). In Bolivia, however, the elites’ attempts at 
forging a nation of Bolivian mestizos have been very weak (García Linera interview 2007).  
53, and the recognition of Quechua as an official language (Pajuelo Teves 2005:113). 
Moreover, the regime changed the name of the officially recognised “Indian communities”54
                                                 
52 Particularly the government of Leguía (1919-1930) was active in this regard. In 1920, it recognised the 
existence of indigenous communities, and the “Indian Day” was instituted (Pajuelo 2005:112).  
 
in the highlands to “peasant communities”. The term “native communities” was introduced to 
refer to the indigenous communities in the Amazon (Yashar 2005:230-1). These statutes 
recognised the native communities’ internal laws, whereas the peasant communities were 
increasingly regulated by the state (Albó 2008a:179). The RGAF created corporatist 
structures to organise the newly “baptised peasants” (Albó 1991), and, like in Bolivia, 
adopted organising and mobilising methods from urban labour unions, which were imposed 
on the traditional Andean organisational structures (Peeler 2003:260). An important point is 
that these corporatist structures were not implemented in the Amazonian region. In 1971, the 
National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) was created by the state to turn lands into 
cooperatives as well as counter the radical influence of the Peruvian Peasant Confederation 
53 The land reform was very radical in scope and had a stronger impact on large landowners than similar reforms 
in Bolivia, Mexico, Chile, or Venezuela (McClintock 1981:60-2).  
54 While, the 1920 Constitution recognised the legal representation of indigenous communities, traditional forms 
of organisation were not recognised (Albó 2008:176).  
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(CCP)55. The support for Velasco’s proposal of a peasant discourse was unexpectedly strong, 
as the CCP and CNA, and the Marxist left, adopted the peasant term (Montoya 1998). During 
the 1970s, the CNA and CCP were influenced by radical Marxists and Maoists who rejected 
an indigenous identity. The indigenous population and its forms of social organisation were 
considered as “remnants” and ethnic differences had to dilute to become integrated into the 
national proletariat (Ruíz Hernández 2001:24-5). Thus, the CCP and CNA never developed a 
discourse based on ethnic claims, but stuck to their imposed peasant identity and claims that 
were limited to the highlands (Remy 1994; Pajuelo Teves 2006). However, some attempts at 
following in the footsteps of the Bolivian Kataristas were sporadically seen56
A fourth reason for the dominance of the class discourse in the highlands is that the influence 
of liberation theology in the Peruvian countryside has been weak. According to Tanaka 
(interview 2007), the Catholic Church in Peru has been dominated by a pure classist theology 
of liberation
, but they were 
not successful (Albó 2008a:183).   
57
                                                 
55 The CCP had been central in land invasions in the highlands in the 1960s, and was controlled by the Peruvian 
Maoist Communist Party, which made the CCP one of the most radical peasant organisations in the continent 
(Albó 2008a:179).  
. Only a smaller part of the Peruvian clergy adopted the ideas of liberation 
theology, and those who did were likely to be replaced by more conservative priests. 
Moreover, the strength of the leftist organisations weakened the influence of liberation 
theology (Sánchez 1996:101). A fifth reason lies in the strong discrimination in Peruvian 
society and the subsequent reluctance of indigenous peoples to refer to themselves as 
indigenous. In the highland Quechua and Aymara communities the terms “Indian” and 
“indigenous” have been rejected to a very large degree. Their own designation would be Runa 
or Qaqi, which means human beings (Montoya 1998:150-2). In Peru, ideological differences 
between the traditional economic and political elites and the peasant and labour unions, 
including indigenous organisations, have become increasingly racialised. Peruvian author 
Mario Varga Llosa, who unsuccessfully ran for president in 1990, may serve as an illustration, 
as he stated that the indigenous movements in Peru and neighbouring countries promote social 
and political disorder, and constitute an obstacle to development (Felix 2008:311). Finally, an 
56 At the CCP’s National Congress in 1978, a group of Aymaras from Puno who were inspired by the Bolivian 
Kataristas emerged waving the wiphala. Shortly after the congress, they created the Federation of Communities 
and Peasants of Aymara Nationality Tupac Katari. However, the CCP soon after excluded them for being 
divisive (Albó 2008a: 183).  
57 Liberation theology is “an interpretation of Christian faith through the poor's suffering, their struggle and 
hope, and a critique of society and the Catholic faith and Christianity through the eyes of the poor" (Berryman 
1987). 
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important point is the presence of the Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrilla movement, 
which emerged in 1980 in the southern highland region of Ayacucho and gradually expanded 
to large parts of the Peruvian highlands as well as the Amazon. The Shining Path was Maoist 
and rejected an indigenous discourse. However, at the start of the rebellion it was considered 
to be an ethnic rebellion as the guerrilla originated in the indigenous highland region of 
Ayacucho (Starn, Degregori et al. 2005). Its influence in the Peruvian countryside did not fade 
away until its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was arrested in September 1992. Thus, Peru, unlike 
Bolivia and other Latin American countries, did not see large demonstrations to celebrate the 
500 years of resistance to colonisation in October 1992. These mobilisations served as a 
mobilising energiser for ethnic movements and ethnic discourses throughout the continent. 
However, just a month after the capture of Guzmán, it was difficult to mobilise Peruvian 
indigenous peoples, from both the highlands and the Amazon, as the armed conflict reached 
both areas (Chirif and García 2009:3)58
De la Cadena (2000) argues that even though ethnic social movements have been weak in 
Peru, this does not imply that indigenous involvement in politics has been absent. In the 
decades prior to the land reform under General Velasco, there was a movement of indigenous 
land seizures. However, the language of ethnicity was not the only one available to 
indigenous subjects, and the indigenous were trapped within “racialized, discriminatory 
practices” (de la Cadena 2008:343). The slow awakening of an explicit indigenous discourse 
and identity in the Peruvian highlands was not seen before the end of the 1990s (Pajuelo 
Teves 2006; Albó 2008a). Today, new organisations, intellectuals, and activists increasingly 
identify themselves as indigenous. This process has been particularly evident in the central 
and southern highlands (Felix 2008:312). According to Felix (2008), indigenous identities 
have been transformed from “archaic” to new ways of thinking about indigeneity to show that 
the indigenous peoples in the highlands “are here and are alive”. Several factors have 
contributed to the reappraisal of indigenous identities. Firstly, Peruvian, Ecuadorian, and 
Bolivian indigenous organisations
.  
59 started a program of exchange, where political and 
organisational experiences were shared (Felix 2008; Vittor 2010a). Furthermore, the diffusion 
or demonstration effect from Bolivian and Ecuadorian movements has been important. 
International NGOs and development agencies60
                                                 
58 Other effects of the presence of Shining Path will be dealt with further in chapter 6.  
 have also provided support and meeting 
59 This program included particularly the Bolivian organisation CONAMAQ and the Ecuadorian organisation 
Ecuador Runakunapak Rikcharimuy (ECUARUNARI) (Vittor 2010a). 
60 Active NGOs include Oxfam America, IWGIA, and Ibis Denmark (Felix 2008).  
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spaces for dispersed communities (Felix 2008). Moreover, Chirif and García (2009) claim that 
the explicit indigenous identification among the Amazonian peoples have influenced the re-
construction of identities in the highlands.  
One of the first signs of the revival of indigenous identities in the highlands was the creation 
of the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples in Peru (COPPIP) in 1997 in Cusco. 
COPPIP was the result of the First National Congress of Human Rights and Indigenous 
Peoples in Peru, which was organised by a group of intellectuals with links to some 
organisations (Pajuelo Teves 2005:127). Organisations from the highlands, CCP and CNA, 
and the Amazon, AIDESEP and CONAP, attended the founding meeting (Pajuelo Teves 
2006:73-74). COPPIP will be dealt with further in chapter 5, when considering the brokerage 
mechanism, as the organisation must be considered an umbrella organisation.  
The currently most important highland organisation which has made claims of a cultural or 
indigenous character is the National Confederation for Communities Affected by Mining 
(CONACAMI) (Felix 2008:313). CONACAMI was created in 1999, and emerged in response 
to the conflicts between mining companies, whose presence are increasing in Peru following a 
boost in mining investments61
                                                 
61 Between 1990 and 1997, mining investments in Peru increased with 2.000 percent, compared to 400 percent 
on average in the rest of Latin America (Albó 2008a: 206). 
, and nearby communities. Before the creation of CONACAMI, 
communities organised their isolated fights to defend their rights both because they do not 
benefit from the extractive industry’s enclave economy, and because their living conditions 
are harmed, not least by water pollution (Albó 2008a; Vittor 2009a). According to 
CONACAMI advisor Luis Vittor (interview 2007), the organisation self-identifies as 
indigenous-peasant, because “our composition is ancestral, but at the same time there are 
agricultural organisations within CONACAMI who have (…) a peasant identification”. Albó 
(2008a:209-10) argues that CONACAMI’s demand that the ILO Convention 169 on the rights 
of indigenous and tribal peoples, is followed by the state, has contributed to the framing of 
their demands based on an indigenous identity. The ILO 169  recognises the collective rights 
of indigenous peoples over their traditional land, and includes a requirement that states 
consult these peoples about development initiatives that may affect their territories (Benavides 
2000:65). The mobilising discourse of CONACAMI, which combines opposition to neoliberal 
reforms and indigenous claims, will be dealt with further in section 4.3. According to 
Montoya (interview 2007), CONACAMI is a possible foetus for significant indigenous 
mobilisation in the future. However, Vittor (2010a) claims that the government, media, and 
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civil society do not perceive the organisation as “indigenous”. Rather, CONACAMI is 
referred to as an NGO or an anti-mining organisation. According to Paredes (2006), “the 
indigenous-mining discourse” within CONACAMI is based on stereotypes such as 
“indigenous territories” which do not reflect the reality of the affected communities. Vittor 
(2010a) denies these arguments, and claims that such misconceptions is part of the 
“invisibilisation of the Andean indigenous elements” in Peru, - the inexistence of the 
indigenous peoples before the government and the dominant society. Albó (2008a:211), again 
in the case of CONACAMI, refers to the dialectic relationship between ethnicity and class, 
which is a creative game “between reality, necessities, and immediate claims, and the 
recognition and recuperation of identities which give a deeper meaning to the claims”.  
 4.2 Inclusive indigenous discourse 
The indigenous movements that have appeared throughout the Latin American continent have 
demanded that their right to be different is recognised: “We are equal, we are different”, has 
been the slogan (Brysk 2007:29). In other words, they want to be part of the national societies, 
but at the same time have the right to be different, which, consequently, leads to the demand 
for a more inclusive model of citizenship (Pajuelo Teves 2006:69). Movements have 
increasingly fought for a pluri-national re-construction of the state and of society, and this 
project is important in the current political actions of social movements in Bolivia, as well as 
in Peru (Pajuelo Teves 2007:26). According to Martí i Puig (2008), an inclusive indigenous 
discourse has been necessary for indigenous parties to become successful. However, not all 
indigenous organisations have used this discourse, but rather set the national and local 
identities against each other.  
4.2.1 Bolivia- salient inclusive indigenous discourse  
In the Bolivian lowlands, the demand to be recognised as different within the limits of the 
nation-state is the prevailing discourse. The lowland indigenous organisations demand that the 
state recognises their demands and access to resources like any Bolivian citizen (García 
Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:243).  
In the Bolivian highlands, by contrast, there has been a stronger tendency of setting the local 
identity against the national, Bolivian identity. Particularly the Aymara, who is the dominant 
ethnic group in the highland departments of La Paz and Oruro, question the relevance of the 
Bolivian identity as the denomination of the population that inhabits the country. Thus, 
contrary to the lowland indigenous population, several highland indigenous organisations tend 
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to justify their claims to be seen as a separate nation by their historically differentiated 
existence prior to the formation of the Bolivian state.  
One may speak of two different ways of organisation of collective identities, where the former 
emphasis prefers a dialogue in the broader context, whereas the latter is of a more disruptive 
kind (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:244). Felipe Quispe, leader of Indigenous 
Pachakutik Movement (MIP)62
“We have Quechua affiliates [in MIP]. They have always submitted themselves to us, 
never have they said that they want to take the lead (…). Because the Quechua is less 
rebellious than the Aymara. There is not much cultural difference between the Aymara 
and the Quechua, but the Aymaras have launched political parties, the Aymaras have 
made history”
, is perhaps the most prominent voice of the radical Aymara 
discourse of “the two Bolivias”. This discourse holds that there are two Bolivian nations, viz. 
the indigenous nation, and the foreign nation composed of ‘qaras’- whites, and mestizos 
(Pajuelo Teves 2007:56). According to Quispe (interview 2007), MIP adheres to the 
Indianista current within the recent wave of Bolivian indigenous mobilisations. Even though 
he admits that classism exists, the most important battle is the fight for the Nación Kollasuyu, 
the Grand Aymara Nation, which should cover the Aymara-dominated part of Bolivia 
(primarily the departments of La Paz and Oruro), and parts of Peru, Chile and Argentina. A 
pertinent question to be asked is why the Aymara discourse is so much more radical than 
other Bolivian ethnic discourses. According to Moira Zuazo (interview 2007), the Quechua, 
which is the largest Bolivian indigenous group, is much more open to the “western” world 
than are the Aymaras. The Aymaras managed to maintain a high conscience of cultural 
identity throughout the Spanish rule. The history of the Aymaras since the Spanish conquest 
has been marked by fights for survival and resistance (Goedeking, interview 2007). This is a 
point that Felipe Quispe (interview 2007) emphasises:  
63
Indeed, most of the large indigenous movements in the highlands have originated in the 
Aymara-dominated department of La Paz. However, according to Moira Zuazo (interview 
2007), the exclusive ethnic identity promoted by Quispe and MIP has not been successful in 
attracting affiliates, not even in the Aymara-dominated areas. García Linera (interview 2007) 
.  
                                                 
62 Quispe is also a former leader of the Tupaj Katari Guerilla Army (EGTK), and former secretary general of the 
CSUTCB.  
63 Quispe principally refers to the before mentioned Indian Tupak Katari Movement (MITKA). 
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considers the radical discourse of Quispe to have been very effective with regard to the 
construction of discourses that served as the inspiration for large mobilisations in the Bolivian 
highlands from 2000 until 2005: “Felipe [Quispe] is able to make a speech and inflame a 
hundred thousand people”. However, his radical discourse did not manage to unify the 
indigenous organisations. According to García Linera (interview 2007), Quispe is a poor 
“weaver”, in the sense that his discourse is too radical to unite large numbers of affiliates and 
organisations. Evo Morales, by contrast, is an “excellent weaver, and holds outstanding 
capabilities to organise. Similarly, Madrid (2008:475), considers the more inclusive ethnic 
discourse of MAS a success, as it combines a populist appeal, which succeeded in forming 
alliances, with representation of a diversity of ethnic groups, approaching all members of the 
nation.  
4.2.2 Peru- prevailing inclusive indigenous discourse 
Roughly speaking, one could say that the Amazonian indigenous organisations in Peru 
maintain a relatively moderate indigenous discourse, working for the integration of their 
indigenous communities into the national society (Montoya 1998:154). The largest indigenous 
organisations are multi-ethnic, thus preventing the extremely exclusive discourse seen in 
some Bolivian highland organisations. Moreover, the political party the Indigenous 
Movement of the Peruvian Amazon (MIAP), which was created by AIDESEP in 1996, aims 
to be a political alternative both for indigenous and non-indigenous (Van Cott 2005:171). The 
MIAP will be dealt with further in chapter 6.  
In the Peruvian highlands, by contrast, more radical and ethno-exclusive discourses have 
erupted at intervals. In the 1980s, the Indian Tawantinsuyo Movement (MIT), the Inka 
Movement (MI), and the Ayllu Integration (IA) group emerged. A common denominator for 
all these organisations is that they reappraised the word “Indian”, claimed a war against the 
occident, and searched for a second Tawantinsuyo64
                                                 
64 Tawantinsuyo refers to “The Four Territories” of what today is best known as the “Inca Empire” (Huber 
2008).  
. In other words, their discourse was 
radical and ethno-exclusive, and they did not manage to reach out to the highland 
communities (Montoya 1998:138-9). Thus, these organisations’ success was marginal. Also 
more recently there have been attempts at creating radical and in certain ways exclusive 
indigenous discourses in the Peruvian highlands. The Cusco Declaration from 2006, which 
was formulated at the foundational congress of the Andean Coordinator of Indigenous 
Organisations (CAOI) with the presence of CONACAMI, speaks of the expiration of mono-
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national and mono-cultural nation-states, demanding the foundation of a pluri-national state. 
More radical is the demand for a political reconstruction of the Tawantinsuyo and the Abya 
Yala65
4.3 Connection with anti-neoliberal discourse  
 (Huber 2008:8). According to Montoya (1998:154), the sporadic and more radical 
indigenous discourses of smaller highland organisations, can possibly be explained by the fact 
that the Peruvian Quechua, who constitute the largest indigenous group,  do not feel that there 
is a “Peruvian identity”,  and have thus not so far opted for a double citizenship. Yet, the 
inclusive indigenous discourse, like the one promoted by CONACAMI- an organisation 
which includes both indigenous and peasant identities - is the dominant discourse in the 
Peruvian highlands.  
According to Martí i Puig (2008:705-8), indigenous organisations’ discourses are more likely 
to be successful when they are connected with opposition to the neoliberal reforms. The 
implementation of these reforms have generated an ethnic awakening in many Latin 
American countries (Yashar 2005; Pajuelo Teves 2007). Particularly, reforms that have 
threatened the inalienability of communally held land have challenged the indigenous concept 
of territoriality and given further impetus to the fight against neo-liberalism (Yashar 2005:68). 
The aim of this section is to evaluate the degree to which Bolivian and Peruvian indigenous 
organisations have linked their indigenous discourses to an anti-neoliberal discourse.  
4.3.1 Bolivia- intertwining of ethnic and anti-neoliberal discourses  
In Bolivia, the mobilisations against neoliberal reforms from 2000 marked a watershed for the 
social movements. These mobilisations joined together numerous SMOs and civil society 
groups, such as indigenous organisations, students, workers, neighbourhood associations, and 
sectors of the middle class (Arce 2008:41). However, the indigenous organisations were the 
protagonists of the protests (García Linera interview 2007). According to García Linera et al. 
(2004), the various Bolivian social movements were converted into a “societal movement” 
which forced two presidents, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and Carlos Mesa, to resign. To be 
able to understand the success of this combination of an indigenous and anti-neoliberal 
discourse, a brief background on the nature of the neoliberal reforms in Bolivia is required. 
The neoliberal reforms in Bolivia were the most radical in Latin America, after Chile, and 
among the most innovative in the world. The process of neoliberal restructuring has gone 
through three phases (Kohl 2006:305). The first started in 1985 with the New Economic 
                                                 
65 Abya Yala refers to the Latin American continent and originated among the Kuna ethnic group of Panama. 
Currently, the term has been adopted by many Latin American indigenous organisations (Huber 2008).  
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Policy (NEP) and the imposition of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) to halt the 
hyperinflation that was plaguing the country66
The second phase was dominated by the Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada administration (1993-
1997), which implemented the Plan for All
. The NEP stabilised the economy, but did not 
address the fundamental economic problems. Jobs within the mining and manufacturing 
industries were dramatically reduced, and by 1988, the informal economy included more than 
70 percent of the urban work force (Kohl 2006:311). The majority of the Bolivian indigenous 
population now lives in the cities (Albó 2008a:22), thus constituting a large part of the 
informal work force.  
67 which among other things, but most importantly 
here, led to the privatisation of the largest state- owned companies68
The third phase started with the Cochabamba Water War in 2000, which marked the first 
significant and successful popular battle against neo-liberalism. The municipal-owned water 
company in Cochabamba was sold to Aguas del Tunari, a consortium owned by the US-based 
Bechtel, in late 1999. Shortly after the handover, water prices increased by as much as 400 
percent in some areas (Finnegan 2002). The Committee to Defend Water and Life was created 
in the city of Cochabamba, federations within the cocalero movement and the CSUTCB 
joined the protests (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004), and finally the water 
privatisation was withdrawn (Arce 2008:47). The resistance among popular and indigenous 
sectors against the privatisation of the oil sector increased, and the protests became even more 
accentuated when the Sanchez de Lozada government wanted to export gas to the United 
 of which the state-owned 
gas and oil company (YPFB) was the most important. The social movements considered the 
capitalisation to be a sell-out of Bolivian resources to transnational corporations (Kohl 2004; 
Kohl 2006). Furthermore, the National Agrarian Reform Institute Law (INRA), known as “the 
second land reform”, was implemented in 1996 and reversed the rights established by the 
1953 land reform, viz. the recognition of the social function of land and land ownership to the 
tiller (Kohl 2006:315). Many indigenous organisations, particularly the lowland-based 
CIDOB, mobilised against this reform that contributed to the concentration of land ownership 
(García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).  
                                                 
66 The NEP was implemented by Victor Paz Estenssoro, one of the main leaders of the 1952 MNR-led 
revolution. One of the revolutionary government’s main achievements was the nationalisation of the mines, and 
it is thus ironical that Paz Estenssoro in 1985 privatised these state-owned mines and other enterprises.  
67 ‘Plan de Todos’. 
68 With the implementation of the Capitalisation Law, 50 percent of the shares in state industries that until then 
had provided 60 percent of all government revenues were sold to multinational companies (Kohl 2006). 
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States through a pipeline to a Chilean port69
Both Evo Morales (MAS) and Felipe Quispe (MIP) were prominent in the mobilisations 
against neoliberal reforms, and they both “became household names throughout rural Bolivia” 
(Kohl 2006:318). Morales led many mobilisations and blockades both before and in support 
of the water protests. Resistance to the privatisation of water is a very strong and symbolic 
mobilising factor, as it illustrates the worst of neo-liberalism (García Linera, Chávez León et 
al. 2004). At the time, the cocaleros were already highly mobilised because of the protests 
against the US-supported coca eradication policies in the Chapare region of Cochabamba. 
Even though the coca eradication cannot be considered part of the neoliberal programs, 
Morales succeeded in linking “a common nationalist thread” around the defense of coca-
growing and the resistance to the privatisation of the hydrocarbon resources. After Morales 
was elected to Congress in 2002 and MAS formed the largest opposition party, he articulated 
an explicit anti-neoliberal stance both in Congress and in the streets (Kohl 2006:318-9).  
 in 2002. A National Coordinator for the Defence 
and Recovery of Gas - an unlikely coalition of cocaleros, union representatives, highland 
indigenous organisations, and military leaders - was established. In September 2003, the 
various organisations involved in this coordinator were able to carry out a series of nation-
wide violent actions, which ultimately led to the resignation of President Sanchez de Lozada 
(Kohl 2006:320).   
Felipe Quispe also lent on an explicit anti-neoliberal discourse combined with Indianist 
nationalism, through which he mobilised indigenous peasants and urban inhabitants in the 
department of La Paz on the basis of resistance to the INRA law and a new water law (García 
Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). According to Quispe (interview 2007), he and his 
organisation, MIP, were the protagonists of the mobilisations against the neoliberal reforms:  
“We have fought against the neoliberal governments, because in our country we have had 
leaders who have sold our natural riches that Mother Nature gave us”. García Linera 
(interview 2007), agrees that Quispe’s mobilising discourse was highly successful in the 
protests and rebellions in the department of La Paz, particularly during the Gas War. 
Furthermore, Quispe (interview 2007) argues that this sell-out of resources is not new, but has 
been present since the arrival of the Spanish conquerors. However, the recent round of 
neoliberal reforms worsened the situation: “We have lost land and territory. We no longer 
have the control of the soil, the subsoil, and the air. That is where the natural riches are (…) - 
                                                 
69 Many Bolivians have a hostile relationship with Chile after the loss of Bolivia’s coastline to Chile in the 
Pacific War (1879-1883).  
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the iron, the gold, the plants, and especially the hydrocarbons. But we do not possess these 
natural resources”. According to Tanaka (interview 2007), the neoliberal reforms provided a 
fertile context for the ethnic discourse in Bolivia, as it gave more oxygen to the indigenous 
cause. Other authors point to the fact that the counter-movements that mobilised on the 
grounds of nationalist or indigenous discourses, managed to collectively identify neo-
liberalism as the root of Bolivia’s difficulties (Kohl 2006:321).   
4.3.2 Peru- recent anti-neoliberal discourse 
Mobilisations against neoliberal reforms have been much weaker and fragmented in Peru than 
in Bolivia, and started at a later stage. According to Martí i Puig (2008:708), Peruvian 
indigenous organisations have not applied an antagonistic discourse to neoliberal politics. 
However, in light of the past few years’ incidents, this observation does not present an 
accurate picture. AIDESEP and CONACAMI have increasingly articulated anti-neoliberal 
ideas. According to Greene (2005), the leaders of the Andean organisations have followed in 
the footsteps of the Amazonian organisations, who were the initiators of the combined 
indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourses. According to the Peruvian Ombudsman Office70
When Alberto Fujimori was elected president in 1990, he turned against his electoral 
promises and implemented a package of neoliberal reforms known as the “fujishock”. At first, 
the neoliberal restructuring was met with little societal resistance, as the reforms were 
implemented in a period of a “devastated” Peruvian society due the ongoing civil war, a 
collapse in the party system (Kenney 2003), and the economic crisis which had escalated 
under President Garcia’s (1985-1990) disastrous economic policies (Pajuelo Teves 2005). 
Indigenous, as well as peasant sectors supported him initially. However, this support faded 
 
(2010:6), there are 260 active social conflicts in Peru, of which more than fifty percent are 
linked to socio-environmental issues (Defensoría del Pueblo 2010:6). These localised 
conflicts are driven by mineral extraction, oil exploration and production, and subsequent 
environmental contamination (Defensoría del Pueblo 2007). However, this thesis will only 
focus on the intertwining of ethnic and indigenous discourses related to mining extraction, 
which has given rise to CONACAMI, and the so-called “Jungle Laws”, which opened up the 
Amazon to foreign investments and led to large mobilisations led by AIDESEP in Bagua in 
June 2009. First, a backdrop for this recently developed discourse is required.  
                                                 
70 Defensoría del Pueblo. 
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away over the course of his term, as communal land was liberalised71 through the 
implementation of a new land law in 1995, which removed the inalienability of community-
held land. This law was designed to promote private investments both in the Amazon and in 
the highlands (Hughes 2010:88). Indigenous communities considered the law to be a serious 
threat to their existence, although all the administrations since the removal of Velasco (1975) 
had implemented policies that implied privatisation of land and cuts in agricultural 
subsidies72. The implementation of neoliberal reforms gradually led to instability in the 
countryside as poverty rates increased tremendously in the 1980s and 1990s (Yashar 
2005:67). Moreover, foreign investment, particularly mining and oil companies, were 
facilitated entrance into indigenous-populated areas in the highlands and the Amazon (Arce 
2008; Albó 2008a:193-4). The mining industry is principally located in the Peruvian 
highlands, and the industry has given rise to conflicts73
The mobilising discourse of the largest indigenous highland organisation, CONACAMI, is 
precisely a combination of “the right to land” in socio-economic terms, and a “concept of 
territory”, which reflects an indigenous discourse. In Peru, mining investments have increased 
five-fold during the 1990s due to the strong emphasis on foreign direct investment (Arce 
2008:52). The fundamental problem is that mining corporations want mining concessions for 
land which is classified as allegedly empty land, whilst local communities claim that the land 
has a deeper meaning for them, - it is their territory (de la Cadena 2008). The increasing use 
and understanding of ILO 169 by CONACAMI has come as a consequence of exchanges with 
Bolivian and Ecuadorian indigenous movements (Vittor 2010b) and has contributed to the 
framing of demands based on an indigenous identity (Albó 2008a:209-10).  
 related to contamination, land rights, 
water management, as well as the management of concessions (Arce 2008:53).  
                                                 
71 Fujimori liberalised land markets through giving the peasant communities the right to sell land that until then 
had been inalienable. Moreover, his administration eliminated the remnants of agricultural subsidies, allowed 
larger landholdings to be exempt from expropriation, and eliminated the Agrarian Bank (Yashar 2005).  
72 At the transition to democracy, the state did not recognise the social rights from the Velasco period, and did 
not support the creation of corporatist peasant federations. Rather, the new democratically elected governments 
cut state-run programs as well as narrowed the spaces for class-based organising. Under the Belaúnde 
administration (1980-1985), the peasant communities were granted the right to sell or mortgage lands, and by 
1986, close to sixty percent of the peasant cooperatives had been sold as individual parcels of land (Gonzales de 
Olarte 1994: 48). Alan García’s first administration (1985-1990) implemented economic policies that challenged 
indigenous collective rights (Yashar 2005).  
73 Currently, the most common social conflicts in Peru are those related to the mining industry (Defensoría del 
Pueblo 2007).  
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AIDESEP’s claim to defend indigenous territories became more intense as the neoliberal 
processes intensified in the 1990s and 2000s, and it has concentrated around the defense of 
indigenous collective rights over natural resources in their territories (Pajuelo Teves 2006:69-
70). Currently, there is oil production or prospecting in eighty percent of the indigenous 
territories in the Peruvian Amazon (Albó 2008a:227). However, AIDESEP and CONAP, who 
both organise indigenous communities in the Peruvian Amazon, have not agreed on a 
common stance against the neoliberal reforms. CONAP distinguishes itself from other 
Peruvian and Latin American indigenous movements in that it from its foundation made clear 
that land is not an exclusive right for the indigenous people- it should also be given to the 
colonisers74. Furthermore, CONAP is supportive of the presence of private companies in the 
Amazon because it can generate profits to Amazonian communities (Chirif and García 
2009:7). It was not until 2008, after the implementation of the so-called “Jungle Laws” by 
president García, that the combined indigenous and anti-neoliberal discourses of AIDESEP 
became visible for the rest of the Peruvian society. The “Jungle Laws” refer to a series of 
presidential decrees issued from 2007 to 200875
What sparked the mobilisations by AIDESEP in May and June 2009, was the fact that the 
Peruvian government did not carry out the consultations that it had committed itself to 
through the ratification of ILO 169 in 1993 (Vega 2010). Statements by president García 
where he accused the people of the Peruvian Amazon of ‘laziness and indolence’ further 
added fuel to the fire (Hughes 2010:86). AIDESEP had resorted to demonstrations, road and 
river blockades and the like before the issue of the decrees, but the most intense mobilisations 
against the neoliberal reforms took place in Bagua from April 2009, when AIDESEP declared 
a national strike against the decrees. As a consequence of the strike, the government imposed 
a state of emergency in the five affected regions, which ultimately led to the death of 33 
 which opened up the Peruvian Amazon to 
increased foreign and private investment in the wake of the signing of a free trade agreement 
with the USA (Hughes 2010:86). According to de la Cadena (2008:348), a main distinction 
from former transfers of land in this area, is that the current neoliberal reforms threaten to 
destroy territories and destroy or evict the populations who claim it. The decrees are by many 
considered to be a sell-out of rainforest lands, trees, and water to capitalist investors against 
the will and livelihoods of local populations (Lévano 2008).  
                                                 
74 The “colonisers” refer to the migrants that moved to the Peruvian Amazon in the second half of the 20th 
century (Yashar 2005).  
75 99 legislative decrees were issued, of which No. 1090 was one of the most controversial. According to 
AIDESEP, a consequence of this decree could be that 45 million hectares could lose protected forestry status and 
be reversed to agricultural land and sold off for extractive use (Hughes 2010).  
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people on the 5th of June the same year (Hughes 2010:88-9).  The leader of AIDESEP, 
Alberto Pizango, had claimed the right to insurgency of the indigenous communities against 
the provocation of the government, and the mobilisations have enjoyed support from both 
foreign and Peruvian social movements. As a result of the violence, Prime Minister Yelaunde 
Simón resigned because of his inability to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the situation and 
two of the decrees, which had been targeted by the protests, were repealed (Hughes 2010:90).  
It remains to be seen whether AIDESEP’s political arm, MIAP, which has so far only had 
electoral success at the local level, can take advantage of the societal support for their 
mobilisations against the neoliberal reforms in terms of a broadened electorate. Hughes 
(2010:90) argues that Ollanta Humala may profit from this crisis as the indigenous people 
lack a party that unites highland and lowland indigenous people. Humala, who ran for 
president in 2006, initially wanted to hoist the indigenous flag, but he soon realised that it was 
contra-producing because the classist and socio-economic tradition is still very strong in Peru. 
Instead, he asserted a socioeconomic discourse which stresses exclusion and the effects of 
neoliberalism (Tanaka, interview 2007).  
 
4.4 Main findings  
Table 2: Framing processes – main findings 
Framing processes Bolivia Peru 
 
1. Prevailing ethnic discourse over 
class discourse 
Present. Strong ethnic discourse 
has developed since the end of the 
1960s and 1970s  in the highlands. 
Particularly strong from 2000. 
Present in the lowlands since 
1980s. 
Not present. Dominant class 
discourse, though incipient ethnic 
discourse in the Peruvian highlands 
since ultimo 1990s. In the Amazon, 
clear indigenous discourse. 
   
2. Inclusive indigenous discourse Present. Prevailing inclusive 
discourse both in highlands and 
lowlands. Exclusive discourse 
(MIP) failed. Inclusive discourse in 
the lowlands.  
Present. Inclusive discourse in the 
Amazon. Largest highland 
organisation, CONACAMI, 
inclusive discourse. Attempts at 
radical and exclusive discourses in 
the highlands.  
3. Connection with anti-neoliberal 
discourse 
Present. Strong anti-neoliberal 
discourse connected with 
indigenous discourse from 2000. 
Gas War, Water War. 
Present, but only recently 
combined indigenous and anti-
neoliberal discourse against mining 
and oil-companies. Strongest in the 
Amazon. 
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5.0 Mobilising structures: Organisational infrastructure 
The mobilising structures approach focuses on mobilisation processes, and the formal 
organisational manifestations of these processes, which in the combined analysis with framing 
processes and political opportunity structures may give us some answers to what factors have 
been present for indigenous organisations to launch political parties. This chapter will analyse 
to what degree the indigenous groups in Peru and Bolivia have developed sufficient 
organisational infrastructure to be able to launch political parties. The theory chapter yielded 
three main variables from the mobilising structures approach suitable to the Latin American 
context: (1) Territorial concentration of the indigenous population; (2) maturity of indigenous 
organisations; (3) and presence of brokerage mechanism.  
5.1 Territorial concentration of affiliates 
This section will look into demographic resources, or more specifically, the territorial 
concentration of indigenous groups, and the effects of migration and urbanisation on the 
mobilisation of indigenous people. Where indigenous groups are concentrated, interaction and 
the construction of networks and parties are easier and more feasible. Indeed, the majority of 
the successful indigenous parties in Latin America have emerged in electoral districts with a 
large indigenous proportion of the population (Van Cott 2005:46).  
5.1.1 Territorial concentration of indigenous people 
In Peru, the indigenous people constitute approximately 39 percent of the total population 
(Pajuelo Teves 2006:18), whereas the corresponding number for Bolivia is 62 percent (Molina 
and Albó 2006). Table 3 illustrates the concentration in percentage of the indigenous peoples 
across the Bolivian departments and the Peruvian regions. As can be seen, more than fifty 
percent of the departments in Bolivia have an indigenous majority, whilst only twenty percent 
of the Peruvian regions have such majority. However, when applying the numbers from the 
partial census, ENAHO 2001, which included the criterion of indigenous self-identification, 
the number of Peruvian regions with an indigenous majority increases from five to eleven.  
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Table 3: Dispersion and concentration of indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Peru 
 
 
Country 
Percent of 
subnational units 
with indigenous 
majority 
Percent  of 
subnational units 
25-50% 
indigenous 
Percent of 
subnational 
units 10-25% 
indigenous 
Percent of 
subnational 
units less than 
10% indigenous 
Bolivia (INE 2001) 56.5% (5/9) 22.2 % (2/9) 22.2% (2/9) 0% (0/9) 
Peru (INEI 1993) 20% (5/25) 8% (2/25) 36% (9/25) 36% (9/25) 
Peru (ENAHO 2001) 44% (11/25) 24% (6/25) 12% (3/25) 20% (5/25) 
Source:  Pajuelo (2006); Molina and Albó (2006)  
 
Bolivia has 36 ethnic groups, of which 31 live in the lowlands76 in the east of the country 
(IWGIA 2009). The largest indigenous groups are Quechua (30.7% of the total population), 
followed by Aymara (25.2 %). The Aymara and Quechua, who are principally concentrated in 
the highlands, constitute 90.1 percent of the total indigenous population. Of the lowland 
indigenous groups, the most numerous are Chiquitano (2.2 % of total population), Guaraní 
(1.6 %), and Mojeño (0.9 %)(Molina and Albó 2006:70)77. Table 4 illustrates that the 
departments with an indigenous majority are concentrated in the Western highlands and 
valleys, and that either the Quechuas or the Aymara constitute the largest indigenous group in 
all of the Bolivian departments78
Table 4: Indigenous concentration by department in Bolivia (over age 15) 
.  This is due to migration processes that will be looked into 
shortly. 237 of a total of 327 Bolivian municipalities have a majority who identify as 
indigenous. These municipalities are principally located in the highlands, but also Santa Cruz 
(37.5% of the total municipalities), and Beni (15.8%) have their share, whereas Beni and 
Pando have none (Albó 2008a:23).  
Department Number 
of indigenous 
Total percentage 
indigenous 
Largest ethnic 
group 
Potosí 347.847 83.9 Quechua 
La Paz 1.163.418 77.5 Aymara 
Cochabamba 669.261 74.4 Quechua 
Oruro 185.474 73.9 Aymara 
Chuquisaca 202.204 65.6 Quechua 
Santa Cruz 456.102 37.5 Quechua 
Beni 66.217 32.8 Aymara 
Tarija 47.175 19.7 Quechua 
Pando 4.939 16.2 Aymara 
Source: INE (2001); Molina and Albó (2006:70-71) 
                                                 
76 Bolivian researchers and indigenous organisations primarily refer to ’tierras bajas’ (lowlands) and ‘tierras 
altas’ (highlands).  
77 The rest, 1.4 percent, belong to other native groups.  
78 See Map 3 in preface for a visualisation of the concentration of the Bolivian indigenous population.  
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Peru has 72 different ethnic groups, of which 65 are Amazonian and seven are located in the 
highlands79 (Van Cott 2005:143). Like in Bolivia, the highland indigenous population is much 
larger than the Amazonian. The latter consists of 332.000 persons, constituting solely 1.2 
percent of the total population (INEI 2009). However, they are dispersed in eleven regions80, 
including very small populations in the valleys of the highland regions of Cusco and 
Ayacucho (INEI 2009). The largest ethnic groups are the Quechua that constitute about four 
and a half million persons (11.4 % of the total population), and the Aymara that constitute 
approximately half a million persons (1.5 %). The largest Amazonian ethnic groups are the 
Arahuaca (38,6 % of total Amazonian indigenous population), Jibaro (24%), and Quechua 
(10,9%) (INEI 2009). Table 5 illustrates that based on the results from the 1993 census, only 
five of the Peruvian regions have an indigenous majority81
Table 5: Indigenous concentration by region in Peru (over age 5) 
.  
Region Percentage 
indigenous a 
 
Percentage 
Indigenous 
homes b 
Region Percentage 
indigenous a 
Percentage 
indigenous 
homes b 
Apurímac 76.95 91.8 Pasco 14.05 49.9 
Puno 75.97 95.5 Ucayali 12.48 25.0 
Ayacucho 70.83 87.0 Amazonas 11.95 22.2 
Huancavelica 66.97 71.1 Lima 10.07 29.7 
Cusco 64.37 79.9 Ica 6.89 24.2 
Ancash 36.35 55.4 Callao 6.7 28.6 
Huánuco 30.78 68.6 Loreto 5.4 25.9 
Madre de Dios 24.11 72.1 San Martin 3.1 14.6 
Tacna 24.38 59.5 Lambayeque 2.98 4.3 
Moquegua 23.67 40.5 Cajamarca 1.27 0.9 
Arequipa 19.25 51.8 La Libertad 0.59 1.9 
Junín 15.13 50.0 Tumbes 0.55 1.8 
   Piura 0.39 3.1 
a Based on INEI 1993 census; b Based on ENAHO 2001. “Indigenous” includes the following categories: 
Indigenous from the Amazon, Quechua and Aymara. Source: INEI (1993) and Pajuelo (2006:44).  
 
These regions are all located in the Andean highlands: Apurímac, Puno, Ayacucho, 
Huancavelica, and Cusco. During the 20th century this area was referred to as “the Indian 
stain” in an evidently derogatory manner (Pajuelo Teves 2006), and more recently “the 
Andean trapezoid” (Van Cott 2005). However, when using the results from the ENAHO 2001 
                                                 
79 Peruvian scholars and indigenous organisations primarily distinguish between the indigenous population of ‘la 
sierra’ (the highlands) and the Amazon.  
80 The total of 332.975 Amazonian indigenous are native to the following regions: Loreto (31.8% of the total 
Amazonian indigenous population); Junín (22.1%); Amazonas (15.7 %); Ucayali (12.1%); San Martín (6.4%); 
Pasco (4.9%); Cusco (4.6%); Madre de Dios (1.2%); Huánuco (0.8%); Cajamarca (0.3%); and Ayacucho (0.1%) 
(INEI 2009).  
81 See map 4 in the preface to this thesis for a map of the concentration of the indigenous population in Peru.  
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survey, four regions in the Central Jungle area82
Peru covers a slightly larger territory than Bolivia: 1.285.216 km2 compared to 1.098.581 
km2 (CIA 2009). However, the indigenous core areas are much more concentrated in Bolivia 
than in Peru. In Peru, very large distances separate the ethnic groups, and this is one of the 
reasons behind an identity linked to the local community and the limited contact between the 
communities (Montoya 1998:154-160). The geographical location of the capitals also plays an 
important role. Lima was the centre of the Viceroyalty of Peru, a Spanish colonial 
administrative district created in 1542 which for close to two centuries covered most parts of 
South America
 (Huánuco, Pasco, Junín and Ucayali), Madre 
de Dios (Southern Amazonian area), and Ancash (situated in the coast to the north of Lima) 
have an indigenous majority.  
83
In addition to the geographical dispersion of Peruvian highland communities, another obstacle 
to organise across Quechua communities is the language barrier. According to Montoya 
(1998:159), there are eight dialectical varieties of Quechua in Peru, which  complicates the 
communication between the communities. In Bolivia, on the other hand, Quechua does not 
have these dialectical difficulties. Moreover, in the region of Chapare, which is where the 
important cocalero movement was born, most of the meetings are bilingual, which means that 
. According to anthropologist Rodrigo Montoya (interview, 2007), the fact 
that Lima is a colonial city that was organised in opposition to the indigenous Andean area is 
a crucial difference from the administrative capital of Bolivia, La Paz, which is situated in the 
indigenous-dominated highlands. Montoya argues that if Cusco, the historical centre of the 
Peruvian indigenous highlands, had been the capital of Peru, one would see the same 
processes of indigenous politicisation as in the neighbouring country. Moreover, the fact that 
La Paz lies in the heart of the predominantly indigenous highlands and is ethnically marked, 
whereas Lima is situated in the coast and experienced a rapid mestizo homogenisation (García 
Linera interview 2007), is an important difference. Both the physical distance (1.155 
kilometres) and the cultural differences between Cusco and Lima are important for 
understanding the variance in opportunities for collective action and alliance-building. A 
concrete example of the logistical and thus mobilising challenges in Peru is that it is much 
more complicated to organise marches to the government seat in Lima than in La Paz (Albó 
2008a:231-2). 
                                                 
82 ‘Selva Central’ is the Spanish denomination. 
83 The viceroyalty of New Spain was created in 1717 and mainly covered the current territories of Panama, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The viceroyalty of Río de la Plata was created in 1776, and roughly 
corresponded to the current territories of Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  
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Aymara or Quechua is spoken simultaneously as Spanish (Albó, personal communication 
2010). 
5.1.2 Migration and urbanisation of indigenous peoples 
Both Peruvian and Bolivian highland indigenous peasants migrated to the cities in large 
numbers in the second half of the 20th century due to demographic growth and processes of 
modernisation. However, the migration processes as well as the degree of urbanisation and 
homogenisation were much stronger in Peru than in Bolivia (Montoya 1998:156, García 
Linera interview 2007). In the period from 1940 to 1981, Lima’s population grew from 
645.000 to 4.6 million, and so hastily that it has been termed “the Andean reconquest” of the 
Spanish conquerors’ capital. Many of these migrants have ended up in slums on the outskirts 
of Lima (Stokes 1995). The indigenous population in Lima and other Peruvian cities 
constitutes more than one million people, representing approximately 30 percent of the total 
indigenous population. Numbers from 1993 show that 45 percent of the people born in the 
indigenous-dominant region of Ayacucho, now live in Lima (García, cited in Vittor 2010a). 
An important difference between Bolivian and Peruvian migrants is that in Bolivia the 
indigenous peasants to a larger degree reappraised their ethnic condition in the meeting with 
racism and stigmatisation in the cities. In Peru, the peasants found a way of affirmation 
through class or territorial identity, rather than ethnicity (Pajuelo Teves 2006:33). This latter 
point is confirmed by Vittor (interview 2007), who claims that Peruvian people more easily 
identify with their geographical location than with an “indigenous identity”. Furthermore, 
Vittor (2010a:5) claims that “[the indigenous people] abandon their mother tongue, their 
clothing, and are no longer dependent on the Pachamama84, but rather [have to struggle with] 
underemployment in the cities”. The Peruvian Amazon experienced a process of mass 
settlement from 1947 to 1990. The state considered the land to be unoccupied and thus state 
property. The migration to the Amazon was much more rapid than to the rest of the country, 
and from 1940 to 1981 the population quintupled. The higher jungle area was more heavily 
populated than the lower jungle arena85
                                                 
84 “Mother Earth”. 
. Under general Velasco (1968-1975), a process of 
colonisation of the Amazon by Andean migrants was started. These migrants gained titles to 
land that had previously been used by indigenous peoples, but that was not protected (Yashar 
2005:256-8). Today, Quechuas that have migrated from the highlands constitute the largest 
85 The population in the higher Amazon increased more than sixfold, whereas the population in the lower 
Amazon increased more than threefold.  
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indigenous group in seven of the eleven regions that form part of the Peruvian Amazon (INEI 
1993)86
In Bolivia, there was a marked demographic imbalance at the time of the creation of the 
republic: 80 percent of the population occupied 400.000 km2 of the territory delimited to the 
highlands and valleys, whereas the remaining 20 percent occupied an area of 700.000 km2 in 
the eastern plains. Various government decrees, ministries, and national councils facilitated a 
process of migration, known as colonisation, from the most densely populated to the more 
remote areas (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:271). This process began in 1890, 
accelerated after the 1952 Revolution, and culminated in the creation of the Colonisation 
Institute in 1967. Initially, the migration processes were targeted at the tropical zones of Alto 
Beni in La Paz, Chimoré in Cochabamba, and Yapanchani in Santa Cruz. From the 1950s on, 
there was a massive migration from the highland departments to the lowland departments of 
the south, particularly to Santa Cruz, in a process that has been called “the march toward the 
Orient” (Albó 2008a:34). This process was encouraged by a “developmentalist” tendency 
within the nationalist state, whose aim was to incorporate the peasants into the market, 
substitute the imports of land and cattle and promote the diversification of exportations, 
populate the national territory with people who were unionised, as well as the movement of 
peasants from areas of traditional agriculture to areas with larger resources (García Linera, 
Chávez León et al. 2004:271-4). The tropical region of the department of Cochabamba
.  
87
                                                 
86 The Quechuas are the largest indigenous group in Junín, San Martin, Pasco, Madre de Dios, and Huánuco, as 
well as in the lowland areas of the regions of Cusco and Ayacucho. The Aymaras are the largest group in 
Cajamarca, and “other” indigenous groups are the largest in Loreto, Amazonas, and Ucayali (INEI 1993).  
, 
where the coca-growers movement emerged, was very scarcely populated until the beginning 
of the 20th century when large-scale migration started. At the beginning of the 1980s, the 
population had increased tremendously in the coca-growing province of Chapare. It was 
particularly landless Aymara and Quechua people from Potosí, La Paz, and Oruro that 
migrated here (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:383-5). Many of these migrants had 
organisational experience from the unions and organisations of the highlands, which 
contributed to the emergence of the coca-growers' movement in this region. According to 
Zuazo (interview, 2007), the region of Chapare is a peculiar case in the Bolivian context. It 
could be characterised as an ethnic melting pot as a result of the large-scale immigration, but 
simultaneously it shows a high degree of unionism. Currently, the Aymaras or the Quechuas 
constitute the largest indigenous groups in all the Bolivian departments, including in the 
87 This area includes the regions of Chapare, Carrasco and Tiraque (Garcia Linera et al. 2004:383).  
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lowlands. Moreover, the majority of the persons who identify as indigenous now live in the 
cities. Especially in the highlands, this identification is maintained in the migration to the 
cities (Albó 2008a:22).  
5.2 Maturity of the SMO 
This section discusses the maturity of indigenous organisations. It will first look at the years 
in existence of the organisations, before turning to the unity of the organisations. The 
assumption is that the longer an organisation has been in existence, the more politically 
experienced will the leaders and members of the organisation be, and the more likely is it that 
a sense of belonging to the organisation will develop, possibly leading to the formation of a 
political party.   
5.2.1 Years in existence of the SMO 
In Bolivia, a new cycle of indigenous social mobilisations that involved both highland and 
lowland organisations started in 2000. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, the 
indigenous organisations in the highlands have mobilised on the basis of an indigenous 
identity since the end of the 1960s, and especially since the transition to democracy in 1982 
(Albó 2008a:234). Lowland indigenous organisations appeared on the national stage during 
the 1990s, and have played an important role in demanding and negotiating territorial 
autonomy and land reform proposals (Yashar 1998:25). In Peru, the Amazonian indigenous 
groups started to organise as early as the end of the 1960s, and the currently largest 
organisation, the Interethnic Association of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP), was created 
in 1980. In the highlands, on the other hand, incipient organising based on an explicitly 
indigenous identity did not emerge until the end of the 1990s (Albó 2008a). Table 6 provides 
an overview of Peruvian and Bolivian indigenous/peasant organisations after the transition to 
democracy88
 
, as well as party creations.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 With the exception of the Bolivian CSUTCB, all the organisations appeared after the transitions to democracy.  
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Table 6: Significant Peruvian and Bolivian indigenous/peasant organisations 
Organisations Year 
formed 
Party creation Geographical 
location 
Bolivian organisations    
Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores 
Campesinos de Bolivia (CSUTCB) 
1979 MIP:2000,ASP/IPS 
(MAS): 1995 
Predominantly 
highland 
Confederación Indígena del Oriente Boliviano 
(CIDOB) 
1982 - Lowland 
La Coordinadora de las seis Federaciones del 
Trópico de Cochabamba (Coca Trópico) 
1992 ASP/IPSP (MAS): 
1995 
Highland(lowland 
region in highland) 
Coordinadora de Pueblos Étnicos de Santa Cruz 
(CPESC) 
1992 - Lowland 
Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas de 
Qullasuyu (CONAMAQ)       
1997 - Highland 
Peruvian organisations    
Asociación Interétnica de la Selva Peruana 
(AIDESEP) 
1980 MIAP: 1998 Amazon 
Confederación de Nacionalidades Amazónicas del 
Perú (CONAP) 
1987 - Amazon 
Conferencia Permanente de los Pueblos Indígenas 
del Perú (COPPIP) 
1997 - Amazon+ highland 
Confederación Nacional de Comunidades 
Afectadas por la Minería (CONACAMI) 
1999 - Highland 
Source: Van Cott 2005; Huber 2008; Yashar 2005 
As we can see, only one indigenous party has emerged out of a social movement in Peru - 
MIAP - while three parties have been created in Bolivia - ASP, MIP, and MAS89
5.2.2 Unity of the SMO 
. However, 
the Bolivian parties are the only ones that have had success at the national level, a fact that 
chapter 6 will analyse in detail.   
Due to the scope of the thesis, the analysis of the maturity of the indigenous organisations will 
be limited to the most influential organisations in both countries equivalent to those listed in 
Table 690
Bolivia- rivalries, splits and tensions within the largest organisations 
. In both Bolivia and Peru, indigenous organisations have shown a systematic 
tendency towards disagreements which have culminated in rivalries and splits of the 
organisations.  
According to Garcia Linera et al. (2004:222), the Bolivian indigenous organisations show a 
systematic tendency of division because of leadership problems and conflicts over economic 
resources, but the most important are the ideological and political differences. In the Bolivian 
                                                 
89 ‘MAS’ is the current name of the ‘IPSP’.  
90 In the Bolivian case, it is difficult to establish the most important indigenous organisations, as many of them 
have created continuous alliances since 2000. Yet, due to the scope of the thesis, the number of organisations 
presented has been limited to the organisations that Van Cott (2005) lists as important.  
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highlands, the indisputably largest indigenous organisation is the Sole Union Confederation of 
Bolivian Peasant Workers (CSUTCB) with its 3.8 million affiliates. As mentioned, the 
Kataristas took over the CNTCB in 1979 and renamed it CSUTCB. Thus, even though the 
CSUTCB was built on the remnants of a former corporatist organisation, a new era was 
initiated within the peasant organisations: Communities elected their own representatives 
rather than accepting leaders imposed on them externally. The CSUTCB consists of nine 
departmental federations, four regional or intermediate federations, and a female branch, the 
National Federation of Bolivian Peasant Women- Bartolina Sisa (FNMCB-BS). Beneath are 
the provincial federations, the subcentrals, and the communities (García Linera, Chávez León 
et al. 2004:213). However, due to the size of the CSUTCB and its presence in all the Bolivian 
departments, the organisation has inevitably been ridden by rivalries since its creation in 1979 
(Van Cott 2005:57-9). Particularly, the question of whether to apply an ethnic or class 
discourse has been central. Indianista Aymaras from the radical Tupak Katari departmental 
branch of La Paz led by Quispe and more class-oriented federation leaders, particularly from 
the cocalero (coca-growers) movement, have fought over the leadership of the CSUTCB. 
Moreover, serious disagreements with regard to the launching of political parties have 
surfaced. However, this fractionalisation has been present since shortly after the constitution 
of the CSUTCB, as two very different currents of unionism were present in the organisation: 
The first was principally upheld by the Kataristas’ political arm, the Revolutionary Tupaj 
Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL), which asserted ethnic pride, and claimed the 
necessity of the syndicate to express its autonomy and the diversity of the peasant-indigenous 
base of the country (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). The second current was 
supported by leftist parties, which tried to reshape the old clientelistic model of the MNR. 
From 1985 on, the labour movement declined due to economic restructuring and the closure 
of mines, whilst several political parties aggressively tried to influence the CSUTCB 
leadership (Van Cott 2005:56). Thus, the Katarismo influence was severely weakened (García 
Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). 
In 199291
                                                 
91 The organisation had been planned as a project since 1988 (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). 
, the Coordinator of the Six Federations of Tropical Cochabamba (Coca Trópico) 
was established. The movement’s initial claim was the defence of the coca leaf. The coca leaf 
was cultivated from the 1970s in Chapare, and the production increased during the 1980s in 
spite of falling prices and several governments’ coca eradication programs. After the signing 
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of the Vienna Convention92
The incorporation of four of the branches of the Coca Trópico into the CSUTCB provoked 
even more serious rivalries within the CSUTCB (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 
2004:391). The cocaleros became a driving force within the peasant movement, and by 1992 
they had seized control of the CSUTCB, and Roman Loayza was elected executive secretary 
in 1996 (Van Cott 2003b). In 1995, the CSUTCB Assembly voted for the creation of its own 
political party, the Assembly for the Sovereignty of the People (ASP), of which the 
Cochabamba peasant leader Alejo Véliz was elected president (Stefanoni 2004). It was 
principally the cocalero movement that provided the new political party with leaders. Thus, 
the ASP became the first political party to emerge from an indigenous movement (Van Cott 
2005:70). However, what is central here, is that leadership disputes within the ASP between 
Evo Morales and Véliz led to a division of the ASP, and the creation of the Political 
Instrument for the Sovereignty of Peoples (IPSP), which was led by Morales (Stefanoni 
2004). IPSP was a coalition of various organisations- the CSUTCB, Bartolina Sisa, and the 
Coca Trópico (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:431).  
 in 1961, all succeeding Bolivian governments worked to abolish 
coca cultivation. However, it was not until the “Dignity Plan” launched by president Bánzer 
(ADN) in 1997, which implied forced eradication of coca crops without compensation, that a 
series of violent clashes between cocaleros and the eradication forces started (García Linera, 
Chávez León et al. 2004:384-9). The appearance of Coca Trópico must be understood within 
the context of the introduction of the neoliberal New Economic Policy (NEP) in 1985. One of 
the main effects of the NEP was the closure of mines. Approximately 22.000 of 28.000-
30.000 miners in the state mining corporation (COMIBOL) lost their jobs (García Linera, 
Chávez León et al. 2004). Many of the ex-miners returned to their communities and tried to 
sustain themselves as peasants. However, as these communities were incapable of absorbing 
them due to a lack of land, many Quechua and Aymara ex-miners eventually moved to the 
coca-growing Chapare region. Many of the migrants had union experience, and in Chapare 
they became politically active and organised as coca farmers (Albó 2008a). By 1993, current 
Bolivian president Evo Morales was elected leader of the cocalero movement, which 
promptly affiliated with the CSUTCB.   
                                                 
92 The Single Convention of Narcotic Drugs. 
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Thus, to avoid a severe split within the CSUTCB, the radical Indianista Felipe Quispe was 
elected executive secretary of the CSUTCB in 1998 as a consensus agreement between the 
blocks supporting Evo Morales and Alejo Véliz. Quispe was primarily supported by the 
CSUTCB branch of La Paz, which defined a clear line of indigenous emancipation through 
the recuperation of power and territory through the re-emergence of the Aymara nation,  as 
well as a clear indigenous discourse at the expense of class discourse (García Linera, Chávez 
León et al. 2004). Thus, the election of Quispe implied the revival of Aymara leadership and 
the rejection of the more inclusive ethnic discourse of Morales and Véliz. Moreover, Quispe 
sought to distance the CSUTCB from the political project of MAS-IPSP, which many 
members of the organisation supported. After the Indigenous Pachakuti Movement (MIP) was 
launched as a new electoral vehicle by the CSUTCB in November 2000, tensions further 
increased (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). Even though the party was established by 
a personal decision of Quispe, ten thousand Aymaras attended the formation ceremony (Van 
Cott 2005). This decision provoked a stronger parallelism within the CSUTCB structure. The 
disputes between Quispe and Morales prevented CSUTCB from getting behind one single 
indigenous party that could have better chances for electoral success (Van Cott 2005:78, 
García Linera interview 2007).  
CONAMAQ, which was established in 1997, is principally present in the highland department 
of Oruro, but it is also present in some areas of La Paz, Cochabamba, Potosí, and Chuquisaca 
(García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:323). As mentioned in chapter 4, its main goal is the 
reconstitution of the ayllu within the Bolivian state. Its organisational structure93
                                                 
93 The differences from other Bolivian indigenous organisations consist of another type of territorial organisation  
into the traditional ayllus, markas and suyus; and the application of the traditional names of the leaders, for 
example Mallkus (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004) 
 attempts to 
substitute the union names that are common in the CSUTCB, the Coca Trópico, and other 
Bolivian organisations. CONAMAQ demands that the indigenous, primarily Aymara and 
Quechua, identities are recognised by the state. These claims have been embedded in the local 
sphere, and the organisation has tended to take a negotiating stance towards the government in 
order to achieve this goal. CONAMAQ has, like other Bolivian organizations, suffered from 
disputes between its leaders, particularly with regard to the participation in mobilisations from 
2002 (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:338-40). According to Lucero (2006), 
CONAMAQ is by many other organisations considered to be an outsider because of their 
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close ties with national and international NGOs94
Unity of Bolivian lowland organisations 
. CONAMAQ has not launched its own 
political party, and has been very critical towards Evo Morales and MAS, as well as 
CSUTCB, for not representing the indigenous communities, but rather the “peasant workers” 
(García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:336).  
In the Bolivian lowlands, the organisations have also been ridden by rivalries, although to a 
much lesser degree than in the highlands. The largest lowland indigenous organisation, the 
CIDOB, was created in 1982. At the foundational meeting, representatives from 25 
communities and five indigenous peoples95, principally from the department of Santa Cruz, 
were present. By 1989, the organisation incorporated 80 percent of the nationalities inhabiting 
the Eastern, Chaco, and Amazonian regions of Bolivia (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 
2004:219). CIDOB serves as the national level of the organisation, whereas eight different 
regional organisations constitute the next organisational level96
However, the CPESC split from CIDOB in 2002, an event that constituted one of the most 
critical moments in CIDOB’s history. The division of the CIDOB also led to further splits 
within the CPESC and CPIB, with some of the organisations choosing to stay within the 
organisational network of CIDOB and others choosing to become independent. The reason 
. All of these regional 
organisations, with one exception, have a multiethnic character, linking together various 
ethnic groups. The most important of the regional organisations are the Assembly of the 
Guaraní People (APG) which covers the departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, and Chuquisaca; 
the Coordinator of Ethnic Peoples in Santa Cruz (CPESC); and the Central of Indigenous 
Peoples in Beni (CPIB). The regional organisations are further linked to centrales, 
subcentrales or captaincies, which are ultimately linked to the communities through ethnic 
self-identification (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:267). Thus, the reaffirmation of 
ethnicities constitutes the social unification of the communities and the constituting elements 
of the organisation. CIDOB covers all the lowland departments, as well as Chuquisaca, the 
tropical north of the department of La Paz, and the tropical part of Cochabamba (García 
Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:221).  
                                                 
94 CONAMAQ was established with the help from NGOs, of which the most important was the Taller de 
Historia Oral Andina (THOA).  
95 Izozeños, avas, ayoreos, guarayos, and chiquitanos (García Linera et al. 2004: 219). 
96 The second level organisations are: APG (departments of Santa Cruz, Tarija, Chuquisaca); CPESC (Santa 
Cruz); CPIB (Beni); ORCAWETA (Tarijia); CIRABO (Pando); CPILAP (La Paz); CPITCO (Cochabamba); and 
CIPOAP (Pando).  
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why CPESC chose to leave CIDOB was that the former was more radical and more prone to 
confrontation than the latter, which is more pragmatic and negotiation-oriented (García 
Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004). According to Jaime Casanova, spokesperson in CPESC 
(personal communication 2010), the CPESC considered CIDOB to be servile to, and 
dependent on, the rightist governments at the time. However, the CPESC rejoined CIDOB in 
2006 to strengthen and unify the lowland indigenous movement. According to García Linera 
et al. (2004:223), the major problem for the Bolivian lowland organisations is that is that the 
various indigenous groups are divided at the ground level. As previously mentioned, there are 
31 lowland indigenous groups, which complicate the task of forging a united movement. 
There has been a continuous transfer of forces, alliances, and strategies among the lowland 
indigenous peoples and organisations. During the 20 years of existence of the CIDOB, they 
have organised two large marches to press the government to recognise their demands. The 
first March for Territory and Dignity in 1990 was very successful, whereas the National 
March for Land and Territory in 1996 did not reach La Paz because of discrepancies between 
APG and the rest of CIDOB. In spite of the rivalries between the various organisations 
constituting CIDOB, the marches have served to increase the visibility of the lowland 
indigenous organisations (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).  
The CIDOB has not launched its own political vehicle. The organisation’s statutes state 
clearly that leadership of the CIDOB or the regional organisations cannot form part of a 
political party. Individuals from the communities that constitute the lowest level of the 
organisation can be party members and activists, however (Casanova, personal 
communication 2010). In the 1990s, when the indigenous parties started to emerge in the 
Bolivian highlands, the lowland indigenous population did not have any strong ties to political 
parties, due to the parties’ lack of interest in them. From the middle of the 1990s and until 
today, CIDOB has allied with different established parties, particularly the Free Bolivia 
Movement (MBL), and recently with MAS (Van Cott 2005:71) .  
Peru- stronger Amazonian than highland organisations 
The Peruvian Amazon has a longer history of mobilisation along ethnic lines than to do the 
indigenous peoples in the highlands. Facing threats by colonisers, timber merchants, and more 
recently oil workers and drug-dealers, numerous indigenous organisations like the Amuesha 
Congress (1969), and the Central of Native Communities of the Central Jungle, organised by 
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the Asháninka indigenous group (1970), were created. In the 1970s, indigenous federations97 
started to form on the basis of the recognised native communities (Chirif and García 2009), 
and by 1980, the currently largest Amazonian indigenous organisation was created, viz. the 
AIDESEP. The AIDESEP is constituted by six regional federations and dozens of local 
federations of different indigenous groups (Pajuelo Teves 2005:13). In 1987, a rupture within 
the AIDESEP due to internal conflicts led to the creation of the Confederation of Amazonian 
Nationalities in Peru (CONAP) (Pajuelo Teves 2006:26). The fast organisational growth of 
AIDESEP meant that decisions were taken without properly consulting the bases, and that 
there were increasing discrepancies between the local, regional, and central levels. Thus, in 
1989, measures were taken to come to grips with these problems, and a decentralised structure 
with regional offices in San Lorenzo, Iquitos, Pucallpa, Satipo, and later in Bagua and Madre 
de Dios, was implemented. Each of these headquarters has their own legal representation as a 
civil association98
The CONAP has not achieved the same presence and influence as the AIDESEP, and has 
suffered from serious leadership problems lately (Albó 2008a:225). Still, it is  present in 
certain areas in the Northern Amazon (Remy 1994; Pajuelo Teves 2006:26). The creation of 
CONAP sealed the division of the Amazonian indigenous movement which is still present. As 
we saw in the previous chapter, CONAP takes a different stance to the presence of oil 
companies in indigenous territories, and they have accused the AIDESEP of manipulating the 
Amazonian indigenous people (Chirif and García 2009:8). These discrepancies can partly 
explain why there is still no unified Amazonian indigenous organisation. However, CONAP 
and AIDESEP together represent practically all of the federations in the Peruvian Amazon 
(Yashar 2005:266). Currently, 85 percent of the indigenous population in the Amazon is 
 and enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the central leadership (Chirif 
and García 2009). A particular feature of the AIDESEP is that it has promoted several 
development projects, such as bilingual education and health missions (Chirif and García 
2009). According to Vega (2010), AIDESEP has experienced a strong incitement following 
the mobilisations against foreign investments in the Amazon in 2008 and 2009, as they have 
gained experience, achieved some of their goals, and have seen the appearance of new leaders 
with a professional background.  
                                                 
97 Examples of these federations were the Central of Campa Communities of the Central  Jungle (CECONSEC), 
the Campa Congrss of Pinchis (ANAP), and the Aguaruna Huambisa Council (Pajuelo Teves 2006).  
98 There is no opening in Peruvian legislation for the recognition of indigenous organisations (Chirif and García 
2009). 
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affiliated with a local or regional organisation which is again affiliated with CONAP or 
AIDESEP (Huber 2008:6-7).  
The Amazonian organisations, in spite of their smaller population and greater dispersion, are 
better organised than the Andean organisations (Albó 2008a:225). It was AIDESEP that 
launched the first Peruvian indigenous party after the transition to democracy (1978), the 
Indigenous Movement of the Peruvian Amazon (MIAP) in 1996. In June 1998, 
representatives from the Asháninka indigenous group from the Amazonian region of Junín 
registered for the October municipal elections in the district of Perene the same year. In a 
document, MIAP states: 
“MIAP emerged as a political alternative for the indigenous citizens as well as non-
indigenous who identify with our proposals, in order that they [do] not be tricked or 
manipulated by parties and/or movements that lack a vision and a proposal of integral 
and sustainable development for the Amazon, and to fight in an organised manner for 
the application of their proposals” (MIAP 1998, cited in Van Cott 2005:171). 
However, as we will see in chapter 6, the Peruvian institutional framework has hindered the 
MIAP from stepping up from the local level. Another plausible explanation is the recurrent 
problem of the Peruvian Amazonian indigenous organisations, namely the lack of training of 
their own leaders. Thus, they have to rely on external advisors that do not always have a 
concurrent view of decision-making and strategy in the indigenous organisations (Davila 
Puño 2005). As most of the organisations are composed of members from different 
indigenous groups, the task of electing leaders who are both representative of the group’s 
values and effective in the political arena is complicated (Davila Puño 2005). Moreover, there 
are disagreements over traditional and modern ways of organising and decision-making. 
There is often a divide in the indigenous organisations between skilled and educated leaders 
who are capable of understanding the mechanisms of the national society, on the one hand, 
and the majority of members of the organisation on the other (Benavides 2000:67-8).  
Peruvian highlands 
The most important highland organisation is CONACAMI. Its core areas are the Northern 
highland regions of Cajamarca and Ancash, and the Central Andean highlands (Vittor, 
interview 2007). Due to the large geographic dispersion of the communities that are affiliated 
with CONACAMI, the organisation has had to organise at the macro-regional level- north, 
centre, and south, and has established decentralised offices in the regions of Cusco, 
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Moquegua, and Apurímac. According to Vittor (2010a), the large distances and the diversity 
of the communities have implied organisational difficulties that have limited the strength of 
the organisation. CONACAMI has been strongly present in the Permanent Conference of the 
Indigenous Peoples in Peru (COPPIP), which was created in 1997.  
5.3 Brokerage mechanism 
The third variable, presence of brokerage mechanism, is operationalised as inter- and 
intraregional cooperation between indigenous organisations. The task of this section is to 
analyse the degree to which formerly disconnected groups have been able to cooperate in 
order to create dense organising networks that may be conducive to the launching of 
indigenous parties.  
Intra- and inter-region cooperation between indigenous organisations in Bolivia 
In Bolivia, the three largest indigenous organisations, CSUCB, Coca Trópico, and CIDOB, 
are situated in three distinct geographical and ecological zones of the country (Lucero 
2006:38). However, collaborations between these organisations and other indigenous 
organisations have taken place at a large scale, although the alliances have been more of an ad 
hoc nature than through formalised networks (García Linera, interview 2007). The strong 
presence of cooperation across regional and ethnic divisions in Bolivia must be understood 
within the context of neoliberal reforms which were implemented from 1985. The Water War 
(2000) and the Gas War (2003) served to build alliances between the Coordinators of the 
Defence of Water and Gas, and various indigenous organisations. Particularly in the period 
from 2000 until 2004, indigenous organisations upheld constant mobilisations, strikes, and 
blockades (Kohl 2006). During the Water War, which García Linera et al. (2004) refer to as 
the most important indigenous uprising of the past decades, the main roads in the country as 
well as all the roads linking La Paz to the rest of the departments and provinces were blocked 
by tens of thousands of indigenous peoples for more than two weeks. The mobilisations were 
led by the Aymara sector in the highlands, while the coca-growers in Cochabamba and the 
Coordinator for the Defense of Water were protagonists in the mobilisations blocking the 
Cochabamba-Santa Cruz road and in the valley of Cochabamba (García Linera, Chávez León 
et al. 2004:124). Thus, these mobilisations saw the joint efforts and participation of Morales,  
Oscar Olivera, leader of the Coordinator for Water, and Quispe and his radical faction of the 
CSUTCB (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).   
However, even before 2000, there were examples of collaboration across regions in Bolivia. 
One important turning point was the 500 years of resistance to colonisation, which was 
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celebrated throughout the continent in 1992 (Molina and Albó 2006:29), with the notable 
exception of Peru (Albó 2008a:192). The 12th of October 1992, hundreds of thousands of 
indigenous people and peasants marched in the principal cities in Bolivia, in a demonstration 
which was very important for the visibility of the various Bolivian indigenous movements. 
The wiphalas dominated in the marches. Both CIDOB and the CSUTCB participated in the 
committee that organised the celebration (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:119). From 
1995 on, two large marches were organised by CSUTCB and other organisations, and these 
marches served to strengthen the alliances that later led to the establishment of the Political 
Instrument for the Sovereignty of the People (IPSP/MAS), and the large uprisings in 2000 
(García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:120).  
In 1996, CIDOB, in coordination with CSUTCB and the Union Confederation of Bolivian 
Colonisers (CSCB), organised a march from all the departments of the country to La Paz to 
pressure the government to modify the new INRA Land Law99
The cooperation between highland and lowland organisations has not been easily 
accomplished. One reason is the different mobilisation tactics of the lowland and highland 
organisations. In the highlands, there is a long tradition of disruptive activities. In 1979, the 
, which as we saw, removed 
the recognition of the social function of land and land ownership to the tiller (Kohl 2006:315). 
Moreover, various national marches organised by CIDOB and CPESC have united indigenous 
organisations from the lowlands, highlands, and the valleys. CIDOB has also collaborated to a 
certain degree with the highland organisation CONAMAQ. The leaders of CONAMAQ were 
initially hostile to the cooperation with CSUTCB and the cocaleros because they did not 
consider these organisations to be authentically “indigenous”. Collaboration with CIDOB and 
CPESC through marches have been considered more natural because the lowland 
organisations are “clearly indigenous” (CONAMAQ affiliate Gualberto Aguilar, cited in 
García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:335). Nevertheless, CONAMAQ has participated in 
mobilisations organised by the radical La Paz branch of the CSUTCB, and according to 
García Linera (interview 2007), the organisation has been an important actor in the dense 
networks who have carried out mobilisations in the highlands since 2000.  
                                                 
99 Their claims included: Titling of indigenous, peasant and colonisers’ territories; consensual approval of the 
INRA law and “no” to the commercialisation of land; the incorporation of employed rural workers in the General 
Worker’s Law; the creation of indigenous municipalities; the nomination of election candidates without 
connections to political parties; and the establishment of national funds for indigenous, peasant and colonisers’ 
development (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004).  
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CSUTCB organised a road blockade that paralysed the country for over a week. This was the 
largest mobilisation of Bolivian peasants since the 1952 revolution (Yashar 2005:178). 
Moreover, the mobilisations surrounding the Water War were characterised by blockades and 
strikes. The lowland indigenous organisations, on the other hand, have, due to the dispersion 
and low numbers of indigenous peoples, tended to rely on symbolic and negotiating strength 
in their mobilisations (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:230-1). According to Ever 
Aide from CIDOB (cited in García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:230), “above all we are a 
pacific people who know how to negotiate and reconcile” (my translation). According to 
García Linera et al. (2004), this statement summarises the general philosophy that 
characterises the collective behaviour of a large number of lowland indigenous organisations. 
More recently, however, indigenous organisations in the lowlands have resorted to more 
direct actions, such as road blockades. This development must be seen within the context of 
the more generalised social insurgency in the country. Particularly APG has been active in 
this regard and has blocked access to oilfields as well as closed gas valves (García Linera, 
Chávez León et al. 2004:244).  
However, even though the CIDOB and other lowland organisations have maintained certain 
connections with highland indigenous and peasant organisations, there have been few 
alliances to carry out collective action with organisations that are not located in the lowlands. 
According to García Linera et al. (2004:261), the highland and lowland indigenous 
organisations lack practical and efficient links to articulate efforts during mobilisations. The 
alliances that have worked have been of a more declarative nature, such as an act that was 
signed in 2000 by CSUTCB, the CSCB, and CIDOB to mobilise together in defence of the 
collective property of the hydrocarbons. Moreover, recently the distance between CIDOB and 
the highland indigenous organisations has increased because of political differences between 
the leadership of the organisations as well as the political growth of the highland indigenous 
organisations. This growth has given the highlands organisations more strength and autonomy 
in the meeting with political parties than what is the case for CIDOB (García Linera, Chávez 
León et al. 2004:262). 
In order to summarise, one could say that the brokerage mechanism has been highly present in 
the Bolivian case, although the cooperation between organisations have been more important 
within the highlands than between the highlands and the lowlands. The CSUTCB has been 
revitalised and other organisations, such as the Coca Trópico and the CIDOB, have gained 
strength. These movements have in alliance with other local organisations created larger 
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social movement networks which have reconstructed the social weaving while maintaining 
their autonomy from the state. Moreover, the movements have created flexible mechanisms of 
participation and affiliation that are adapted to the new and hybrid social identities and classes 
in Bolivia. The former workers’ movement had the union cohesion as its organisational 
centre. The current social movements, however, count with the broader popular-indigenous-
peasant segment at the organisational core (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:13-7).  
Intra- and inter-region cooperation between indigenous organisations in Peru 
Until the end of the 1990s, cooperation between highland and lowland indigenous 
organisations in Peru has been scarce, and according to Albó (1991:326) it is as if they belong 
to two different worlds. Similarly, Mallon (1995) argues that there is a profound regional 
variation and fragmentation of the indigenous movement in Peru.  
A first attempt at creating a Peruvian national indigenous organisation was the formation of 
The Indian Council of South America (CISA) in Cusco in 1980. CISA united the indigenous 
peoples of the coast, the Amazon and the highlands (Montoya 1998:136). However, in spite of 
the organisation’s influence on UN documents on indigenous peoples, as well as an important 
experience of visibilisation of ethnic claims before the state (Pajuelo Teves 2005:115), CISA 
never managed to achieve the same foundation as the peasant federations CCP and CNA. One 
reason why CISA failed was that the majority of the affiliates were radical Indianistas, 
intellectuals and activists, who were not able to relate to the already existing organisations 
(Albó 2008a:183-4). The organisation was finally dissolved due to internal divisions. 
 A second attempt at establishing a national indigenous organisation in Peru was the creation 
of the Permanent Conference of the Indigenous Peoples in Peru (COPPIP) in 1997. The most 
important Peruvian peasant and indigenous organisations - CCP, CNA, AIDESEP, CONAP, 
as well as other organisations - attended the COPPIP founding meeting (Pajuelo Teves 
2006:73-74). At the time, the CCP and the CNA were in periods of organisational crisis. 
Another factor that may have facilitated the extensive participation in the call for a meeting 
was the fact that COPPIP was originally thought to be a permanent congress without strong 
organisational attachments. However, the interference of first lady Eliane Karp, president 
Toledo’s wife, in the second congress of COPPIP in 2001, led to serious disagreements within 
the organisation that ultimately led to the split of COPPIP  in 2002 (Pajuelo Teves 2005:129).  
Karp created the National Commission of Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian peoples 
(CONAPA) by a decree in 2001. CONAPA should serve as a government-dependent 
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organism with the aim to promote development policies towards the indigenous population. 
The decree determined that CONAPA should be composed by 21 members: Eight of 
indigenous origin, and the rest were representatives of several ministries as well as academics. 
However, the creation of CONAPA led to serious rivalries within COPPIP. The main problem 
was the question of the presence of COPPIP leaders within CONAPA. Thus, in 2002, the 
COPPIP split into two separate organisations, and the attempt at uniting Peruvian peasant and 
indigenous organisations failed. The CNA, CCP, AIDESEP and CONACAMI decided to 
distance themselves from CONAPA, and created COPPIP-Coordinadora. On the other hand, 
the remaining organisations that supported Karp and CONAPA renamed their organisation 
COPPIP- Conferencia (Pajuelo Teves 2005:129).  
For outside observers, the creation of CONAPA may have seemed like a state-led ‘ethnic 
opening’ in Peru. However, Pajuelo (2005:110-11) and Montoya (interview 2007) argue that, 
to the contrary, what happened was a failure of the state to co-opt indigenous organisations. 
The incipient processes of articulation of autonomous organisations and the cooperation 
between these organisations which had occurred since the end of the 1990s were cut short 
(Pajuelo Teves 2005:110-11). Only recently, there have been important developments towards 
more autonomous indigenous organisations, and AIDESEP and CONACAMI have been 
important in this respect. Jointly they have started a process of articulation that led to the 
organising of the First Summit of Indigenous Peoples in 2004 (Pajuelo Teves 2006:74-76). 
The collaboration of CONACAMI and AIDESEP has strengthened both organisations and the 
visibility of the Peruvian indigenous movement. However, it has not yet been converted into a 
project of launching a political party (Diez, personal communication 2010).  
The recent protests in the Peruvian Amazon, led by AIDESEP, against the neoliberal reforms, 
have not scaled up and contributed to cooperation between indigenous organisations at the 
national level like in Bolivia. According to Chirif and García (2009), AIDESEP lacks the 
capacity of brokerage in that the organisation is isolated from, and has not entered into, 
alliances with other popular movements until recently. However, after the decrees issued by 
president García in 2007 and 2008, AIDESEP has positioned itself as the leader of indigenous 
mobilisations that have included numerous peasant and workers’ unions. Thus, the 
organisation has demonstrated that it keeps its doors open to create alliances with other 
organisations.  
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5.4 Main findings 
 
Table 7: Mobilising structures – main findings 
Mobilising structures 
 
Bolivia Peru 
Territorial concentration of affiliates 
1.Territorial concentration of 
indigenous people 
Indigenous majority 50 % of 
departments. Indigenous core areas 
more concentrated. Shorter 
distances between communities. 
Closer communication. 
Indigenous majority 20% of 
regions. Larger distances between 
communities. Quechua variants 
complicate communication. 
2. Migration and urbanisation  Weaker modernisation/ 
urbanisation. Maintenance of 
indigenous identities in spite of 
high level of migration. 
 
Stronger modernisation/ 
urbanisation. Stronger de-
indianisation.  
Maturity of SMO   
3. Years in existence of SMO No particular differences between the two cases.  
 
4. Unity of SMO Not present. Continuous rivalries 
and splits.  
 
Not present. Splits within 
organisations.  
Brokerage mechanism   
5. Inter-and intraregional 
cooperation between indigenous 
organizations 
Strongly present through 
mobilisation in defense of natural 
resources.  
”Societal movement” 
Not present. Weak in the 
highlands. Attempts at unifying 
various indigenous organisations in 
COPPIP failed. Last years, 
CONACAMI and AIDESEP 
cooperate.   
 
6.0 Political opportunities: External factors that may influence the 
emergence or lack of indigenous parties 
 
Frames that construct a collective identity and discourse as well as significant mobilising 
networks are necessary for the emergence of indigenous organisations or larger social 
movement networks.  However, the possibilities or constraints to launch a political party must 
be analysed according to political factors that are external to groups that may attempt to 
mobilise. These factors may influence the form, content and possibility of mobilisation, in this 
case the possibilities to launch political parties, when opportunities are seized. In this chapter, 
two variables from the political opportunities approach will be analysed: (1) Political 
associational space, and (2) the openness of the institutionalised political system. 
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6.1 Political associational space 
The goal of this variable is to analyse the degree to which indigenous organisations in Bolivia 
and Peru enjoyed freedom of expression and association in the analysis period- from the 
transitions to democracy in 1982 and 1978, respectively, until today.   
After the transition to democracy, Peru experienced a bloody civil war (1980-2000) which led 
to intense violence towards the indigenous population. In the Peruvian highland region of 
Ayacucho, the Maoist guerrilla movement Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) started a 
rebellion in 1980, which developed into a civil war. Particularly the central highlands and the 
central Amazonian area experienced intense violence (Yashar 2005). At the outset, the 
Shining Path was interpreted by many to be an Indian revolt to restore the Inca Empire, but it 
was later discovered that the guerilla was more of an “ethnocidal guerilla” than an “ethnic 
guerilla” (Martí i Puig 2008). However, because the guerrilla actions initially were interpreted 
as an indigenous rebellion, the military started a strategy of repression in the highlands which 
hurt the indigenous population in particular (Remy 1994:124). 70 percent of the 70.000 
victims of the warfare were indigenous people (CVR 2003)100.  Shining Path experienced 
some early success in the recruiting of indigenous peasants for the revolutionary struggle. 
However, the guerrilla’s ideology which maintained that everything associated with the “old 
state”, such as peasant communities and local administrations, had to be eliminated, led to a 
series of ruthless violent actions and killings of community leaders associated with the system 
(Remy 1994:126; Starn 1995). Thus, not only were indigenous peasants in the southern 
highlands under attack from the army, but they were also suffering from attacks and forced 
recruitments by the guerrilla. This dynamic of violence reached new levels when the armed 
forces and the local self-defense squads101 entered the conflict. The squads organised to keep 
the guerrillas from entering the communities (Starn 1995:554)102
                                                 
100 According to Varese (2006:47), the atrocities committed against the Quechua, Asháninka, and Yanesha 
peoples in Peru are examples of genocide and ethnic cleansing.  
. Peru became heavily 
militarised. In 1989, nine regions were in a state of emergency, and, in 1991, 16 of the 25 
Peruvian regions, which included over half the total population of the country, were at least 
partially governed by the military (Roberts and Peceny 1997:198). The military displaced the 
elected local officials in these emergency zones. Civil liberties and human rights violations 
committed by the military, as well as insurgencies, drug traffickers, and civilian paramilitary 
101 “Rondas campesinas”.  
102 The rondas were initially resisted by the army. Later on they were encouraged by president García (1985-
1990), and president Fujimori decreed a law in 1992 that recognised the rights of the squad members to arm 
(Starn 1995:554).  
 
 
82 
 
patrols were frequent (Yashar 2005:248). Thus, the opportunities for organising across 
communities were severely constrained, and existent networks that could have facilitated 
indigenous peoples’ mobilisation were destroyed (Yashar 2005:262-4). 
The Shining Path leader, Abimael Guzmán, and the majority of the guerrilla’s leadership were 
arrested in 1992. President Fujimori used this victory, or the “strategic defeat” of Shining 
Path, for all it was worth. As the intensity of the conflict declined gradually after the capture 
of Guzmán, the regime’s primary concern was to maintain its own political power rather than 
to understand the roots of the insurgency or rebuild the democratic system. There were no 
attempts at finding sustainable ways of encouraging guerrilla fighters and their supporters to 
abandon their struggle and peacefully rejoin society. Thus, political outsider and populist 
Alberto Fujimori, who was president from 1990 until 2000, allowed the Shining Path to 
regroup and rebuild its organisation.103
                                                 
103 Currently, most analysts believe that the Shining Path is split into two factions: The pro-peace faction that 
follows Guzman’s pledge to end violent actions, and the Red Path/Proseguir faction that still follows the doctrine 
of popular revolutionary warfare. The latter faction funds itself by drug trade and trafficking and offers 
protection to the coca growers in the jungle regions. There is disagreement regarding the degree to which these 
different factions are united, but there is reason to believe that their actions mutually reinforce each other. Many 
military attacks have been carried out by the Proseguir faction in the 1990s and 2000s, however far fewer than 
before the imprisonment of Guzmán (Burt 2005: 32-7).  
 Furthermore, in 1992, Fujimori carried out an 
insitutional coup against his own government in which he closed the civilian courts and 
Congress, and undermined constitutional rights and protections. Moreover, during his term, 
press outlets were closed, political parties were weakened, and civil liberties were frequently 
violated (Yashar 2005:249). In 2000, Fujimori fled the country because of electoral fraud and 
allegations of corruption. During the subsequent government of Toledo (2001-2006), the 
political environment provided greater levels of mobilisation. Initially, Toledo attempted to 
relieve the dislocations caused by the neoliberal reforms through a “willingness to 
accommodate societal and regional demands” as well as a decentralising reform. With a more 
open access to power, opposition and civil sectors were able to mobilise freely (Arce 2008:43-
4). However, the Toledo regime (2001-2006) frequently accused social protestors of being 
infiltrated by the Shining Path or of being linked to “terrorism” in order to harm their 
reputation both in negotiations and in the eyes of the public. During the Toledo 
administration, there was a process of change in the criminalisation of all types of social 
protest, especially the protests linked to mining activities (Burt 2005; Vittor interview 2007).  
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Moreover, during the mobilisations in Bagua in June 2009, the state imposed a state of 
emergency, and 33 people were killed, including 23 police officers and 10 civilians. 
According to Amnesty International (2009:14), the special operation units within the National 
Police use excessive force when they tried to disperse the indigenous protestors who were 
unarmed and peacefully blocking the street. Moreover, AIDESEP leaders have been 
intimidated and harassed since the events.   
In Bolivia, on the other hand, the transition to democracy led to an increasing respect for both 
political and civil rights: The repression declined, and there were fewer constraints on 
organising across communities, expressing opinions publicly, and holding assemblies (Yashar 
1998:31). However, the cocalero region of Chapare has been highly militarised because of the 
state-led coca-eradication policies. Particularly the period from 1994 until 2001 saw the 
strong presence of police and armed forces who confronted the “self-defence committees” of 
antagonistic organised cocaleros. Yet, even though the repression was hard, the cocaleros 
managed to maintain their high level of mobilisations through marches and strikes (Komadina 
and Geffroy 2007:40-1). Also the large mobilisations and rebellions in 2000 and 2005 led to 
violent clashes between protesters and armed forces. However, the level of repression cannot 
be compared to the intense violence during the Peruvian civil war.  
6.2 Openness of the political system 
A political system can be characterised as open when linkages between parties and voters are 
eroded. Then, space may be opened to political challengers (Mainwaring and Scully 1995:18). 
Tanaka (interview 2007) argues precisely that the demise of leftist parties throughout Latin 
America opened a political opportunity space that was favourable to the emergence of 
indigenous parties. Moreover, the institutional framework, including electoral institutions, 
create an underlying structure that can support or impede the development of party systems 
and that can partly explain the variation of party systems among countries (Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989). The formal electoral rules shape the incentives that face the political actors. 
Thus, changes that lower the barriers for participation in elections are essential for the 
entrance of challenger parties, among them indigenous parties.  
6.2.1 Weakening of leftist parties 
Because of the general economic marginalisation of the indigenous population in Bolivia and 
Peru, leftist organisations and parties have tended to see them as natural allies. Leftist political 
parties were the first to directly appeal to indigenous voters by addressing their needs as an 
exploited economic class both in Bolivia and Peru (Van Cott 2005), although the alliances 
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were characterised by racism (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Van Cott and Rice 2006). 
However, leftist parties all over the continent weakened during the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
aim of this section is to evaluate the degree to which leftist parties weakened in Bolivia and 
Peru and left a political space that indigenous parties could take advantage of in the electoral 
arena.  
In Bolivia the majority of the left united behind Hernan Siles Zuazo and the moderate leftist 
Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP) coalition in the 1980 elections104
Peru has traditionally had a very strong and radical political left, and the most prominent 
leftist parties were the APRA and the Peruvian Communist Party
. The combined votes 
for the left reached 47 percent. However, the Siles Zuazo government maintained disastrous 
economic policies, which led to early elections in 1985 and a dramatic setback for the left 
(Gamarra and Malloy 1995). The support for the leftist parties decreased from 47,4 per cent in 
1980 to 0,7 percent in 2002. The decline was particularly strong after the Movement of the 
Revolutionary Left (MIR) moved to the right in the political landscape in 1989, leaving a 
picture of a collapsed left (Van Cott 2005:757). Thus, with the UDP coalition down with a 
broken back and the dismantling of the syndical left due to the imposition of neoliberal 
reforms, which among other things led to the closing of mines and the weakening of the 
Bolivian Workers Central (COB), conservative and rightist parties monopolised the political 
representation in the country (García Linera, Chávez León et al. 2004:13). However, as we 
shall see shortly, political parties with their roots in the indigenous movements were created 
from 1995, and eventually filled the vacuum left by the leftist parties.  
105
                                                 
104 A military coup prevented Congress from assembling to elect a new president.  In 1982, the Congress elected 
in 1980 was convoked, and Hernan Siles Zuaso from the UDP was elected president (Gamarra and Malloy 
1995). 
 (Cotler 1995). 
Throughout the 20th century, Marxist parties maintained a very strong presence in the rural 
areas. However, the Peruvian leftist parties did not moderate themselves to the same degree as 
in other Latin American countries. Instead, the radical Marxist class-based discourse was 
upheld during the 1980s (Cotler 1995). When the leftist parties failed in the elections in 1980, 
many of them established an electoral coalition, viz. the United Left (IU). In spite of placing 
second in the 1985 presidential elections, IU never became an organised political party. It was 
105 APRA was created by Victor Raul Haya de la Torre in 1928 and the Communist Party by José Carlos 
Mariátegui in 1929. Haya de la Torre emphasised an alliance of workers and the middles class, whereas 
Mariátegui’s aim was to create a broad front of workers and peasants (Stokes 1995:133-4).  
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constituted by fragmented parties and independent leaders. Tensions that erupted between the 
radical and moderate wings, led to the split into two alliances in 1989. One of the wings 
maintained the IU banner, whereas the other grouping was called the Socialist Left (IS) 
(Kenney 2003:1233). They both lost credibility as serious political alternatives to govern the 
country among their voters. Furthermore, in the 1990 elections, the two parties were 
considered to have positioned themselves too far to the left in the political spectrum and far 
away from the original IU and the political centre, and thus were not considered to be serious 
alternatives, thus experiencing catastrophic elections (Kenney 2003:1234). Moreover, an 
analysis of the demise of the Peruvian left is not complete without mentioning the role played 
by Shining Path in discrediting the political and peaceful left (García Linera interview 2007).  
The political vacuum that emerged after the failure of the leftist parties was not filled with a 
coalition of smaller leftist parties or indigenous parties, but rather by authoritarian president 
Alberto Fujimori (Tanaka and Trivelli 2002; Kenney 2003). Fujimori dismissed both classist 
and ethnic discourses, and instead promoted clientelism through traditional populism. Thus, 
the space available due to the decline of the Left was eventually filled with new indigenous 
actors in Bolivia, while in Peru, Fujimori occupied this space. Social politics and investments 
helped Fujimori in achieving a solid base in rural indigenous areas (Tanaka interview 2007). 
Fujimori obtained overwhelmingly strong support from the indigenous core areas in the 1990 
elections, but in the subsequent elections in 1993, 1995 and 2000, the votes for his electoral 
vehicles decreased dramatically (Pajuelo Teves 2006:30-40). When Ollanta Humala (The 
Peruvian Nationalist Party, PNP106) ran for president in 2006 he was considered by many to 
be a new Evo Morales as his father and brother belong to the etnocacerismo107 ideology 
(Madrid 2008:506). He fared exceptionally well in the Andean highlands in the second round 
of the presidential elections108, even though he did not count on an indigenous movement that 
could have provided him with organisational resources (Madrid 2008:506). Ultimately, Alan 
García of the Peruvian Aprista Party109
                                                 
106 Due to party registration requirements, the PNP was registered as Union for Peru (UPP).  
 won the elections (Pajuelo Teves 2006:67). However, 
Humala’s electoral program did not stress ethnic revindications (Mäckelmann 2006:21), and 
according to Madrid (2008) the PNP is better defined as populist, rather than ethno-populist.  
107The etnocacerismo is a Peruvian ethnic nationalist ideology which glorifies the Inca Empire. The term 
cacerismo refers to the Pacific War (1879-1993 between Chile and Bolivia/Peru) hero Andrés Avelino Cáceres. 
Ollanta Humala’s father Antauro Humala created the doctrine.   
108 In the five Andean regions of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Puno, Humala received 75 % 
of the vote (Pajuelo Teves 2006:67). 
109 Formerly known as Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). 
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6.2.2 Party registration requirements 
Bolivia and Peru, together with Ecuador, have had the highest level of barriers to party 
registration in Latin America (Van Cott 2005:27). These barriers have traditionally been 
applied to minimise the number of personalist and populist electoral vehicles, as well as to 
delimit the highest levels of party system fragmentation in Latin America (Van Cott 2003a; 
Lazarte 2008).  
In Bolivia, a change from no pre-election signature requirements to 0.5 of registered voters 
before the 1989 elections, led to a striking decline from 72 parties registered for the 1985 
elections to 15 in 1989 (Birnir 2004). The indigenous parties the Assembly for the People’s 
Sovereignty (ASP) and the Political Instrument for the People’s Sovereignty (IPSP) solved 
the registration problem by using the authorised registrations of defunct parties, Izquierda 
Unida (IU) and Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), respectively. In 2004, social movements 
and civil society groups were authorised to compete in municipal elections for the first time 
through the law for “citizen groupings110” and “indigenous peoples” (Ballivián 2005; Van 
Cott 2005:27). The indigenous groupings only had to be recognised as an indigenous group111
In Peru, the most important requirement with regard to the possible launching of indigenous 
parties was the spatial requirement, effective until 1993, which said that each party had to 
register in at least half of Peru’s 25 regions. As we saw in chapter 5, only five Peruvian 
regions count with indigenous majorities. Moreover, given the difficulties of cooperation 
between lowland and highland organisations, as well as the record of rivalries and splits 
within the organisations and the broader federations or coordinators, a requirement of 
registering a party in thirteen regions was hard to overcome. However, the Law of Political 
Parties that was implemented in 2003 reinstituted geographical registration requirements for 
participation in national elections. The intention of the law was twofold - to delimit the 
participation of electoral vehicles that only lasted for one election and thus decrease party 
system fragmentation, as well as to promote internal democracy and transparency within the 
parties (Crabtree 2006; Tuesta Soldevilla 2008). However, the consequences for the 
indigenous political organisations are detrimental. Parties must present committees in at least 
16, two-thirds, of the regions. If this requirement is not met, parties can only participate in 
regional or municipal elections (Davila Puño 2005). According to Davila-Puño (2005), the 
 
in the municipalities where they wanted to participate (Ballivián 2005:26).  
                                                 
110 The citizen groupings needed to collect signatures equivalent to two percent of the votes cast in the last 
municipal election in the municipalities where they wanted to participate (Ballivián 2005:26).  
111 ‘Pueblo indígena’.  
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new geographical party registration requirements are a consequence of the Peruvian political 
elite’s fear of experiencing the successful indigenous political mobilisations that have taken 
place in Ecuador and Bolivia. Irrespective of the elites’ intentions, the emergence of a 
national indigenous party now faces more possible institutional barriers than in the 1990s. The 
MIAP, which was created by AIDESEP in 1996, has enjoyed success in local elections in the 
region of Junín. However, these geographical requirements have proven very hard to meet 
because the Amazonian indigenous population only has a very scattered population in nine of 
the Peruvian regions (INEI 2009). Thus, MIAP, or other incipient indigenous parties, must 
seek alliances with traditional parties that do not include indigenous demands on their 
political agenda in order to be represented at the national level. This harms their 
organisational maturity and their political proposals (Davila Puño 2005). Alliances could be 
forged with the indigenous population in the highlands, which is numerically much larger, to 
meet the requirement. However, as we have already seen, the highland organisations are much 
weaker, and the Amazonian and highland organisations have had difficulties in cooperating. 
Even though the spatial registration requirement was abolished in the period from 1993 to 
2003, no indigenous party achieved electoral success at the national level. However, the 
effects of electoral rules need not necessarily be observed instantly (Crabtree 2006)112
Post-election requirements 
.  
Until 2001, post-election vote requirement in Peru was at five percent, and thus higher than 
the registration requirement. Consistently, numerous parties lost their party registration even 
though they had achieved legislative representation113. However, as indigenous parties did not 
participate in national elections, it did not affect them. Nevertheless, the requirement did add 
up to the high levels of party registration and a relatively closed nature of the institutional 
framework during large parts of the period under study. In Bolivia, a post-election 
requirement which was effective between 1979 and 1999 affected smaller parties. Parties that 
did not succeed in winning fifty thousand votes, or between two and three percent of the 
national vote, had to pay back the amount that it cost to include them on the ballot114
                                                 
112 In Ecuador and Colombia, however, indigenous parties emerged immediately after a spatial registration 
requirement was removed in 1995 and 1991, respectively (Birnir 2004).  
 (CNE 
1998). Thus, between 1979 and 1999, all parties except four had to pay fines for not reaching 
fifty thousand votes (Birnir 2004:20-21). Thus, the majority of smaller parties had to pay fines 
which hampered their continual organisational development. Local indigenous parties 
113 In 1995, only 3 of the 13 parties that had achieved seats in the parliament maintained their party registration 
after the elections (Birnir 2004: 18).  
114 In 1999, the requirement was set to 2% (CNE 1999) 
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competing in the first municipal elections in 1995 formed pragmatic electoral alliances with 
major national parties in order to avoid the financial burden. Moreover, two indigenous 
parties were prevented from participating in elections because of post-election fines. Both the 
Indian Tupak Katari Movement (MITKA), which elected two representatives to Congress in 
1980, and the Revolutionary Tupaj Katari Movement for Liberation (MRTKL), which won 
two seats in the national legislature in 1985, lacked resources to pay the fines that were 
imposed on them by the National Electoral Court (Birnir 2004).  Thus, MITKA was not able 
to run in the 1985 elections, and as MRTKL only received 1.63 percent of the national vote in 
1989 and, subsequently, had to pay the fine. As a consequence, in 1993, MRTKL ran for 
elections in an alliance with the much larger and neoliberal party MNR.  
6.2.3 Type of electoral system and threshold of representation 
The following section analyses the type of electoral system, and whether the threshold of 
representation can be categorised as low, based on electoral district magnitude115
Peru began the democratic period with a PR- system and maintained it throughout the period 
under study. Bolivia, on the other hand, started out with a pure PR system that was changed in 
1994 to a mixed PR- SMD system in which more than half the lower chamber of the 
bicameral legislature was elected by single member districts This change came as a result of 
popular pressure that surged by the end of the 1980s and was implemented by the political 
elites as a constitutional reform manoeuvre to litigate the crisis of representation that had been 
underway since the transition to democracy in 1982 (Lazarte 2008). Thus, district magnitude 
decreased in Bolivia, and generally small electoral districts are not favourable to smaller 
parties
 and the 
threshold for gaining seats. The district magnitude is considered to be the essential 
institutional variable explaining the emergence and maintenance of parties (Ordeshook and 
Shvetsova 1994:105). Larger districts are favourable to challenger or new parties, as they 
need not win a plurality in a district in order to win mandates. However, the impact of district 
magnitude depends on whether the electoral systems are PR or plurality-based (Sartori 1986; 
Taagepera and Shugart 1989).  
116
                                                 
115 As explained in the theory chapter, only the district magnitude at the national level will be treated.  
. However, Van Cott (2003b:756) argues that the SMD system was favourable to 
regionally based indigenous parties like ASP. This is because parties that are weak nationally 
can win mandates in single-member districts if they succeed in presenting candidates that 
116 Currently, 55 % of the total circumscriptions are defined as small with two to five seats (PNUD/IDEA 2007).  
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have strong local or regional credibility (Lazarte 2008:295)117
In terms of district magnitude, Peru had one single national district from 1992 until 2001 and 
differs from other countries with such an arrangement because of its comparatively much 
larger population (Tuesta Soldevilla 2008)
. Muñoz- Pogossioan 
(2008:114) supports Van Cott’s argument in that the change to a mixed system helped 
electoral minorities like the ASP (which ran under IU’s party registration) to achieve 
representation in the 1997 general elections. However, Madrid (2008:483) argues that Van 
Cott’s explanation is “unconvincing” because the vote that ASP (IU) and IPSP (MAS) won in 
the 1997 elections would have been approximately the same under the old proportional 
representation system: Under the old system the party would have won three legislative seats, 
whereas the mixed system gave them four seats. Thus, one possible conclusion is that the 
introduction of the SMD system helped smaller parties because they were allowed to delimit 
their campaigns to the uninominal districts instead of campaigning extensively.  
118
Peru and Bolivia are among only five Latin American countries that employ an electoral 
threshold (PNUD/IDEA 2007:22-23)
. Theoretically, increased district magnitude 
under a proportional representation electoral system should be favourable to the emergence of 
smaller parties, including indigenous parties. The fact that Fujimori introduced a single 
national district is paradoxical because Fujimori’s personalist party, Cambio 90, constituted a 
majority in the Congress and would have benefited more from a majoritarian system (Tanaka 
2002:10). Tanaka (2002) argues that district magnitude was increased because of the 
extremely personalist nature of the Fujimori political project and Fujimori’s displeasure of 
negotiating with regional actors - a point that will  be analysed in dept in the decentralisation 
section. The effective number of parties in Congress increased dramatically and created 
serious problems for representation and political dialogue (Van Cott 2003a; Tuesta Soldevilla 
2008). In 2001, circumscriptions based on regions were reintroduced, and currently eighty-
seven percent of the circumscriptions are defined as small (two to five seats) and thus 
theoretically disadvantageous for the electoral success of smaller parties (PNUD/IDEA 2007).  
119
                                                 
117 This happened to Izquierda Unida (IU) and Movimiento Bolivia Libre (MBL) (Lazarte 2008: 295).  
. In Bolivia, an election threshold of three percent of 
the total national vote to win seats in the multi-member districts was established in 1997. 
However, parties that obtain less than three percent may still have candidates elected in 
single-member districts (PNUD/IDEA 2007; Lazarte 2008:293-94). The threshold hindered 
118 The other countries are Israel, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Guyana, Liberia, Moldova, Namibia, and Sierra Leone  
(Tuesta Soldevilla 2008: 840).  
119 The others are Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico (PNUD/IDEA 2007: 22-23).  
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the Indigenous Pachakutik Movement (MIP) that won six seats in the lower chamber in 
Congress in 2002 from achieving congressional representation in 2005, because they only 
won 2.16 percent of the vote (CNE 2007). According to Quispe (interview 2007), the loss of 
the party registration because they did not achieve congressional representation, constituted a 
hinder for the development of the political movement. Consequently, MIP did not run in the 
2009 elections. In Peru, there was no election threshold to qualify for congressional 
representation before a four percent barrier of the national vote was introduced for the 2006 
elections. This threshold will be further increased to five percent in the elections in 2011 
(Schmidt 2007:815). According to Tuesta Soldevilla, this manoeuvre will be effective in 
dealing with the fragmented multiparty system (2008). Nevertheless, the new threshold may 
be hard to overcome for indigenous parties that seek to achieve congressional representation.  
6.2.4 Electoral arrangements to enhance participation of ethnic minorities 
In Latin America, reserved seats for ethnic minorities in the National Legislature had only 
been established in Colombia and Venezuela (Van Cott 2005)120, countries with minuscule 
indigenous populations, until the new Bolivian constitution, approved by referendum in 2009, 
opened for direct representation of indigenous groups that constitute minorities in their 
departments (Gustafson 2009:1005). The general elections in Bolivia in December 2009 
counted with seven special circumscriptions for peasants, and indigenous and native 
peoples121, which each got one seat in the lower house of the Congress122
                                                 
120 In Colombia, two seats in the Senate are reserved for indigenous candidates. Indigenous candidates in 
Venezuela compete for three seats in the national unicameral legislature and in municipal and state assemblies in 
regions where indigenous populations are concentrated (Van Cott 2005: 15).  
. The electoral 
results showed that MAS won with at least 62.70 percent in all seven circumscriptions, except 
the one in Pando (CNE 2009b). This can be explained by the fact that many of the candidates 
who ran for indigenous organisations like the CIDOB registered for the elections in the name 
of MAS (Cambio 03.09.2009). However, this recent electoral arrangement cannot explain the 
emergence of the wave of new indigenous parties in Bolivia during the 1990s. What this 
arrangement can contribute with eventually, is the emergence of new indigenous parties in 
future elections that originate in other indigenous movements. Particularly the employment of 
121The official name of the special circumscriptions is “circumscripciones especiales indígena originario 
campesinas” (CNE 2009a). The circumscriptions corresponded to the departments of La Paz, Santa Cruz, 
Cochabamba, Oruro, Tarija, Beni and Pando. However, the constituencies could not cross departmental borders 
and were only valid in the rural areas of the departments (CNE 2009a).  
122 The Congress is now renamed the Plurinational Legislative Assembly (CNE 2009a).  
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special seats for indigenous candidates (CNE 2009a) in regional elections123
In Peru, a requirement of a fifteen percent quota of ethnic minorities on party lists was 
introduced in 2002 (Tuesta Soldevilla 2008:860). Ironically, this requirement was only valid 
in native communities corresponding to the Peruvian Amazon where there was an incipient 
indigenous party, the already mentioned MIAP (Davila Puño 2005; Van Cott 2005). In the 
highlands, where a large proportion of the population is indigenous and where there was at the 
time no indigenous party, no such requirement was introduced. The consequences were 
detrimental, as many prominent indigenous leaders were persuaded to run with established 
non-indigenous parties which resulted in disappointing results for MIAP and the weakening 
of the AIDESEP (Davila Puño 2005; Van Cott 2005). According to Julio Davila Puño, this 
requirement is only one of many that illustrates that the indigenous peoples are not yet 
considered integrated into the national political agenda, and that the participation of this 
sector is sought to be minimised (2005:8).  
, may give rise to 
new indigenous parties in Bolivia that may later step up to the national level. 
6.2.5 Political and administrative decentralisation 
Both Peru and Bolivia were centralised and unitary states at the time of the democratic 
transitions. The main task here is thus to investigate whether the decentralising, and in Peru’s 
case also recentralising reforms, constituted opportunities and/or constraints that hindered or 
fostered the emergence of indigenous parties. Firstly, the characteristics of decentralised 
political and administrative levels in both countries will be presented. Then, the degree to 
which decentralising reforms have provided opportunities for social movements to create 
electoral vehicles at the local or regional levels in Bolivia and Peru will be analysed. The aim 
is to evaluate whether elections held at decentralised levels have served to build a party 
organisation at the lower levels before stepping up to the national levels (Dalton, Flanaghan et 
al. 1984:467). Both countries hold local and regional elections separately from national 
elections, and one could thus assume that the advantage of larger parties may be reduced (Van 
Cott 2003a:11-12). A last point to be made is that the focus will be on the effects of the 
decentralisation, not the motivations behind the reforms124
                                                 
123 In the regional elections in April of 2010, all departments except Potosí employed special seats for 
indigenous candidates. However, due to the lack of electoral data, indigenous groups’ electoral performance in 
these elections is excluded from the analysis. 
.  
 
124 For reasons behind the reforms, see for example O’Neill (2003; 2005); and Grindle (2000). 
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Bolivia- the implementation of the Popular Participation Law 
Until 1995, Bolivia was a centralised, unitary system. The territorial structure consisted of 
departments, provinces, province sections and cantons. Local elections were only held in a 
dozen larger Bolivian cities and suburbs which made it difficult for the locally and regionally 
based and, at the time, organisationally weak social movements to compete in elections (Van 
Cott 2003a:755-56). This political structure had served to control political and economic 
resources from the governmental level and downwards (O'Neill 2005:124). However, by the 
mid-1990s, a series of political and legal reforms opened up for more direct forms of citizen 
participation. Following the implementation of the Popular Participation Law125 in 1994 and 
the 1995 Decentralisation Law126, the province sections were converted into 311 
municipalities that were constituted throughout the country. Currently, the number or 
municipalities is 327. As 237 of these municipalities have a majority who identify as 
indigenous (Albó 2008a:23), one could predict how radically the political landscape would 
change in the wake of these reforms. Currently, the decentralised structure of the state 
consists of nine departments, as well as provinces, and municipalities (O'Neill 2006). Until 
2005, the Bolivian decentralisation reform was centred at the municipal level. The 
departmental prefects were appointed by the national government (Eaton 2007:81). However, 
the new Bolivian constitution, which was approved in Congress in 2008 and in a popular 
referendum in 2009, establishes four levels of administration, viz. departments, regions 
(provinces), municipalities, and indigenous aboriginal peasant territories127. The new 
autonomy implies the direct election of authorities at all levels (Gustafson 2009). The 
departmental political structure consists of a departmental assembly and an executive that is 
led by a directly elected governor (Ministerio de Autonomía 2009). Martí i Puig (2008) argues 
that pressures to implement decentralising reforms were seen both from above through the 
regional elites in la Media Luna128
                                                 
125 ‘Ley de Participación Popular’. 
 (Santa Cruz, Tarija, Pando and Beni), and through 
demands from below, illustrated by the indigenous population. O’Neill (2005: Ch.5), on the 
other hand, claims that the incumbent party MNR took a strategic decision to carry through 
decentralisation reforms in the 1990s because of its strong and stable support throughout the 
country, particularly in the countryside, and its more volatile electoral success at the national 
126 The Decentralisation Law guaranteed municipal governments 20 percent of the federal budget, and the 
decentralisation was particularly innovative in that it recognised grassroots civil organisations and encouraged 
members of these groups to form civic oversight committees (Grindle 2000; O'Neill 2006:177).  
127 “Territorios indígena originarios campesinos”.  
128 Media Luna (The Half Moon) is an informal denomination for the four departments in the Bolivian East that 
do not have an indigenous majority of the population.  
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level129
Peru: Interrupted decentralisation processes 
. As we will see shortly, this strategy seems to have backfired. Notwithstanding the 
reasons behind the decentralisation, the reforms were crafted by a team of technocrats that 
worked behind closed doors (O'Neill 2005), and the reforms were heavily criticised by 
powerful sectors of society (Grindle 2000:125). Critics saw the decentralisation as a deliberate 
attempt by the central government to fragment, localise and calm down popular social 
movements in order to facilitate the implementation of neoliberal reforms (Kohl 2002). The 
social movements were also sceptical to the introduction of decentralising reforms and called 
them “the damned laws” (Van Cott 2003b).  
Peru, like Bolivia, has traditionally been a very centralist state in which the political system 
has an elitist and exclusivist nature, and where a large segment of the population remains at 
the margins of the political system (Crabtree 2006). Currently, there are three levels of 
political decentralisation, viz. region, province and municipal district. Provinces and districts 
have municipal status and elect local officials130(Albó 2008a:196). Municipal elections 
including direct elections of mayors were reintroduced in 1980131
The regional level was created in 1989, and in 1990 the first regional elections were held 
(O'Neill 2003:1072). This first round of regional decentralisation was a chaotic experience 
and did not include a clear transfer of fiscal resources to the regions (Tanaka 2002:8). 
Fujimori dissolved the elected regional assemblies in 1992. Such a recentralisation of power 
is very rare, and Peru is the only recent example in Latin America (O'Neill 2005:47). In 2002, 
regional elections were restored through a reform that was welcomed by political and social 
sectors. Decentralisation had appeared as a core issue in the 2001 election campaign inspired 
by civil society’s role and participation in the downfall of Fujimori in 2000. Elected president 
Alejandro Toledo fronted decentralisation as a main topic for his government. However, as in 
. Authoritarian president 
Alberto Fujimori removed mayoral elections in 1992 and reinstituted them in 1993 (O'Neill 
2005). However, one can hardly talk of representative democracy during Fujimori’s period. 
He instituted a strategy of total control of Congress, the judiciary, and the electoral 
institutions. The “direct democracy” that Fujimori promoted sought to minimise the parties’ 
mediating role between the state and civil society (Crabtree 2006).  
                                                 
 
130 In 2004, there were 194 provincial municipalities, 1.646 district municipalities, and 1.824 municipalities of 
populated centres. The latter must consist of at least 1000 inhabitants (Albó 2008: 196). 
131 Municipal elections were first introduced in 1963, but were interrupted by military regimes from 1968 until 
1980 (Paredes 2008).   
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the first round of decentralisation, the allocation of functions and authority was unclear 
(Sabatini 2003)132
This quick review reveals two very different developments in Bolivia and Peru. Bolivia, on 
the one hand, experienced a continuous opening at the municipal level from 1995, albeit 
fifteen years into its democratic regime, but did not open up for direct elections at the 
departmental level before in 2010. In Peru, on the other hand, a very short-lived experience of 
regional decentralisation was cut short by a decade of recentralisation, before regional 
decentralisation again was implemented in 2002. The municipal level was only formally 
interrupted from 1992 until 1993, but some areas, particularly the civil war-torn region of 
Ayacucho, experienced difficulties of holding elections.  
.  
Indigenous participation in municipal elections 
Bolivia and the “ruralisation” of politics 
Decentralisation led to major changes in the Bolivian party system. At the time of the 
implementation of the reform, Bolivia’s party system was strongly controlled by national 
elites who determined the candidates for closed party lists (O'Neill 2005:43). Until the 
municipal elections in 2004, candidates had to present their candidacies on behalf of a 
national party in order to minimise the number of local parties (Sabatini 2003:140-5). 
However, in spite of this restriction, many local indigenous movements forged electoral 
alliances with national parties or launched their own parties that had success from the first 
municipal elections in 1995 (Grindle 2000:126-9; Van Cott 2005). The local electoral 
campaigns shifted their focus to a more prominent local agenda, and the possibilities for 
political careers at the local level made local leaders less dependent on the party machines 
(Grindle 2000:129). In the first nation-wide municipal elections in 1995, many inhabitants in 
smaller towns and villages participated electorally for the first time (Grindle 2000:2). Peasant 
and indigenous organisations who allied with non-indigenous parties, most often MNR or The 
Free Bolivia Movement (MBL), won 28.6 percent of the total vote in these elections (Van 
Cott 2003b:756). Moreover, ASP, a new indigenous party with its base among the coca-
growers in Cochabamba affiliated with the CSUTCB, won ten mayors and 49 municipal 
council seats in the department of Cochabamba.  
                                                 
132 The Toledo government did not have a coherent proposal for decentralisation and participation, and there 
was much bureaucratic resistance to the reforms, especially in the Ministry of Economy and Finance (Crabtree 
2006). This latter point is illustrated by the lack of significant advances in the transfer of responsibilities to the 
regional and local governments.   
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It is unclear whether the decentralising reforms were decisive for the coca-growers affiliated 
with the CSUTCB to launch ASP. Alejo Véliz, the ASP president at the time, assured that the 
reforms did not have any influence on the decision, as forming a party was the next logical 
step in the maturation of the movement (Véliz 2001, in Van Cott 2003a:22). However, Roman 
Loaza, ASP deputy elected in 1997 stressed the importance of the reforms in the creation of 
the first successful party based on the indigenous peasantry (Loaza 1997, in Van Cott 
2003a:22). Albó and Quispe (2004a:15) share Loaza’s view: “The growth of indigenous and 
campesino power in the government structures (…) undoubtedly started in the years when the 
LPP was instituted” (my translation). After the electoral success in the municipal elections in 
1995, ASP decided to move on the national level to execute real influence on political 
decision-making (Van Cott 2003a). In the 1997 general elections, the ASP, using the party 
registration of Izquierda Unida, won four seats in the lower chamber of Congress in 
uninominal districts in Cochabamba.   
In the subsequent municipal elections in 1999, the IPSP, a splinter party from ASP, 
participated electorally for the first time under the party registration of MAS. As we saw in 
the party registration section, the MAS registration was used to solve the pre-election 
signature requirement. The IPSP won a total of 3.27 percent nationally, which corresponded 
to 79 municipal council seats. In contrast to the ASP, which won 28 council seats and five 
mayoralties in the same elections - but limited to the department of Cochabamba, the IPSP 
reached a broader geographical scope and gained seats in seven of the nine departments (Van 
Cott 2003a). A report on the municipal councillors elected in 1999, showed that almost two-
thirds of the councillors self-identified as belonging to a indigenous group or an ayllu 
(Ballivián 2005:80). IPSP, which by the national elections in 2002 had adopted the MAS 
name, did extraordinarily well in the 2002 national election and won 20.94 percent of the 
vote, less than two percentage points behind MNR, the largest party at the national level. In 
the presidential elections in 2005, MAS won an overwhelming majority of 53.7 percent (CNE 
2007), and it asserted its position with 64.2 percent of the vote in the national elections in 
2009 (CNE 2009b). Thus, ASP and IPSP (MAS) started out with modest success in municipal 
elections, before competing successfully in national elections.  
Until 2004, the traditional parties- MNR, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), 
Democratic and Nationalist Action (ADN), and Civic Solidarity Union (UCS)-  fared better in 
the municipal elections compared to the results in national elections. However, in the 2004 
municipal elections, these parties only won a total of 17. 4 percent of the vote compared to 59 
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percent in 1999 (Ballivián 2005:47). MAS won 17.1 percent of the vote, and was thus the 
largest party. MIP, on the other hand, won a total of 2.2 percent. The 2004 municipal elections 
were the first in which citizen and indigenous groupings were allowed to run in elections, 
which constituted a step forward for other indigenous organisations’ political participation.  
The electoral results showed extremely high levels of volatility: Eighty parties, citizen and 
indigenous groupings finished first in at least one municipality as compared to thirteen parties 
in 1999 (Ballivián 2005:40). However, the parties still won 76.8 of the vote at the expense of 
the other groupings. Indigenous groupings, on the other hand, gained a total of only 1.9 
percent of the vote (Carvajal Donoso and Pérez Arnez 2005:167). 
Ballivián (2005:81-82) links the relatively poor performance of the indigenous groupings 
beyond MAS and MIP to their failure to mobilise sympathisers and party activists that could 
be included on the lists of candidates, their limitation of political agendas to cultural demands, 
as well as the fragmented nature of the participation of indigenous groups133
Peru: Weak indigenous parties at the municipal level 
. Another element 
that can explain the poor results of indigenous groups is their inability to create municipal 
dynamics because of their general concentration to a lower local level than the municipality 
(Ballivián 2005; Gustafson 2009). A last point to be made is that the new legislation was only 
implemented five months before the elections, and it was thus probable that the ‘non-parties’ 
would perform better in the 2010 municipal elections scheduled for April (Ballivián 2005:89). 
Due to a lack of access to the results, this election is not analysed in this thesis. 
Compared to Bolivia, there have been few examples of Peruvian indigenous parties 
competing in municipal elections. Before the 1998 municipal election, the authoritarian 
Fujimori administration created the Vamos Vecinos134
                                                 
133 This fragmentation is illustrated by the Assembly of the Guaraní People (APG) that presented three different 
group lists in the departments of Tarija and Santa Cruz (Ballivián 2005:81).  
 movement whose aim was to control 
and co-opt the social and political elites at the municipal level (Tanaka 2002:14). This 
measure was taken because the electoral vehicles Fujimori created to win national elections 
were not successful at the municipal levels (O'Neill 2005:72). Rather, at the municipal level, 
the opposition was taking advantage of the political space available, and the traditional parties 
did considerably better in local than in national elections (Tanaka 2002:10). However, the 
Vamos Vecinos movement was successful, and won 25 percent of the total votes in the 
134 Let’s Go Neighbours 
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elections. Many peasant indigenous organisations were co-opted into this strongly controlled 
clientelistic network that weakened indigenous and peasant struggles for municipal power 
(Palmer 2004).  
MIAP was the first indigenous party to win municipal elections, and paradoxically this 
happened in the Amazon (region of Junín), where relations with political parties started later 
than in the highlands, and where the indigenous population is numerically much smaller. 
MIAP was created at AIDESEP’s National Congress in 1996, and in 1998, the first native 
community registered a list for the municipal elections the same year. MIAP and its affiliated 
lists won thirteen indigenous mayors in various provinces in the region of Junín in the 1998 
municipal elections. The MIAP leaders realised that they had to establish alliances with 
sympathetic social and political actors and at the same time remain independent from political 
parties. Prior to the creation of MIAP, indigenous mayors as well as municipal and regional 
councillors were elected in many Amazonian districts in the 1980 and 1990s, primarily 
through AIDESEP’s local alliances with political parties. CONAP also achieved 
representation at the local level through alliances with parties from 1987 on. However, as we 
saw in chapter 5, the lack of consensus, financial resources, and political experience among 
the Amazonian communities complicated the task of organising a political party. Moreover, 
as we saw in the section on electoral rules, registration requirements have complicated the 
task of running in elections at higher levels than the local (Van Cott 2005; Huber 2008). 
However, MIAP participated in the general elections in 2000 with Somos Perú, but failed to 
win any seats (Van Cott 2005).   
The 2000s have witnessed some attempts at launching parties that stress ethnic or indigenous 
claims in the highlands. In 2002, the Regional Llapanchik Front135
                                                 
135The Spanish name is “Frente Popular Llapanchik”. “Llapanchik”  means “all of us” in the local Quechua 
(Albó 2008:197). 
 won the elections in the 
municipal province of Andahuaylas in the region of Apurímac. According to Meléndez 
(2003), Llapanchik is not an indigenous party, but rather articulate regional and classist 
demands. However, Pajuelo (2006:104) argues that Llapanchik indeed is an incipient 
indigenous party and cites a document where the movement refers to the historical Andean 
project, as well as demands for a plurinational state. These elements are all central in the 
political project of MAS, and in fact it was not coincidental. Just a few weeks before the 
publishing of the document, representatives from the Llapanchik met with Ecuadorian and 
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Bolivian politicians in an Indigenous Congress (Pajuelo Teves 2006:197). In 2006, the front 
won in four municipal provinces (Pajuelo Teves 2006).  
The experience of regional elections 
The first regional elections in Bolivia were held in April 2010, but will not be analysed in this 
thesis due to a lack of access to electoral results. In Peru, however, the new regional elections 
have contributed to increased political participation among the indigenous population in the 
highlands, albeit weak compared to the Bolivian experience at the municipal level. As we saw 
in chapters 4 and 5, a formation of discourses of ethnic demands by social leaders and new 
local organisations have taken place in the 2000s (Pajuelo Teves 2006; Albó 2008a). At least 
one indigenous party has had electoral success at the local and regional political scene. The 
already mentioned Popular Front Llapanchik’s candidate, David Salazar, was elected the new 
regional president of Apurímac. Given the rivalries within the leadership of the movement 
which erupted after the 2002 elections and the subsequent organisational weakening, this was 
a fairly good result, even though Salazar won with a small margin136
The Movement for Regional Quechua Aymara Autonomy (MARQA) won the regional 
elections in the region of Puno, which borders with the Bolivian department of La Paz, in 
2002. Even though the roads in Puno have been filled with allusive Aymara propaganda since 
then, Albó (2008a:205) argues that this is rather a consequence of the contact with the 
Bolivian Aymaras than a sign that Puno is following in the footsteps of Bolivia. According to 
Meléndez (2003), MARQA cannot be characterised as an indigenous party, as class-based and 
regional demands are more prominent than are ethnic claims. Also, the Inka Pachacuteq Party 
in the department of Cusco which uses indigenous symbolism, is considered to be classist 
rather than indigenous (Meléndez 2003). The leader of the coca-growers movement 
(CONPACCP), Nelson Palomina, has launched a political party, albeit unsuccessfully. 
However, several of the coca movements’ leaders represented Ollanta Humala’s Union for 
Peru (UPP) in the 2006 elections and were elected to Congress (Albó 2008a:216). 
 (Pajuelo Teves 
2006:109). However, Pajuelo (2006:108) argues that the fact that Llapanchik did not win 
more municipal provinces than in 2002 illustrates the “limits of the construction of an ethno-
cultural discourse” in Peru.   
In addition to the already mentioned mobilising and logistical difficulties of the Peruvian 
indigenous movements, the poor presence and performance of indigenous parties at the 
                                                 
136 26 % compared to number two: Agrupación Independiente Sí Cumple (23.4%) (Pajuelo Teves 2006).  
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regional level can be explained by the fact that the indigenous peoples are not integrated into 
the legal framework of the decentralisation process. The legislation lacks a contextual 
sensitivity to the local governments in indigenous territories. The laws are only adequate to 
urban realities and are not adjusted according to the multiculturalism of the constitution 
(Davila Puño 2005). The indigenous population has not been referred to as political subjects 
nor has there been any discussion of the need to create specific circumscriptions or municipal 
entities for the indigenous peoples (Martí i Puig 2008:693). The indigenous peoples' 
organisational models are not recognised, often leading to conflicts between the communities 
and their elected authorities in the Amazon (Davila Puño 2005:8-9). Conflicts with local 
authorities are also present in the highlands. Most of the conflicts have occurred because of 
dissatisfaction with the local governments, but also regional governments have been targeted 
(Pajuelo Teves 2006). Moreover, the lack of responsiveness of the central and regional 
governments induces social protests by groups that try to pressure the formal political system 
from the outside (Arce 2008:46).  
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6.3 Main findings 
 
Table 8: Political opportunities – main findings 
Political opportunities 
 
Bolivia Peru 
Political associational space   
1. Freedom of association and 
expression 
Present, although violence between 
cocaleros and armed forces, and 
violent clashes during the Gas War 
and Water War. 
Not present. Civil war 1980-2000 
severely constrained organizing 
across communities. Authoritarian 
president Fujimori 1990-2000. 
Violent actions against indigenous 
mobilisations in the Amazon in 
2009. 
The relative openness or closure of the institutionalised political system 
1. Weakening of leftist parties 
 
Present.  Collapsed in 1989. Present. Collapsed in 1990. 
2. Softer party registration 
requirements 
Mixed picture. Pre-election 
requirement (0.5% of reg. voters) 
in 1989. Solved my incipient 
parties by running in elections on 
the registration of defunct parties.  
2004: citizen groupings and 
indigenous groups allowed to run 
in municipal elections.  
Pre-election:  
-1993: Spatial requirement to 
register in half of the 25 regions. 
2003- geographical requirement:  
3. Shift to PR-system and low 
threshold of representation 
District magnitude 
 
 
Election threshold 
1980-94: PR 
1994- Mixed PR/SMD 
District magnitude: 1982-1995 
departments. 1995- departments 
plurimember districts, 68 single-
member districts 
1997- 3% of national vote in 
plurimember districts 
PR-system throughout period.  
 
1993-2001: National district 
Rest of period: Regional districts. 
 
2005- 4% of national vote 
 
4. Electoral arrangements to 
enhance participation of ethnic 
minorities 
Present from 2009:  Not able to 
explain the emergence of 
indigenous parties from the 1990s.  
Present from 2003: Requirement of 
at least 30% indigenous 
representatives on party lists in the 
Amazonian regions. However, 
opposite effect of what the theory 
predicts.  
5. Decentralisation Present from municipal elections in 
1995. Direct regional elections 
2010.  
Regional decentralisation 1989-
1993. Recentralisation 1993-2002. 
2002- regional decentralisation. 
Municipal elections throughout 
period, except 1992-1993.  
 
7.0 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to answer why indigenous parties have emerged at the national level in 
Bolivia, while there is no parallel experience in Peru. It has applied the Most Similar Systems 
Design which has rendered possible the omission of common characteristics as operative 
independent variables. As all the successful indigenous parties in Latin America that have 
developed since the 1990s have emerged out of social movements, three main approaches 
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from social movement theory have served as foundations for the analysis. Firstly, the 
“framing processes” approach has focused on the symbolic aspects of collective action, and 
development of indigenous-based discourses and their relations with anti-neoliberal 
discourses. Secondly, the “mobilising structures” approach has focused on the organisational 
infrastructure of indigenous movements. In this thesis, is has looked into the territorial 
concentration of indigenous peoples, the migration and urbanisation of indigenous peoples, 
the maturity of the indigenous organisations, as well as the degree to which the indigenous 
organisations in the two cases have been able to cooperate inter- and intra- regionally with the 
aim to create dense networks and launch successful parties. Thirdly, the “political 
opportunity” approach has focused on the presence of political associational space, which is 
crucial for the possibilities to organise. Furthermore, it has looked into the relative openness 
or closure of the institutionalised political system, through the possible weakening of leftist 
parties in the two cases that could create political space for indigenous people who have 
traditionally voted for leftists parties. Finally, a series of institutional arrangements have 
served to analyse the degree to which they have constituted opportunities or constraints for 
the creation and success of indigenous parties. The rest of this thesis will summarise the main 
findings in each analytical chapter, before proceeding to an integrated model of explanation of 
the dependent variable, - the emergence of indigenous parties, and a comment on the validity 
of this study.  
7.1 Framing processes  
With regard to the first indicator, prevailing ethnic discourse over class discourse, the two 
cases diverge. In Bolivia, a strong ethnic discourse has been present since the end of the 
1960s, through the ethno-nationalist discourse developed by the Kataristas, who gained 
increasing influence in the largest peasant union in the years before the transition to 
democracy, culminating in the creation of the CSUTCB. However, the indigenous discourse 
has been particularly strong from 2000, and several scholars explain this strength through 
strategic decisions made by the organisations to attract more supporters and affiliates. In the 
case of the Peruvian highlands, the peasant or class identity has overshadowed an indigenous 
identity until the turn of the millennium. According to Pajuelo (2006:73), the main reason for 
the prolonged lack of ethnic organisations in the Peruvian highlands can be accounted for by 
the radicalisation under general Velasco, and the adoption of the peasant term by the largest 
peasant federations CNA and CCP. Moreover, the radical left, including the guerrilla group 
Shining Path, were influential in the Peruvian countryside, often intruding the unions, as well 
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as leaving a classist hegemony at the expense of the development of a more salient indigenous 
discourse. In the Peruvian Amazon, on the other hand, an indigenous discourse had developed 
since the end of the 1960s, giving rise to several organisations.  
The second indicator, inclusive indigenous discourse, is present in both cases. Even though 
the radical exclusionary indigenous discourse of Quispe and his followers has been strong in 
Bolivia, it is the inclusive discourse that dominates both among the highland and lowland 
indigenous organisations. In Peru, the largest highland and lowland indigenous organisations, 
AIDESEP and CONACAMI both have an inclusive discourse, even though the highlands 
have seen some attempts at more exclusionary Aymara discourses.   
With regard to the last indicator, in both countries, the neoliberal reforms left the rural and 
indigenous population “shocked”. However, the connection between indigenous and anti-
neoliberal discourses has been more present in Bolivia than in Peru, and it surfaced at an 
earlier stage than in Peru. Both Evo Morales and Felipe Quispe were highly successful in 
articulating anti-neoliberal discourses which led to large mobilisations, particularly from 
2000. These mobilisations led to the broadening of the constituencies of their parties, MIP and 
MAS, a fact that will be dealt with further in chapter 6. However, as the second indicator 
illustrated, Morales' inclusive discourse as opposed to Quispe’s ethno-exclusionary discourse 
proved to be more successful in attracting non-indigenous voters to his party. In Peru, this 
connection has not been present until recently. Mobilisations against foreign mining and oil 
companies have increased and particularly the protests led by AIDESEP in the Peruvian 
Amazon in 2009 have made visible the indigenous fight against neoliberal reforms that harm 
their territories. However, it remains to be seen whether AIDESEP or CONACAMI manage 
to take advantage of this combination of discourses in the general elections set for 2011.   
7.2 Mobilising structures 
With regard to territorial concentration of affiliates, the Bolivian indigenous population 
constitutes a larger segment of the population than in Peru. Moreover, more than fifty percent 
of the Bolivian departments have an indigenous majority, whereas the corresponding regions 
in Peru only reach twenty percent of the total. The processes of modernisation and 
urbanisation have been present in both countries. However, in Peru, the migration to the cities 
have implied a much stronger process of de-indianisation than in Bolivia (Montoya 1998:156; 
Pajuelo Teves 2006). In Peru, the distances between communities as well as Quechua 
linguistic variance has further complicated communication between Peruvian highland 
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communities and the formation of transcommunity networks. In Bolivia, particularly in the 
highlands, migration to the cities has not led to the abandoning of indigenous identities (Albó 
2008a).  Moreover, the fact that many Bolivian ex-miners with union experience of Aymara 
and Quechua origin migrated to the region of Chapare in the department of Cochabamba, 
contributed to the creation and strength of the cocalero movements. Thus, the expected 
outcome - that migration of indigenous people leads to the weakening of ethnic identities  is 
not valid in Bolivia. The second variable, the maturity of SMO, was operationalised into two 
indicators. The first, years in existence of the SMO, does not vary substantially between the 
two cases. However, the oldest exisisting indigenous organization in Bolivia, the CSTUCB 
has been able to launch three different political parties. However, the most successful one, 
MAS, was principally created by the Coca Trópico organisation which is affiliated with the 
CSUTCB. In Peru, the Amazonian organisation AIDESEP is the oldest of the currently largest 
indigenous organisations, and it has gained sufficient organisational maturity to launch a 
political party, the MIAP. With regard to the second indicator, the unity of the SMO, the most 
important indigenous organisations in both countries have been characterised by continuous 
rivalries and splits, due to regional and inter-ethnic differences, and cannot explain any 
substantial variation between the two cases. In the Peruvian Amazon, particularly, leadership 
questions and diverging views of the presence of extractive industries on indigenous territory 
have proved divisive. In Bolivia, the largest organisation CSUTCB has been particularly 
plagued by conflicts regarding the dominance of indigenous or class discourses, which again 
hindered the launching of one single indigenous party.  
The third variable, brokerage mechanism, has been clearly present in Bolivia and close to 
absent in Peru. However, Bolivia has still not experienced any successful attempts at creating 
an indigenous organisation which is completely national in the sense that it has a significant 
presence in all parts of the national territory. Even though the CTUSCB has branches in all of 
the Bolivia departments, it is much stronger in the highland departments, particularly in La 
Paz, and is commonly considered to be a highland organisation. However, strong regional 
federations have emerged, of which the CSTUCB, the Coca Trópico, and the CIDOB are the 
most significant. A peculiar characteristic of Bolivian indigenous organisations, is the extent 
to which various indigenous or peasant organisations, in spite of their rivalries and problems 
of cooperation, have united in a series of mobilisations, marches and other types of 
cooperation both inter- and intra- regions in ad hoc coordinators in the defence of diverse 
natural resources. Thus, the social movements in Bolivia constitute a new power bloc that 
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consists of diverse sectors of society, but which is dominated by indigenous peasants and 
urban indigenous people, as well sectors of the middle class. Together, this block, or this 
“societal movement” was able to neutralise the upper classes and reach the government 
(Garcia Linera interview 2007). In Peru, COPPIP has been an attempt at creating a national 
indigenous organisation as it linked the largest indigenous/peasant organisations in the 
Amazonian and the Andean regions. However, the interference of the state-initiated 
CONAPA led to rivalries, disagreements, and the separation into two separate organisations 
in 2002. However, the past few years have shown increased collaboration between 
CONACAMI and AIDESEP, and it remains to be seen whether this alliance will be 
strengthened further in the years to come, and what possible effects such an alliance may have 
for party formation and mobilisation. 
7.3 Political opportunities 
With regard to political associational space, the two cases diverge significantly. Peru 
experienced a strong political and social conflict with the presence of armed irregular groups 
from 1980 until 2000 (Martí i Puig 2008:700). The violence associated with the Shining Path, 
and the counteroffensive by self-defense squads and the Peruvian army, was particularly 
present in the indigenous-populated central highlands and central Amazonian area. The civil 
war developed into a dynamic of terror which severely constrained the possibilities to 
organise across communities and destroyed networks that could have facilitated indigenous 
peoples’ mobilisation. Furthermore, an institutional coup by Fujimori in 1992, led to the 
centralisation of power, and frequent violations of civil liberties. More recently, fights against 
foreign extractive companies led by CONACAMI and AIDESEP have been increasingly 
opposed and met with criminalisation by the state. In the case of AIDESEP, last year’s 
mobilisations led to excessive use of violence by the police, and in the aftermath, leaders have 
been harassed. In Bolivia, on the other hand, the violence experienced by the Cochabamba 
coca-growers and the violent actions against protestors in the 2000 and 2003 uprisings, are not 
comparable to the levels of violence experienced in Peru, particularly during the 1980s and 
the beginning of the 1990s.  
Weakening of leftists parties has been present in both countries, and the collapse of these 
parties occurred at only one year interval. Yet, the vacuum left by these parties, was only 
filled by indigenous political parties in Bolivia. In Peru, on the other hand, the authoritarian 
president Fujimori filled this space. Thirdly, party registration requirements have been stricter 
in Peru than in Bolivia. Particularly the geographical registration requirement based on 
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regions has harmed a smaller Peruvian indigenous party, MIAP, from stepping up from the 
municipal level, and is a significant hinder to the launching of indigenous parties in the future. 
In Bolivia, the softening of party registration in 2004 which allowed indigenous groups to run 
in municipal elections has not yet led to the emergence of significant indigenous parties apart 
from MAS. With regard the type of electoral system and threshold of representation, Peru 
paradoxically experienced a low threshold of representation under authoritarian president 
Fujimori (1990-2000): There was one national electoral district combined with a PR electoral 
system. Furthermore, there was no election threshold, and the geographical registration 
requirement was removed. Yet, the context of extreme violence and centralisation of power 
was not propitious for the launching of indigenous parties. In Bolivia, the second largest 
indigenous party, MIP, lost its party registration after the 2006 elections because of its failure 
to reach the election threshold.  
Electoral arrangement to enhance participation of ethnic minorities, proved to serve to the 
opposite of what the theory predicted in Peru. A requirement of a 15 percent quota of ethnic 
minorities on party list was introduced in 2002, but the condition was only valid in the 
Amazonian regions, where it led to disappointing results for the MIAP as many indigenous 
leaders ran with non-indigenous parties. In Bolivia, special circumscriptions for indigenous 
peoples were instituted in 2009, but it is too early to say whether this arrangement can lead to 
the emergence of new Bolivian indigenous parties originating in other indigenous 
organisations.With regard to decentralisation, the implementation of municipal 
decentralisation in Bolivia in 1995, led to a “ruralisation of politics” which ultimately resulted 
in the replacement of the traditional political elites by a new indigenous elite with its roots in 
the municipalites. In Peru, by contrast, the regional decentralisation was removed under 
Fujimori, and was not restored before in 2002. However, incipient indigenous parties have 
emerged in the Bolivian highlands, of which the most important has been the Frente Popular 
Llapanchik.    
7.4 Integrating framings, mobilising structures, and political opportunities 
To be able to answer the research question, - why has only Bolivia experienced indigenous 
parties at the national level -, the MSSD design has served to highlight the different values of 
the explanatory variables in the two cases. Firstly, in Bolivia, the ethnic discourse has been 
much stronger than in Peru. Secondly, the indigenous discourse in Bolivia has been highly 
successful in connecting with anti-neoliberal discourses, thus providing a broader popular 
constituency. Thirdly, in Bolivia, the indigenous groups are more concentrated than in Peru, 
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and the distances between communities are shorter. Furthermore, the predicted negative 
impact of migration of indigenous people, has instead, particularly in the region of Chapare, 
led to the maintenance of indigenous identities. The level of cooperation between formerly 
disconnected organisations has been much more present in Bolivia than in Peru. A crucial 
factor for the lack of indigenous parties in Peru is the absence of political associational space 
due to the civil war and the authoritarian president Fujimori. Finally, the presence of 
decentralising reforms in Bolivia from 1995 was very important for the stepping up of small 
indigenous organisations to the “whipalisation” of Bolivian politics experienced today.  
This thesis has illustrated that Peru is a deviant case in terms of the creation of indigenous 
parties at the national level. Moreover, only a few parties have emerged at the regional and 
municipal levels. However, Peru can no longer be considered a failure with regard to 
indigenous mobilisation. Indigenous discourses are increasingly salient in Peru, and the 
successful combination of anti-neoliberal and indigenous discourses in recent years, may lead 
to the emergence of national indigenous parties in the near future. However, perhaps the 
Peruvian indigenous peoples need not follow in the footsteps of neighbouring Bolivia and 
Ecuador. Tanaka (interview 2007) argues that it is important that the indigenous peoples find 
ways to defend their rights, cultures and values, but an organisation which upholds a specific 
indigenous discourse, is just one of the possible roads. The Peruvian indigenous movement 
needs to mark out their own path.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1: Overview Bolivian presidents, 1982-2010 
Years Head of Government Party 
 
1982-1985 Hernán Siles Zuazo IU 
1985-1989 Víctor Paz Estenssoro ADN 
1989-1993 Jaime Paz Zamora MIR (in alliance with ADN 
1993-1997 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada MNR 
1997-2001 Hugo Bánzer ADN 
2001-2002 Jorge Quiroga* ADN 
Aug. 2002- Oct. 2003 Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada** MNR 
Oct. 2003- June 2005 Carlos Mesa*** Independent 
June 2005- Jan. 2006 Eduardo Rodríguez-Veltzé**** Independent 
2006-2010 Evo Morales Ayma MAS 
2010-  Evo Morales Ayma MAS 
*Banzer was ill and replaced with vicepresident Jorge Quiroga 
 **Sanchez de Lozada resigned after pressure from protesters  
***Carlos Mesa was Sanchez de Lozada’s vice-president 
 ****President of the Supreme Court became president after Mesa’s resignation 
Source: Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University; Gamarra and Malloy 
(1995). 
 
Table 2: Overview Peruvian presidents, 1980-2011 
Years Head of Government Party 
 
1980-1985 Fernando Belaúnde AP 
1985-1990 Alan García APRA 
1990-1995 Alberto Fujimori Cambio’90 
1995-2000 Alberto Fujimori Nueva Mayoría 
2000-2001 Valentin Paniagua AP 
2001-Nov. 2006 Alejandro Toledo Perú Posible 
Nov. 2006- 2011 Alan García APRA 
 
Source: Political Database of the Americas, Georgetown University; Cotler (1995).  
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Table 3: Fragmentation in Bolivia 1980-2009 
 
Year Effective number of 
parties at electoral level 
Effective number of 
parties at the 
parliamentary/legislative 
level 
1980 4.35 4.13 
1985 4.58 4.31 
1989 5.00 3.92 
1993 4.67 3.71 
1997 5.92 5.50 
2002 5.77 4.96 
2005 2.62 2.36 
2009 2.06 1.85 
 
Source: Electoral systems website, Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin.   
 
 
 
Table 4: Fragmentation in Peru 1980-2006 
 
Year Effective number of 
parties at electoral level 
Effective number of parties 
at the 
parliamentary/legislative 
level a 
1980b 4.18 2.47 
1985b 3.02 2.31 
1990b 4.43 4.02 
1995 3.42 2.91 
2000 4.00 3.80 
2001 6.60 4.37 
2006 7.31 3.78 
 
a 1980-1990: Based on lower chamber in Congress, from 1995 based on Congress.  
b My own calculations based at Gallagher’s system 
 
 
Source: Electoral systems website, Department of Political Science, Trinity College, Dublin.   
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